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[Xen-changelog] [xen-unstable] ioemu: Fix PVFB backend to limit frame buffer size



# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxx>
# Date 1210840598 -3600
# Node ID 9044705960cb30cec385bdca7305bcf7db096721
# Parent  86587698116d742ff257e64ddfd230157fcee42c
ioemu: Fix PVFB backend to limit frame buffer size

The recent fix to validate the frontend's frame buffer description
neglected to limit the frame buffer size correctly.  This lets a
malicious frontend make the backend attempt to map an arbitrary amount
of guest memory, which could be useful for a denial of service attack
against dom0.

Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 tools/ioemu/hw/xenfb.c |    1 +
 1 files changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff -r 86587698116d -r 9044705960cb tools/ioemu/hw/xenfb.c
--- a/tools/ioemu/hw/xenfb.c    Wed May 14 14:12:53 2008 +0100
+++ b/tools/ioemu/hw/xenfb.c    Thu May 15 09:36:38 2008 +0100
@@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ static int xenfb_configure_fb(struct xen
                fprintf(stderr,
                        "FB: frontend fb size %zu limited to %zu\n",
                        fb_len, fb_len_lim);
+               fb_len = fb_len_lim;
        }
        if (depth != 8 && depth != 16 && depth != 24 && depth != 32) {
                fprintf(stderr,

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