From xen-announce-bounces@lists.xen.org Mon Apr 20 17:12:22 2015 Return-path: Envelope-to: archives@lists.xen.org Delivery-date: Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:12:22 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xen.org) by lists.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1YkFDz-0005Nl-W3; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:11:11 +0000 Received: from mail6.bemta3.messagelabs.com ([195.245.230.39]) by lists.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1YkFDy-0005Mn-5m; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:11:10 +0000 Received: from [85.158.137.68] by server-17.bemta-3.messagelabs.com id E4/10-14975-D2335355; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:11:09 +0000 X-Env-Sender: iwj@xenbits.xen.org X-Msg-Ref: server-4.tower-31.messagelabs.com!1429549867!18152542!1 X-Originating-IP: [50.57.168.107] X-SpamReason: No, hits=0.0 required=7.0 tests= X-StarScan-Received: X-StarScan-Version: 6.13.6; banners=-,-,- X-VirusChecked: Checked Received: (qmail 26105 invoked from network); 20 Apr 2015 17:11:08 -0000 Received: from mail.xen.org (HELO mail.xen.org) (50.57.168.107) by server-4.tower-31.messagelabs.com with AES256-SHA encrypted SMTP; 20 Apr 2015 17:11:08 -0000 Received: from xenbits.xen.org ([50.57.170.242]) by mail.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1YkFDn-00043P-AW; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:10:59 +0000 Received: from iwj by xenbits.xen.org with local (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1YkFDn-0002ye-1J; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:10:59 +0000 Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:10:59 +0000 Message-Id: Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=separator"; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: MIME-tools 5.428 (Entity 5.428) To: xen-announce@lists.xen.org, xen-devel@lists.xen.org, xen-users@lists.xen.org, oss-security@lists.openwall.com From: Xen.org security team Cc: "Xen.org security team" Subject: [Xen-announce] Xen Security Advisory 132 - Information leak through XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo X-BeenThere: xen-announce@lists.xen.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.13 Precedence: list List-Id: "Xen announcements \(low volume\)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-announce-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-announce-bounces@lists.xen.org --=separator Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory XSA-132 Information leak through XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= The handler for XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo failed to initialize a padding field subsequently copied to guest memory. A similar leak existed in XEN_SYSCTL_getdomaininfolist, which is being addressed here regardless of that operation being declared unsafe for disaggregation by XSA-77. IMPACT ====== Malicious or buggy stub domain kernels or tool stacks otherwise living outside of Domain0 may be able to read sensitive data relating to the hypervisor or other guests not under the control of that domain. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Xen 4.0.x and later are vulnerable. Only x86 systems are vulnerable. ARM systems are not vulnerable. The vulnerability is only exposed to service domains with privilege over another guest. In a usual configuration that means only device model emulators (qemu-dm) when these are running in a separate domain. In the case of HVM guests whose device model is running in an unrestricted dom0 process, qemu-dm already has the ability to cause problems for the whole system. So in that case the vulnerability is not applicable. This vulnerability is applicable for an HVM guest with a stub qemu-dm. That is, where the device model runs in a separate domain (in the case of xl, as requested by "device_model_stubdomain_override=1" in the xl domain configuration file). In this case a guest which has already exploited another vulnerability, to gain control of the device model, would be able to exercise the information leak. However, the security of a system with qemu-dm running in a stub domain is still better than with a qemu-dm running as an unrestricted dom0 process. Therefore users with these configurations should not switch to an unrestricted dom0 qemu-dm. Finally, in a radically disaggregated system, where the service domain software (probably, the device model domain image in the HVM case) is not always supplied by the host administrator, a malicious service domain administrator can exercise this vulnerability. MITIGATION ========== There is no mitigation available. In a radically disaggregated system, restricting HVM service domains to software images approved by the host administrator will avoid the vulnerability (so long as there isn't also a vulnerability in the service domain). NOTE REGARDING LACK OF EMBARGO ============================== The fix for this bug was publicly posted on xen-devel, before it was appreciated that there was a security problem. CREDITS ======= This issue was recognized as security issue by Jan Beulich of SUSE. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa132-unstable.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.5.x, Xen 4.4.x, Xen 4.3.x xsa132-4.2.patch Xen 4.2.x $ sha256sum xsa132*.patch 3a28eb33c02360ec22c51824e469b1cf6be87941256d0b3aa34a5bd1d7735328 xsa132-4.2.patch 329d4edf1e1133795ece41f2fc8887c5f4cc06b42ced63c810c610b17bcee46d xsa132.patch $ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVNTMVAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZ5gIH/iMl92WIuN+lJhnU4J4syaMm vQ6B2yPXPnaTHOOLvnFUvzvv+iavyF8m0BVtRCKweS1x4Y1LtzUdE0WSMMxbu673 YGYX9Dplze9iR21+wAugrQ1hoh+na+oOrr+MHeQdNlbxF2+NHv9VtZ17XE3bFsHy gUn4NnUzdWsaJYJTncBryj5hXDTlhPy6CWY/4oOrF4s1pwwv9f+AEEObXPPu8kGk fIhMMBz8b9Pcc7Zn8ALemqApGzVKnimHTwDdPWLy6Cfyzq0ttDpOJHcM4citn5DK GqN/0ebzdswxqnzhztq/FiUn4Tvzxw1T+qr00Q4y+f24s8OO1W/Np08t3JiUMaI= =8POv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=separator Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="xsa132-4.2.patch" Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="xsa132-4.2.patch" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 ZG9tY3RsL3N5c2N0bDogZG9uJ3QgbGVhayBoeXBlcnZpc29yIHN0YWNrIHRv IHRvb2xzdGFja3MKClRoaXMgaXMgWFNBLTEzMi4KClNpZ25lZC1vZmYtYnk6 IEFuZHJldyBDb29wZXIgPGFuZHJldy5jb29wZXIzQGNpdHJpeC5jb20+ClJl dmlld2VkLWJ5OiBKYW4gQmV1bGljaCA8amJldWxpY2hAc3VzZS5jb20+Cgot LS0gYS94ZW4vYXJjaC94ODYvZG9tY3RsLmMKKysrIGIveGVuL2FyY2gveDg2 L2RvbWN0bC5jCkBAIC0xMjAwLDcgKzEyMDAsNyBAQCBsb25nIGFyY2hfZG9f ZG9tY3RsKAogICAgIGNhc2UgWEVOX0RPTUNUTF9nZXR0c2NpbmZvOgogICAg IHsKICAgICAgICAgc3RydWN0IGRvbWFpbiAqZDsKLSAgICAgICAgeGVuX2d1 ZXN0X3RzY19pbmZvX3QgaW5mbzsKKyAgICAgICAgeGVuX2d1ZXN0X3RzY19p bmZvX3QgaW5mbyA9IHsgMCB9OwogCiAgICAgICAgIHJldCA9IC1FU1JDSDsK ICAgICAgICAgZCA9IHJjdV9sb2NrX2RvbWFpbl9ieV9pZChkb21jdGwtPmRv bWFpbik7Ci0tLSBhL3hlbi9jb21tb24vc3lzY3RsLmMKKysrIGIveGVuL2Nv bW1vbi9zeXNjdGwuYwpAQCAtOTUsNyArOTUsNyBAQCBsb25nIGRvX3N5c2N0 bChYRU5fR1VFU1RfSEFORExFX1BBUkFNKHhlCiAgICAgY2FzZSBYRU5fU1lT Q1RMX2dldGRvbWFpbmluZm9saXN0OgogICAgIHsgCiAgICAgICAgIHN0cnVj dCBkb21haW4gKmQ7Ci0gICAgICAgIHN0cnVjdCB4ZW5fZG9tY3RsX2dldGRv bWFpbmluZm8gaW5mbzsKKyAgICAgICAgc3RydWN0IHhlbl9kb21jdGxfZ2V0 ZG9tYWluaW5mbyBpbmZvID0geyAwIH07CiAgICAgICAgIHUzMiBudW1fZG9t YWlucyA9IDA7CiAKICAgICAgICAgcmN1X3JlYWRfbG9jaygmZG9tbGlzdF9y ZWFkX2xvY2spOwo= --=separator Content-Type: application/octet-stream; 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charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline _______________________________________________ Xen-announce mailing list Xen-announce@lists.xen.org http://lists.xen.org/xen-announce --=separator-- From xen-announce-bounces@lists.xen.org Mon Apr 20 17:12:22 2015 Return-path: Envelope-to: archives@lists.xen.org Delivery-date: Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:12:22 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xen.org) by lists.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1YkFDz-0005Nl-W3; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:11:11 +0000 Received: from mail6.bemta3.messagelabs.com ([195.245.230.39]) by lists.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1YkFDy-0005Mn-5m; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:11:10 +0000 Received: from [85.158.137.68] by server-17.bemta-3.messagelabs.com id E4/10-14975-D2335355; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:11:09 +0000 X-Env-Sender: iwj@xenbits.xen.org X-Msg-Ref: server-4.tower-31.messagelabs.com!1429549867!18152542!1 X-Originating-IP: [50.57.168.107] X-SpamReason: No, hits=0.0 required=7.0 tests= X-StarScan-Received: X-StarScan-Version: 6.13.6; banners=-,-,- X-VirusChecked: Checked Received: (qmail 26105 invoked from network); 20 Apr 2015 17:11:08 -0000 Received: from mail.xen.org (HELO mail.xen.org) (50.57.168.107) by server-4.tower-31.messagelabs.com with AES256-SHA encrypted SMTP; 20 Apr 2015 17:11:08 -0000 Received: from xenbits.xen.org ([50.57.170.242]) by mail.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1YkFDn-00043P-AW; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:10:59 +0000 Received: from iwj by xenbits.xen.org with local (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1YkFDn-0002ye-1J; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:10:59 +0000 Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:10:59 +0000 Message-Id: Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=separator"; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: MIME-tools 5.428 (Entity 5.428) To: xen-announce@lists.xen.org, xen-devel@lists.xen.org, xen-users@lists.xen.org, oss-security@lists.openwall.com From: Xen.org security team Cc: "Xen.org security team" Subject: [Xen-announce] Xen Security Advisory 132 - Information leak through XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo X-BeenThere: xen-announce@lists.xen.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.13 Precedence: list List-Id: "Xen announcements \(low volume\)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-announce-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-announce-bounces@lists.xen.org --=separator Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory XSA-132 Information leak through XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= The handler for XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo failed to initialize a padding field subsequently copied to guest memory. A similar leak existed in XEN_SYSCTL_getdomaininfolist, which is being addressed here regardless of that operation being declared unsafe for disaggregation by XSA-77. IMPACT ====== Malicious or buggy stub domain kernels or tool stacks otherwise living outside of Domain0 may be able to read sensitive data relating to the hypervisor or other guests not under the control of that domain. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Xen 4.0.x and later are vulnerable. Only x86 systems are vulnerable. ARM systems are not vulnerable. The vulnerability is only exposed to service domains with privilege over another guest. In a usual configuration that means only device model emulators (qemu-dm) when these are running in a separate domain. In the case of HVM guests whose device model is running in an unrestricted dom0 process, qemu-dm already has the ability to cause problems for the whole system. So in that case the vulnerability is not applicable. This vulnerability is applicable for an HVM guest with a stub qemu-dm. That is, where the device model runs in a separate domain (in the case of xl, as requested by "device_model_stubdomain_override=1" in the xl domain configuration file). In this case a guest which has already exploited another vulnerability, to gain control of the device model, would be able to exercise the information leak. However, the security of a system with qemu-dm running in a stub domain is still better than with a qemu-dm running as an unrestricted dom0 process. Therefore users with these configurations should not switch to an unrestricted dom0 qemu-dm. Finally, in a radically disaggregated system, where the service domain software (probably, the device model domain image in the HVM case) is not always supplied by the host administrator, a malicious service domain administrator can exercise this vulnerability. MITIGATION ========== There is no mitigation available. In a radically disaggregated system, restricting HVM service domains to software images approved by the host administrator will avoid the vulnerability (so long as there isn't also a vulnerability in the service domain). NOTE REGARDING LACK OF EMBARGO ============================== The fix for this bug was publicly posted on xen-devel, before it was appreciated that there was a security problem. CREDITS ======= This issue was recognized as security issue by Jan Beulich of SUSE. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa132-unstable.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.5.x, Xen 4.4.x, Xen 4.3.x xsa132-4.2.patch Xen 4.2.x $ sha256sum xsa132*.patch 3a28eb33c02360ec22c51824e469b1cf6be87941256d0b3aa34a5bd1d7735328 xsa132-4.2.patch 329d4edf1e1133795ece41f2fc8887c5f4cc06b42ced63c810c610b17bcee46d xsa132.patch $ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVNTMVAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZ5gIH/iMl92WIuN+lJhnU4J4syaMm vQ6B2yPXPnaTHOOLvnFUvzvv+iavyF8m0BVtRCKweS1x4Y1LtzUdE0WSMMxbu673 YGYX9Dplze9iR21+wAugrQ1hoh+na+oOrr+MHeQdNlbxF2+NHv9VtZ17XE3bFsHy gUn4NnUzdWsaJYJTncBryj5hXDTlhPy6CWY/4oOrF4s1pwwv9f+AEEObXPPu8kGk fIhMMBz8b9Pcc7Zn8ALemqApGzVKnimHTwDdPWLy6Cfyzq0ttDpOJHcM4citn5DK GqN/0ebzdswxqnzhztq/FiUn4Tvzxw1T+qr00Q4y+f24s8OO1W/Np08t3JiUMaI= =8POv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=separator Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="xsa132-4.2.patch" Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="xsa132-4.2.patch" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 ZG9tY3RsL3N5c2N0bDogZG9uJ3QgbGVhayBoeXBlcnZpc29yIHN0YWNrIHRv IHRvb2xzdGFja3MKClRoaXMgaXMgWFNBLTEzMi4KClNpZ25lZC1vZmYtYnk6 IEFuZHJldyBDb29wZXIgPGFuZHJldy5jb29wZXIzQGNpdHJpeC5jb20+ClJl dmlld2VkLWJ5OiBKYW4gQmV1bGljaCA8amJldWxpY2hAc3VzZS5jb20+Cgot LS0gYS94ZW4vYXJjaC94ODYvZG9tY3RsLmMKKysrIGIveGVuL2FyY2gveDg2 L2RvbWN0bC5jCkBAIC0xMjAwLDcgKzEyMDAsNyBAQCBsb25nIGFyY2hfZG9f ZG9tY3RsKAogICAgIGNhc2UgWEVOX0RPTUNUTF9nZXR0c2NpbmZvOgogICAg IHsKICAgICAgICAgc3RydWN0IGRvbWFpbiAqZDsKLSAgICAgICAgeGVuX2d1 ZXN0X3RzY19pbmZvX3QgaW5mbzsKKyAgICAgICAgeGVuX2d1ZXN0X3RzY19p bmZvX3QgaW5mbyA9IHsgMCB9OwogCiAgICAgICAgIHJldCA9IC1FU1JDSDsK ICAgICAgICAgZCA9IHJjdV9sb2NrX2RvbWFpbl9ieV9pZChkb21jdGwtPmRv bWFpbik7Ci0tLSBhL3hlbi9jb21tb24vc3lzY3RsLmMKKysrIGIveGVuL2Nv bW1vbi9zeXNjdGwuYwpAQCAtOTUsNyArOTUsNyBAQCBsb25nIGRvX3N5c2N0 bChYRU5fR1VFU1RfSEFORExFX1BBUkFNKHhlCiAgICAgY2FzZSBYRU5fU1lT Q1RMX2dldGRvbWFpbmluZm9saXN0OgogICAgIHsgCiAgICAgICAgIHN0cnVj dCBkb21haW4gKmQ7Ci0gICAgICAgIHN0cnVjdCB4ZW5fZG9tY3RsX2dldGRv bWFpbmluZm8gaW5mbzsKKyAgICAgICAgc3RydWN0IHhlbl9kb21jdGxfZ2V0 ZG9tYWluaW5mbyBpbmZvID0geyAwIH07CiAgICAgICAgIHUzMiBudW1fZG9t YWlucyA9IDA7CiAKICAgICAgICAgcmN1X3JlYWRfbG9jaygmZG9tbGlzdF9y ZWFkX2xvY2spOwo= --=separator Content-Type: application/octet-stream; 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charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline _______________________________________________ Xen-announce mailing list Xen-announce@lists.xen.org http://lists.xen.org/xen-announce --=separator-- From xen-announce-bounces@lists.xen.org Wed Apr 22 13:22:47 2015 Return-path: Envelope-to: archives@lists.xen.org Delivery-date: Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:22:47 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xen.org) by lists.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1Ykuaw-0000MX-VA; Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:21:38 +0000 Received: from mail6.bemta3.messagelabs.com ([195.245.230.39]) by lists.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1Ykuau-0000M9-Uh; Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:21:37 +0000 Received: from [85.158.137.68] by server-5.bemta-3.messagelabs.com id 12/5A-23555-F50A7355; Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:21:35 +0000 X-Env-Sender: iwj@xenbits.xen.org X-Msg-Ref: server-5.tower-31.messagelabs.com!1429708888!18883281!1 X-Originating-IP: [50.57.168.107] X-SpamReason: No, hits=0.0 required=7.0 tests= X-StarScan-Received: X-StarScan-Version: 6.13.6; banners=-,-,- X-VirusChecked: Checked Received: (qmail 25972 invoked from network); 22 Apr 2015 13:21:29 -0000 Received: from mail.xen.org (HELO mail.xen.org) (50.57.168.107) by server-5.tower-31.messagelabs.com with AES256-SHA encrypted SMTP; 22 Apr 2015 13:21:29 -0000 Received: from xenbits.xen.org ([50.57.170.242]) by mail.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1Ykuae-0008Vy-SA; Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:21:20 +0000 Received: from iwj by xenbits.xen.org with local (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1Ykuae-0001bB-4K; Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:21:20 +0000 Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:21:20 +0000 Message-Id: Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=separator"; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: MIME-tools 5.428 (Entity 5.428) To: xen-announce@lists.xen.org, xen-devel@lists.xen.org, xen-users@lists.xen.org, oss-security@lists.openwall.com From: Xen.org security team Cc: "Xen.org security team" Subject: [Xen-announce] Xen Security Advisory 132 (CVE-2015-3340) - Information leak through XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo X-BeenThere: xen-announce@lists.xen.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.13 Precedence: list List-Id: "Xen announcements \(low volume\)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-announce-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-announce-bounces@lists.xen.org --=separator Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2015-3340 / XSA-132 version 2 Information leak through XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo UPDATES IN VERSION 2 ==================== CVE assigned. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= The handler for XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo failed to initialize a padding field subsequently copied to guest memory. A similar leak existed in XEN_SYSCTL_getdomaininfolist, which is being addressed here regardless of that operation being declared unsafe for disaggregation by XSA-77. IMPACT ====== Malicious or buggy stub domain kernels or tool stacks otherwise living outside of Domain0 may be able to read sensitive data relating to the hypervisor or other guests not under the control of that domain. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Xen 4.0.x and later are vulnerable. Only x86 systems are vulnerable. ARM systems are not vulnerable. The vulnerability is only exposed to service domains with privilege over another guest. In a usual configuration that means only device model emulators (qemu-dm) when these are running in a separate domain. In the case of HVM guests whose device model is running in an unrestricted dom0 process, qemu-dm already has the ability to cause problems for the whole system. So in that case the vulnerability is not applicable. This vulnerability is applicable for an HVM guest with a stub qemu-dm. That is, where the device model runs in a separate domain (in the case of xl, as requested by "device_model_stubdomain_override=1" in the xl domain configuration file). In this case a guest which has already exploited another vulnerability, to gain control of the device model, would be able to exercise the information leak. However, the security of a system with qemu-dm running in a stub domain is still better than with a qemu-dm running as an unrestricted dom0 process. Therefore users with these configurations should not switch to an unrestricted dom0 qemu-dm. Finally, in a radically disaggregated system, where the service domain software (probably, the device model domain image in the HVM case) is not always supplied by the host administrator, a malicious service domain administrator can exercise this vulnerability. MITIGATION ========== There is no mitigation available. In a radically disaggregated system, restricting HVM service domains to software images approved by the host administrator will avoid the vulnerability (so long as there isn't also a vulnerability in the service domain). NOTE REGARDING LACK OF EMBARGO ============================== The fix for this bug was publicly posted on xen-devel, before it was appreciated that there was a security problem. CREDITS ======= This issue was recognized as security issue by Jan Beulich of SUSE. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa132-unstable.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.5.x, Xen 4.4.x, Xen 4.3.x xsa132-4.2.patch Xen 4.2.x $ sha256sum xsa132*.patch 3a28eb33c02360ec22c51824e469b1cf6be87941256d0b3aa34a5bd1d7735328 xsa132-4.2.patch 329d4edf1e1133795ece41f2fc8887c5f4cc06b42ced63c810c610b17bcee46d xsa132.patch $ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVN6AYAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZ6R8H/Rq4H94uwp/c8mYM/DHFJf1S YXWGD7jtYYAArAKwG+b3mDYQVzaDhsUR76jS6lssoSWQbSHmqzAKWjZ01Rd5EQDW PqLNwtmIkj9hXCxJdpNubxbr12j0TWzIAOpsUj5alDoy7TaNVMNLG7zSj+jOyNzp uCgIo7TGwWu6OS1xBYZay18oTjv8rEifQgJ8CBRUZHG+xezm94Gbz0iJaonm4bY3 Rjl7U3hfk0O74ncthHOJM5bVTXyDefxeZsR1xkRIWk15GSZ9FXguwfny/m0NQC7Y 7OfGyOyOT27AbxYTOnn30XYwmPAzhw1jrEpdbAwSjxvzRe9iKoxwhezrzgXQ+Q0= =1c8S -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=separator Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="xsa132-4.2.patch" Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="xsa132-4.2.patch" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 ZG9tY3RsL3N5c2N0bDogZG9uJ3QgbGVhayBoeXBlcnZpc29yIHN0YWNrIHRv IHRvb2xzdGFja3MKClRoaXMgaXMgWFNBLTEzMi4KClNpZ25lZC1vZmYtYnk6 IEFuZHJldyBDb29wZXIgPGFuZHJldy5jb29wZXIzQGNpdHJpeC5jb20+ClJl dmlld2VkLWJ5OiBKYW4gQmV1bGljaCA8amJldWxpY2hAc3VzZS5jb20+Cgot LS0gYS94ZW4vYXJjaC94ODYvZG9tY3RsLmMKKysrIGIveGVuL2FyY2gveDg2 L2RvbWN0bC5jCkBAIC0xMjAwLDcgKzEyMDAsNyBAQCBsb25nIGFyY2hfZG9f ZG9tY3RsKAogICAgIGNhc2UgWEVOX0RPTUNUTF9nZXR0c2NpbmZvOgogICAg IHsKICAgICAgICAgc3RydWN0IGRvbWFpbiAqZDsKLSAgICAgICAgeGVuX2d1 ZXN0X3RzY19pbmZvX3QgaW5mbzsKKyAgICAgICAgeGVuX2d1ZXN0X3RzY19p bmZvX3QgaW5mbyA9IHsgMCB9OwogCiAgICAgICAgIHJldCA9IC1FU1JDSDsK ICAgICAgICAgZCA9IHJjdV9sb2NrX2RvbWFpbl9ieV9pZChkb21jdGwtPmRv bWFpbik7Ci0tLSBhL3hlbi9jb21tb24vc3lzY3RsLmMKKysrIGIveGVuL2Nv bW1vbi9zeXNjdGwuYwpAQCAtOTUsNyArOTUsNyBAQCBsb25nIGRvX3N5c2N0 bChYRU5fR1VFU1RfSEFORExFX1BBUkFNKHhlCiAgICAgY2FzZSBYRU5fU1lT Q1RMX2dldGRvbWFpbmluZm9saXN0OgogICAgIHsgCiAgICAgICAgIHN0cnVj dCBkb21haW4gKmQ7Ci0gICAgICAgIHN0cnVjdCB4ZW5fZG9tY3RsX2dldGRv bWFpbmluZm8gaW5mbzsKKyAgICAgICAgc3RydWN0IHhlbl9kb21jdGxfZ2V0 ZG9tYWluaW5mbyBpbmZvID0geyAwIH07CiAgICAgICAgIHUzMiBudW1fZG9t YWlucyA9IDA7CiAKICAgICAgICAgcmN1X3JlYWRfbG9jaygmZG9tbGlzdF9y ZWFkX2xvY2spOwo= --=separator Content-Type: application/octet-stream; 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charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline _______________________________________________ Xen-announce mailing list Xen-announce@lists.xen.org http://lists.xen.org/xen-announce --=separator-- From xen-announce-bounces@lists.xen.org Wed Apr 22 13:22:47 2015 Return-path: Envelope-to: archives@lists.xen.org Delivery-date: Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:22:47 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xen.org) by lists.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1Ykuaw-0000MX-VA; Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:21:38 +0000 Received: from mail6.bemta3.messagelabs.com ([195.245.230.39]) by lists.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1Ykuau-0000M9-Uh; Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:21:37 +0000 Received: from [85.158.137.68] by server-5.bemta-3.messagelabs.com id 12/5A-23555-F50A7355; Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:21:35 +0000 X-Env-Sender: iwj@xenbits.xen.org X-Msg-Ref: server-5.tower-31.messagelabs.com!1429708888!18883281!1 X-Originating-IP: [50.57.168.107] X-SpamReason: No, hits=0.0 required=7.0 tests= X-StarScan-Received: X-StarScan-Version: 6.13.6; banners=-,-,- X-VirusChecked: Checked Received: (qmail 25972 invoked from network); 22 Apr 2015 13:21:29 -0000 Received: from mail.xen.org (HELO mail.xen.org) (50.57.168.107) by server-5.tower-31.messagelabs.com with AES256-SHA encrypted SMTP; 22 Apr 2015 13:21:29 -0000 Received: from xenbits.xen.org ([50.57.170.242]) by mail.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1Ykuae-0008Vy-SA; Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:21:20 +0000 Received: from iwj by xenbits.xen.org with local (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1Ykuae-0001bB-4K; Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:21:20 +0000 Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2015 13:21:20 +0000 Message-Id: Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=separator"; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: MIME-tools 5.428 (Entity 5.428) To: xen-announce@lists.xen.org, xen-devel@lists.xen.org, xen-users@lists.xen.org, oss-security@lists.openwall.com From: Xen.org security team Cc: "Xen.org security team" Subject: [Xen-announce] Xen Security Advisory 132 (CVE-2015-3340) - Information leak through XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo X-BeenThere: xen-announce@lists.xen.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.13 Precedence: list List-Id: "Xen announcements \(low volume\)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-announce-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-announce-bounces@lists.xen.org --=separator Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2015-3340 / XSA-132 version 2 Information leak through XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo UPDATES IN VERSION 2 ==================== CVE assigned. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= The handler for XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo failed to initialize a padding field subsequently copied to guest memory. A similar leak existed in XEN_SYSCTL_getdomaininfolist, which is being addressed here regardless of that operation being declared unsafe for disaggregation by XSA-77. IMPACT ====== Malicious or buggy stub domain kernels or tool stacks otherwise living outside of Domain0 may be able to read sensitive data relating to the hypervisor or other guests not under the control of that domain. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Xen 4.0.x and later are vulnerable. Only x86 systems are vulnerable. ARM systems are not vulnerable. The vulnerability is only exposed to service domains with privilege over another guest. In a usual configuration that means only device model emulators (qemu-dm) when these are running in a separate domain. In the case of HVM guests whose device model is running in an unrestricted dom0 process, qemu-dm already has the ability to cause problems for the whole system. So in that case the vulnerability is not applicable. This vulnerability is applicable for an HVM guest with a stub qemu-dm. That is, where the device model runs in a separate domain (in the case of xl, as requested by "device_model_stubdomain_override=1" in the xl domain configuration file). In this case a guest which has already exploited another vulnerability, to gain control of the device model, would be able to exercise the information leak. However, the security of a system with qemu-dm running in a stub domain is still better than with a qemu-dm running as an unrestricted dom0 process. Therefore users with these configurations should not switch to an unrestricted dom0 qemu-dm. Finally, in a radically disaggregated system, where the service domain software (probably, the device model domain image in the HVM case) is not always supplied by the host administrator, a malicious service domain administrator can exercise this vulnerability. MITIGATION ========== There is no mitigation available. In a radically disaggregated system, restricting HVM service domains to software images approved by the host administrator will avoid the vulnerability (so long as there isn't also a vulnerability in the service domain). NOTE REGARDING LACK OF EMBARGO ============================== The fix for this bug was publicly posted on xen-devel, before it was appreciated that there was a security problem. CREDITS ======= This issue was recognized as security issue by Jan Beulich of SUSE. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa132-unstable.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.5.x, Xen 4.4.x, Xen 4.3.x xsa132-4.2.patch Xen 4.2.x $ sha256sum xsa132*.patch 3a28eb33c02360ec22c51824e469b1cf6be87941256d0b3aa34a5bd1d7735328 xsa132-4.2.patch 329d4edf1e1133795ece41f2fc8887c5f4cc06b42ced63c810c610b17bcee46d xsa132.patch $ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVN6AYAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZ6R8H/Rq4H94uwp/c8mYM/DHFJf1S YXWGD7jtYYAArAKwG+b3mDYQVzaDhsUR76jS6lssoSWQbSHmqzAKWjZ01Rd5EQDW PqLNwtmIkj9hXCxJdpNubxbr12j0TWzIAOpsUj5alDoy7TaNVMNLG7zSj+jOyNzp uCgIo7TGwWu6OS1xBYZay18oTjv8rEifQgJ8CBRUZHG+xezm94Gbz0iJaonm4bY3 Rjl7U3hfk0O74ncthHOJM5bVTXyDefxeZsR1xkRIWk15GSZ9FXguwfny/m0NQC7Y 7OfGyOyOT27AbxYTOnn30XYwmPAzhw1jrEpdbAwSjxvzRe9iKoxwhezrzgXQ+Q0= =1c8S -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=separator Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="xsa132-4.2.patch" Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="xsa132-4.2.patch" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 ZG9tY3RsL3N5c2N0bDogZG9uJ3QgbGVhayBoeXBlcnZpc29yIHN0YWNrIHRv IHRvb2xzdGFja3MKClRoaXMgaXMgWFNBLTEzMi4KClNpZ25lZC1vZmYtYnk6 IEFuZHJldyBDb29wZXIgPGFuZHJldy5jb29wZXIzQGNpdHJpeC5jb20+ClJl dmlld2VkLWJ5OiBKYW4gQmV1bGljaCA8amJldWxpY2hAc3VzZS5jb20+Cgot LS0gYS94ZW4vYXJjaC94ODYvZG9tY3RsLmMKKysrIGIveGVuL2FyY2gveDg2 L2RvbWN0bC5jCkBAIC0xMjAwLDcgKzEyMDAsNyBAQCBsb25nIGFyY2hfZG9f ZG9tY3RsKAogICAgIGNhc2UgWEVOX0RPTUNUTF9nZXR0c2NpbmZvOgogICAg IHsKICAgICAgICAgc3RydWN0IGRvbWFpbiAqZDsKLSAgICAgICAgeGVuX2d1 ZXN0X3RzY19pbmZvX3QgaW5mbzsKKyAgICAgICAgeGVuX2d1ZXN0X3RzY19p bmZvX3QgaW5mbyA9IHsgMCB9OwogCiAgICAgICAgIHJldCA9IC1FU1JDSDsK ICAgICAgICAgZCA9IHJjdV9sb2NrX2RvbWFpbl9ieV9pZChkb21jdGwtPmRv bWFpbik7Ci0tLSBhL3hlbi9jb21tb24vc3lzY3RsLmMKKysrIGIveGVuL2Nv bW1vbi9zeXNjdGwuYwpAQCAtOTUsNyArOTUsNyBAQCBsb25nIGRvX3N5c2N0 bChYRU5fR1VFU1RfSEFORExFX1BBUkFNKHhlCiAgICAgY2FzZSBYRU5fU1lT Q1RMX2dldGRvbWFpbmluZm9saXN0OgogICAgIHsgCiAgICAgICAgIHN0cnVj dCBkb21haW4gKmQ7Ci0gICAgICAgIHN0cnVjdCB4ZW5fZG9tY3RsX2dldGRv bWFpbmluZm8gaW5mbzsKKyAgICAgICAgc3RydWN0IHhlbl9kb21jdGxfZ2V0 ZG9tYWluaW5mbyBpbmZvID0geyAwIH07CiAgICAgICAgIHUzMiBudW1fZG9t YWlucyA9IDA7CiAKICAgICAgICAgcmN1X3JlYWRfbG9jaygmZG9tbGlzdF9y ZWFkX2xvY2spOwo= --=separator Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="xsa132.patch" Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="xsa132.patch" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 ZG9tY3RsL3N5c2N0bDogZG9uJ3QgbGVhayBoeXBlcnZpc29yIHN0YWNrIHRv IHRvb2xzdGFja3MKClRoaXMgaXMgWFNBLTEzMi4KClNpZ25lZC1vZmYtYnk6 IEFuZHJldyBDb29wZXIgPGFuZHJldy5jb29wZXIzQGNpdHJpeC5jb20+ClJl dmlld2VkLWJ5OiBKYW4gQmV1bGljaCA8amJldWxpY2hAc3VzZS5jb20+Cgot LS0gYS94ZW4vYXJjaC94ODYvZG9tY3RsLmMKKysrIGIveGVuL2FyY2gveDg2 L2RvbWN0bC5jCkBAIC04ODQsNyArODg0LDcgQEAgbG9uZyBhcmNoX2RvX2Rv bWN0bCgKIAogICAgIGNhc2UgWEVOX0RPTUNUTF9nZXR0c2NpbmZvOgogICAg IHsKLSAgICAgICAgeGVuX2d1ZXN0X3RzY19pbmZvX3QgaW5mbzsKKyAgICAg ICAgeGVuX2d1ZXN0X3RzY19pbmZvX3QgaW5mbyA9IHsgMCB9OwogCiAgICAg ICAgIHJldCA9IC1FSU5WQUw7CiAgICAgICAgIGlmICggZCA9PSBjdXJyZW50 LT5kb21haW4gKSAvKiBubyBkb21haW5fcGF1c2UoKSAqLwotLS0gYS94ZW4v Y29tbW9uL3N5c2N0bC5jCisrKyBiL3hlbi9jb21tb24vc3lzY3RsLmMKQEAg LTc2LDcgKzc2LDcgQEAgbG9uZyBkb19zeXNjdGwoWEVOX0dVRVNUX0hBTkRM RV9QQVJBTSh4ZQogICAgIGNhc2UgWEVOX1NZU0NUTF9nZXRkb21haW5pbmZv bGlzdDoKICAgICB7IAogICAgICAgICBzdHJ1Y3QgZG9tYWluICpkOwotICAg ICAgICBzdHJ1Y3QgeGVuX2RvbWN0bF9nZXRkb21haW5pbmZvIGluZm87Cisg ICAgICAgIHN0cnVjdCB4ZW5fZG9tY3RsX2dldGRvbWFpbmluZm8gaW5mbyA9 IHsgMCB9OwogICAgICAgICB1MzIgbnVtX2RvbWFpbnMgPSAwOwogCiAgICAg ICAgIHJjdV9yZWFkX2xvY2soJmRvbWxpc3RfcmVhZF9sb2NrKTsK --=separator Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline _______________________________________________ Xen-announce mailing list Xen-announce@lists.xen.org http://lists.xen.org/xen-announce --=separator--