[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen-unstable] x86 hvm: Do not check-and-fail on in_atomic() in hvm_copy().
# HG changeset patch # User Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> # Date 1295018282 0 # Node ID 47d67a64a2d2a1a41e5588b0cbdf179958d1363d # Parent 59396addc9408c68bf3c86a78a33ab490d5962b6 x86 hvm: Do not check-and-fail on in_atomic() in hvm_copy(). Stub this out for 4.0, as PV-on-HVM drivers hit this case when performing grant-table hypercalls. Grant-table code currently accesses guest memory under bug per-domain lock. The test in hvm_copy() is not necessary until the xenpaging implementation is more complete, which will not now be until after 4.1.0. Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+) diff -r 59396addc940 -r 47d67a64a2d2 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c Fri Jan 14 14:26:11 2011 +0000 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c Fri Jan 14 15:18:02 2011 +0000 @@ -1994,11 +1994,20 @@ static enum hvm_copy_result __hvm_copy( int count, todo = size; /* + * XXX Disable for 4.1.0: PV-on-HVM drivers will do grant-table ops + * such as query_size. Grant-table code currently does copy_to/from_guest + * accesses under the big per-domain lock, which this test would disallow. + * The test is not needed until we implement sleeping-on-waitqueue when + * we access a paged-out frame, and that's post 4.1.0 now. + */ +#if 0 + /* * If the required guest memory is paged out, this function may sleep. * Hence we bail immediately if called from atomic context. */ if ( in_atomic() ) return HVMCOPY_unhandleable; +#endif while ( todo > 0 ) { _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog
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