[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen-unstable-smoke test] 133452: trouble: blocked/broken
flight 133452 xen-unstable-smoke real [real] http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/133452/ Failures and problems with tests :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: build-amd64 <job status> broken build-arm64-xsm <job status> broken build-armhf <job status> broken build-amd64 4 host-install(4) broken REGR. vs. 133382 build-arm64-xsm 4 host-install(4) broken REGR. vs. 133382 build-armhf 4 host-install(4) broken REGR. vs. 133382 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-i386 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a build-amd64-libvirt 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-armhf-armhf-xl 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a version targeted for testing: xen 346e7d0f4b2179b9e0b09f4ebc98cbb3aae39a2c baseline version: xen e72ecc7615410e5bf1a1c9a4c7772322c16eeb82 Last test of basis 133382 2019-02-22 22:00:38 Z 4 days Failing since 133430 2019-02-25 23:00:55 Z 1 days 7 attempts Testing same since 133446 2019-02-26 20:00:42 Z 0 days 3 attempts ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> jobs: build-arm64-xsm broken build-amd64 broken build-armhf broken build-amd64-libvirt blocked test-armhf-armhf-xl blocked test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-i386 blocked test-amd64-amd64-libvirt blocked ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org logs: /home/logs/logs images: /home/logs/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs Explanation of these reports, and of osstest in general, is at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README.email;hb=master http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README;hb=master Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary broken-job build-amd64 broken broken-job build-arm64-xsm broken broken-job build-armhf broken broken-step build-amd64 host-install(4) broken-step build-arm64-xsm host-install(4) broken-step build-armhf host-install(4) Not pushing. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit 346e7d0f4b2179b9e0b09f4ebc98cbb3aae39a2c Author: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Feb 26 16:57:56 2019 +0100 x86/vioapic: block speculative out-of-bound accesses When interacting with io apic, a guest can specify values that are used as index to structures, and whose values are not compared against upper bounds to prevent speculative out-of-bound accesses. This change prevents these speculative accesses. Furthermore, variables are initialized and the compiler is asked to not optimized these initializations, as the uninitialized variables might be used in a speculative out-of-bound access. Out of the four initialized variables, two are potentially problematic, namely ones in the functions vioapic_irq_positive_edge and vioapic_get_trigger_mode. As the two problematic variables are both used in the common function gsi_vioapic, the mitigation is implemented there. As the access pattern of the currently non-guest-controlled functions might change in the future as well, the other variables are initialized as well. This is part of the speculative hardening effort. Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> commit 443d3ab6daee9bf77ec1cb2ea7e252fb0ce616a8 Author: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Feb 26 16:57:18 2019 +0100 evtchn: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Guests can issue event channel interaction with guest specified data. To avoid speculative out-of-bound accesses, we use the nospec macros, or the domain_vcpu function. Where appropriate, we use the vcpu_id of the seleceted vcpu instead of the parameter that can be influenced by the guest, so that only one access needs to be protected. This is part of the speculative hardening effort. Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> commit 43282a5e64da26fad544e0100abf35048cf65b46 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Feb 26 16:56:26 2019 +0100 x86/shadow: don't use map_domain_page_global() on paths that may not fail The assumption (according to one comment) and hope (according to another) that map_domain_page_global() can't fail are both wrong on large enough systems. Do away with the guest_vtable field altogether, and establish / tear down the desired mapping as necessary. The alternatives, discarded as being undesirable, would have been to either crash the guest in sh_update_cr3() when the mapping fails, or to bubble up an error indicator, which upper layers would have a hard time to deal with (other than again by crashing the guest). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> commit ce98ee3050a824994ce4957faa8f53ecb8c7da9d Author: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Feb 26 16:55:06 2019 +0100 viridian: fix the HvFlushVirtualAddress/List hypercall implementation The current code uses hvm_asid_flush_vcpu() but this is insufficient for a guest running in shadow mode, which results in guest crashes early in boot if the 'hcall_remote_tlb_flush' is enabled. This patch, instead of open coding a new flush algorithm, adapts the one already used by the HVMOP_flush_tlbs Xen hypercall. The implementation is modified to allow TLB flushing a subset of a domain's vCPUs. A callback function determines whether or not a vCPU requires flushing. This mechanism was chosen because, while it is the case that the currently implemented viridian hypercalls specify a vCPU mask, there are newer variants which specify a sparse HV_VP_SET and thus use of a callback will avoid needing to expose details of this outside of the viridian subsystem if and when those newer variants are implemented. NOTE: Use of the common flush function requires that the hypercalls are restartable and so, with this patch applied, viridian_hypercall() can now return HVM_HCALL_preempted. This is safe as no modification to struct cpu_user_regs is done before the return. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> commit 1c858928009c51178a9c6cac9e42343ee81dfe37 Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Date: Mon Feb 18 10:21:06 2019 +0000 xen/arm: domain_build: Panic message should end with a newline Since commit 25eb5eec79 "xen: Fix inconsistent callers of panic()" all the panic message should end with a newline. Unfortunately, some commits pushed afterwards does not follow the rule. Modify the offending panic messages to avoid more inconsistency. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> commit cc85de570c7ed91b32f123bef35e4ac2692cbfef Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Date: Mon Feb 18 10:14:36 2019 +0000 xen/arm: domain_build: Require the property "cpus" when building a domU The 3rd argument of function dt_property_read_u32() is only valid when the call succeeded. So we cannot assume the value will not be modifed in case of failure. The documentation of Dom0less does not give a default value when the property "cpus" is not set. So require the property in the configuration. Coverity-ID: 1476825 Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> commit 83ba64c3ebf0e8d3834e3e5b79acb2ceb2cd9bba Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Date: Mon Feb 18 09:42:27 2019 +0000 xen/arm: psci: Populate arm_smccc_res on PSCI_FEATURES call Commit 0bc6a68da5 "xen/arm: Replace call_smc with arm_smccc_smc" mistakenly forgot to populate arm_smccc_res. So a garbage value was used as return value. Coverity-ID: 1476827 Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ osstest-output mailing list osstest-output@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/osstest-output
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