[Xen-changelog] Remove definition of NR_PIRQS and replace all uses with

[Xen patchbot -unstable <patchbot-unstable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

# HG changeset patch
# User kaf24@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
# Node ID 0ee104bd65570382ac408ccaa480192d9d047452
# Parent  42a8e3101c6c45687d74a213abb3a2723f2cac62
Remove definition of NR_PIRQS and replace all uses with
NR_IRQS. Allows removal of redundant check in pirq_guest_bind().

Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

diff -r 42a8e3101c6c -r 0ee104bd6557 xen/arch/ia64/xen/domain.c
--- a/xen/arch/ia64/xen/domain.c        Sun Apr 30 09:16:15 2006 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/ia64/xen/domain.c        Sun Apr 30 09:26:01 2006 +0100
@@ -1237,7 +1237,7 @@ static void physdev_init_dom0(struct dom
 {
        if (iomem_permit_access(d, 0UL, ~0UL))
                BUG();
-       if (irqs_permit_access(d, 0, NR_PIRQS-1))
+       if (irqs_permit_access(d, 0, NR_IRQS-1))
                BUG();
 }
 
diff -r 42a8e3101c6c -r 0ee104bd6557 xen/arch/ia64/xen/irq.c
--- a/xen/arch/ia64/xen/irq.c   Sun Apr 30 09:16:15 2006 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/ia64/xen/irq.c   Sun Apr 30 09:26:01 2006 +0100
@@ -435,9 +435,9 @@ int pirq_guest_unmask(struct domain *d)
     int            irq;
     shared_info_t *s = d->shared_info;
 
-    for ( irq = find_first_bit(d->pirq_mask, NR_PIRQS);
-          irq < NR_PIRQS;
-          irq = find_next_bit(d->pirq_mask, NR_PIRQS, irq+1) )
+    for ( irq = find_first_bit(d->pirq_mask, NR_IRQS);
+          irq < NR_IRQS;
+          irq = find_next_bit(d->pirq_mask, NR_IRQS, irq+1) )
     {
         desc = &irq_desc[irq];
         spin_lock_irq(&desc->lock);
diff -r 42a8e3101c6c -r 0ee104bd6557 xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c       Sun Apr 30 09:16:15 2006 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c       Sun Apr 30 09:26:01 2006 +0100
@@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ int construct_dom0(struct domain *d,
     /* DOM0 is permitted full I/O capabilities. */
     rc |= ioports_permit_access(dom0, 0, 0xFFFF);
     rc |= iomem_permit_access(dom0, 0UL, ~0UL);
-    rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 0, NR_PIRQS-1);
+    rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 0, NR_IRQS-1);
 
     /*
      * Modify I/O port access permissions.
diff -r 42a8e3101c6c -r 0ee104bd6557 xen/arch/x86/i8259.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/i8259.c      Sun Apr 30 09:16:15 2006 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/i8259.c      Sun Apr 30 09:26:01 2006 +0100
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <asm/bitops.h>
 #include <xen/delay.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/asm_defns.h>
 #include <io_ports.h>
 
 /*
diff -r 42a8e3101c6c -r 0ee104bd6557 xen/arch/x86/irq.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c        Sun Apr 30 09:16:15 2006 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c        Sun Apr 30 09:26:01 2006 +0100
@@ -356,9 +356,9 @@ int pirq_guest_unmask(struct domain *d)
     unsigned int   irq;
     shared_info_t *s = d->shared_info;
 
-    for ( irq = find_first_bit(d->pirq_mask, NR_PIRQS);
-          irq < NR_PIRQS;
-          irq = find_next_bit(d->pirq_mask, NR_PIRQS, irq+1) )
+    for ( irq = find_first_bit(d->pirq_mask, NR_IRQS);
+          irq < NR_IRQS;
+          irq = find_next_bit(d->pirq_mask, NR_IRQS, irq+1) )
     {
         if ( !test_bit(d->pirq_to_evtchn[irq], s->evtchn_mask) )
             __pirq_guest_eoi(d, irq);
@@ -409,9 +409,6 @@ int pirq_guest_bind(struct vcpu *v, int 
     unsigned long       flags;
     int                 rc = 0;
     cpumask_t           cpumask = CPU_MASK_NONE;
-
-    if ( (irq < 0) || (irq >= NR_IRQS) )
-        return -EINVAL;
 
  retry:
     vector = irq_to_vector(irq);
diff -r 42a8e3101c6c -r 0ee104bd6557 xen/arch/x86/x86_32/traps.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_32/traps.c       Sun Apr 30 09:16:15 2006 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_32/traps.c       Sun Apr 30 09:26:01 2006 +0100
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ unsigned long do_iret(void)
     return regs->eax;
 }
 
+#include <asm/asm_defns.h>
 BUILD_SMP_INTERRUPT(deferred_nmi, TRAP_deferred_nmi)
 fastcall void smp_deferred_nmi(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
diff -r 42a8e3101c6c -r 0ee104bd6557 xen/common/dom0_ops.c
--- a/xen/common/dom0_ops.c     Sun Apr 30 09:16:15 2006 +0100
+++ b/xen/common/dom0_ops.c     Sun Apr 30 09:26:01 2006 +0100
@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ long do_dom0_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(dom0_op
         unsigned int pirq = op->u.irq_permission.pirq;
 
         ret = -EINVAL;
-        if ( pirq >= NR_PIRQS )
+        if ( pirq >= NR_IRQS )
             break;
 
         ret = -ESRCH;
diff -r 42a8e3101c6c -r 0ee104bd6557 xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h Sun Apr 30 09:16:15 2006 +0100
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h Sun Apr 30 09:26:01 2006 +0100
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
 
 #include <xen/config.h>
 #include <asm/atomic.h>
-#include <asm/asm_defns.h>
 #include <irq_vectors.h>
 
 #define IO_APIC_IRQ(irq)    (((irq) >= 16) || ((1<<(irq)) & io_apic_irqs))
diff -r 42a8e3101c6c -r 0ee104bd6557 xen/include/xen/sched.h
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h   Sun Apr 30 09:16:15 2006 +0100
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h   Sun Apr 30 09:26:01 2006 +0100
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <xen/rangeset.h>
 #include <asm/domain.h>
 #include <xen/xenoprof.h>
+#include <xen/irq.h>
 
 extern unsigned long volatile jiffies;
 extern rwlock_t domlist_lock;
@@ -132,9 +133,8 @@ struct domain
      * domain's event-channel spinlock. Read accesses can also synchronise on 
      * the lock, but races don't usually matter.
      */
-#define NR_PIRQS 256 /* Put this somewhere sane! */
-    u16              pirq_to_evtchn[NR_PIRQS];
-    DECLARE_BITMAP(pirq_mask, NR_PIRQS);
+    u16              pirq_to_evtchn[NR_IRQS];
+    DECLARE_BITMAP(pirq_mask, NR_IRQS);
 
     /* I/O capabilities (access to IRQs and memory-mapped I/O). */
     struct rangeset *iomem_caps;

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