[Xen-changelog] [xen-4.0-testing] x86, vtd: [CVE-2011-1898] Protect against malicious MSIs from untrusted devices.

[Xen patchbot-4.0-testing <patchbot@xxxxxxx>]

# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
# Date 1305220065 -3600
# Node ID b85a9e58ec3aa46be0e4148737fefdddd59fdddf
# Parent  f47c6786ea6d8f14ce0a6770e9be51ca2b9d6888
x86, vtd: [CVE-2011-1898] Protect against malicious MSIs from untrusted devices.

In the absence of VT-d interrupt remapping support, a device can send
arbitrary APIC messages to host CPUs. One class of attack that results
is to confuse the hypervisor by delivering asynchronous interrupts to
vectors that are expected to handle only synchronous
traps/exceptions.

We block this class of attack by:
(1) setting APIC.TPR=0x10, to block all interrupts below vector
0x20. This blocks delivery to all architectural exception vectors.
(2) checking APIC.ISR[vec] for vectors 0x80 (fast syscall) and 0x82
(hypercall). In these cases we BUG if we detect we are handling a
hardware interrupt -- turning a potentially more severe infiltration
into a straightforward system crash (i.e, DoS).

Thanks to Invisible Things Lab <http://www.invisiblethingslab.com>
for discovery and detailed investigation of this attack.

Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
xen-unstable changeset:   23337:cc91832a02c7
xen-unstable date:        Thu May 12 16:39:31 2011 +0100
---


diff -r f47c6786ea6d -r b85a9e58ec3a xen/arch/x86/apic.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/apic.c       Thu May 12 09:23:21 2011 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/apic.c       Thu May 12 18:07:45 2011 +0100
@@ -572,12 +572,9 @@
     init_apic_ldr();
 
     /*
-     * Set Task Priority to 'accept all'. We never change this
-     * later on.
+     * Set Task Priority to reject any interrupts below FIRST_DYNAMIC_VECTOR.
      */
-    value = apic_read(APIC_TASKPRI);
-    value &= ~APIC_TPRI_MASK;
-    apic_write_around(APIC_TASKPRI, value);
+    apic_write_around(APIC_TASKPRI, (FIRST_DYNAMIC_VECTOR & 0xF0) - 0x10);
 
     /*
      * After a crash, we no longer service the interrupts and a pending
@@ -1498,3 +1495,9 @@
 
     return 0;
 }
+
+void check_for_unexpected_msi(unsigned int vector)
+{
+    unsigned long v = apic_read(APIC_ISR + ((vector & ~0x1f) >> 1));
+    BUG_ON(v & (1 << (vector & 0x1f)));
+}
diff -r f47c6786ea6d -r b85a9e58ec3a xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S        Thu May 12 09:23:21 2011 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S        Thu May 12 18:07:45 2011 +0100
@@ -27,6 +27,15 @@
         pushq $0
         movl  $TRAP_syscall,4(%rsp)
         SAVE_ALL
+
+        cmpb  $0,untrusted_msi(%rip)
+        je    1f
+        movl  $0x82,%edi
+        call  check_for_unexpected_msi
+        RESTORE_ALL
+        SAVE_ALL
+1:
+
         GET_CURRENT(%rbx)
 
         cmpl  $NR_hypercalls,%eax
diff -r f47c6786ea6d -r b85a9e58ec3a xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S       Thu May 12 09:23:21 2011 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S       Thu May 12 18:07:45 2011 +0100
@@ -310,6 +310,14 @@
         pushq $0
         SAVE_ALL
 
+        cmpb  $0,untrusted_msi(%rip)
+        je    1f
+        movl  $0x80,%edi
+        call  check_for_unexpected_msi
+        RESTORE_ALL
+        SAVE_ALL
+1:
+
         GET_CURRENT(%rbx)
 
         /* Check that the callback is non-null. */
diff -r f47c6786ea6d -r b85a9e58ec3a xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c       Thu May 12 09:23:21 2011 +0100
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c       Thu May 12 18:07:45 2011 +0100
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@
 #define nr_ioapics              iosapic_get_nr_iosapics()
 #endif
 
+/* Possible unfiltered LAPIC/MSI messages from untrusted sources? */
+bool_t __read_mostly untrusted_msi;
+
 int nr_iommus;
 static bool_t rwbf_quirk;
 
@@ -1566,6 +1569,14 @@
     if (!pdev)
         return -ENODEV;
 
+    /*
+     * Devices assigned to untrusted domains (here assumed to be any domU)
+     * can attempt to send arbitrary LAPIC/MSI messages. We are unprotected
+     * by the root complex unless interrupt remapping is enabled.
+     */
+    if ( (target != dom0) && !iommu_intremap )
+        untrusted_msi = 1;
+
     ret = domain_context_unmap(source, bus, devfn);
     if ( ret )
         return ret;

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