[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen-unstable] x86: Detect shadow-emulate write to stack from inside the write
# HG changeset patch # User kfraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx # Date 1172157736 0 # Node ID 9e35371a3caa3fa3be2af51f48c88c99932d6141 # Parent 644e9e18d2efbf4ad8f56f78e21a438e83302c79 x86: Detect shadow-emulate write to stack from inside the write handler, where we can quite conveniently check whether the access segment is SS. This will only give a false positive for non-stack writes that override the destination segment to SS, which it is probably safe to assume will never happen when the destination is a legitimate page table! For now, instead of bailing and unshadowing just increment a perfctr and we'll see if that increases fast under any reasonable workload. Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 4 ++++ xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c | 17 ----------------- xen/include/asm-x86/perfc_defn.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff -r 644e9e18d2ef -r 9e35371a3caa xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c Thu Feb 22 14:58:26 2007 +0000 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c Thu Feb 22 15:22:16 2007 +0000 @@ -274,6 +274,10 @@ hvm_emulate_write(enum x86_segment seg, struct vcpu *v = current; unsigned long addr; int rc; + + /* How many emulations could we save if we unshadowed on stack writes? */ + if ( seg == x86_seg_ss ) + perfc_incrc(shadow_fault_emulate_stack); rc = hvm_translate_linear_addr( seg, offset, bytes, hvm_access_write, sh_ctxt, &addr); diff -r 644e9e18d2ef -r 9e35371a3caa xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c Thu Feb 22 14:58:26 2007 +0000 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c Thu Feb 22 15:22:16 2007 +0000 @@ -2924,23 +2924,6 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, SHADOW_PRINTK("emulate: eip=%#lx esp=%#lx\n", (unsigned long)regs->eip, (unsigned long)regs->esp); - /* - * Check whether this looks like a stack operation. If so, unshadow the - * faulting page. We can allow this to fail: if it does fail then we - * carry on and emulate, otherwise we bail immediately. Failure is - * tolerated because this is only a heuristic (e.g., stack segment base - * address is ignored). - */ - if ( unlikely((va & PAGE_MASK) == (regs->esp & PAGE_MASK)) ) - { - gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "guest stack is on a shadowed frame: " - "%%esp=%#lx, cr2=%#lx, mfn=%#lx\n", - (unsigned long)regs->esp, va, mfn_x(gmfn)); - sh_remove_shadows(v, gmfn, 0 /* thorough */, 0 /* can fail */); - if ( !(mfn_to_page(gmfn)->count_info & PGC_page_table) ) - goto done; - } - emul_ops = shadow_init_emulation(&emul_ctxt, regs); /* diff -r 644e9e18d2ef -r 9e35371a3caa xen/include/asm-x86/perfc_defn.h --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/perfc_defn.h Thu Feb 22 14:58:26 2007 +0000 +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/perfc_defn.h Thu Feb 22 15:22:16 2007 +0000 @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ PERFCOUNTER_CPU(shadow_fault_emulate_rea PERFCOUNTER_CPU(shadow_fault_emulate_read, "shadow_fault emulates a read") PERFCOUNTER_CPU(shadow_fault_emulate_write, "shadow_fault emulates a write") PERFCOUNTER_CPU(shadow_fault_emulate_failed, "shadow_fault emulator fails") +PERFCOUNTER_CPU(shadow_fault_emulate_stack, "shadow_fault emulate stack write") PERFCOUNTER_CPU(shadow_fault_mmio, "shadow_fault handled as mmio") PERFCOUNTER_CPU(shadow_fault_fixed, "shadow_fault fixed fault") PERFCOUNTER_CPU(shadow_ptwr_emulate, "shadow causes ptwr to emulate") _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |