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[Xen-changelog] [xen-unstable] libxl: don't close file descriptors 4..255 in libxl__exec



# HG changeset patch
# User Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
# Date 1306250299 -3600
# Node ID 2e4d29c1c585208cb4e768e4e34c570542de3d72
# Parent  e38f655a72451b30b7547556b13397ea01434ad6
libxl: don't close file descriptors 4..255 in libxl__exec

It prevents callers from deliberately passing file descriptors to the child,
hides any callers who erroneously do so and doesn't deal with all file
descriptors in any case.

Rather than remove it all together replace it with some debug code
which checks for open file handles which do not have either O_CLOEXEC
or FD_CLOEXEC set. To enable the debug set _LIBXL_DEBUG_EXEC_FDS=1 to
print any open and non-CLOEXEC non-stdio FDs just before libxl__exec
actualy calls exec. Set _LIBXL_DEBUG_EXEC_FDS=2 to abort if any of
these exist.

On the basis of this debugging fix some leaked filehandles:
  * The read end of the pipe used to wake the parent from the
    intermediate process during libxl__spawn_spawn was leaked into the
    intermediate process.
  * The file descriptor representing the xl lock was not marked
    O_CLOEXEC (the lock itself is already specified to not be
    inherited across a fork).
  * The file descriptors passed to libxl__exec to be dup'd as
    std{in,out,err} were leaked at their original number. They are
    harmless (an attacker can just as easily use fd 0..2) but close
    anyway since it removes a case which a person evaluating open fd's
    needs to consider.
  * libxl_run_bootloader was leaking the xenconsole pty master into
    the bootloader child process.
  * If the bootloader fails to get as far as opening its end of the
    FIFO then we can also hang, check that the process has not exited
    as part of that loop. (we actually block opening the FIFO too so
    this is only a partial fix for the case where the bootlader has
    crashed quickly).

With these fixes I have tested that device models, bootloaders
(pygrub) and vncviewers which are spawned via libxl__exec with no
unexpected file descriptors open, at least in my configuration.

Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---


diff -r e38f655a7245 -r 2e4d29c1c585 tools/libxl/libxl_bootloader.c
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_bootloader.c    Tue May 24 16:15:53 2011 +0100
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_bootloader.c    Tue May 24 16:18:19 2011 +0100
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@
 #endif
 
     fcntl(*master, F_SETFL, O_NDELAY);
+    fcntl(*master, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
 
     return 0;
 }
@@ -393,6 +394,9 @@
     }
 
     while (1) {
+        if (waitpid(pid, &blrc, WNOHANG) == pid)
+            goto out_close;
+
         fifo_fd = open(fifo, O_RDONLY);
         if (fifo_fd > -1)
             break;
diff -r e38f655a7245 -r 2e4d29c1c585 tools/libxl/libxl_exec.c
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_exec.c  Tue May 24 16:15:53 2011 +0100
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_exec.c  Tue May 24 16:18:19 2011 +0100
@@ -36,20 +36,72 @@
     return (waitpid_cb) ? waitpid_cb(pid, status, options) : waitpid(pid, 
status, options);
 }
 
+static void check_open_fds(const char *what)
+{
+    const char *env_debug;
+    int debug;
+    int i, flags, badness = 0;
+    char path[PATH_MAX];
+    char link[PATH_MAX+1];
+
+    env_debug = getenv("_LIBXL_DEBUG_EXEC_FDS");
+    if (!env_debug) return;
+
+    debug = strtol(env_debug, (char **) NULL, 10);atoi(env_debug);
+    if (debug <= 0) return;
+
+    for (i = 4; i < 256; i++) {
+#ifdef __linux__
+        size_t len;
+#endif
+        flags = fcntl(i, F_GETFD);
+        if ( flags == -1 ) {
+            if ( errno != EBADF )
+                fprintf(stderr, "libxl: execing %s: fd %d flags returned %s 
(%d)\n",
+                        what, i, strerror(errno), errno);
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if ( flags & FD_CLOEXEC )
+            continue;
+
+        badness++;
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+        snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%d/fd/%d", getpid(), i);
+        len = readlink(path, link, PATH_MAX);
+        if (len > 0) {
+            link[len] = '\0';
+            fprintf(stderr, "libxl: execing %s: fd %d is open to %s with flags 
%#x\n",
+                    what, i, link, flags);
+        } else
+#endif
+            fprintf(stderr, "libxl: execing %s: fd %d is open with flags 
%#x\n",
+                    what, i, flags);
+    }
+    if (debug < 2) return;
+    if (badness) abort();
+}
+
 void libxl__exec(int stdinfd, int stdoutfd, int stderrfd, const char *arg0,
                 char **args)
      /* call this in the child */
 {
-    int i;
-
     if (stdinfd != -1)
         dup2(stdinfd, STDIN_FILENO);
     if (stdoutfd != -1)
         dup2(stdoutfd, STDOUT_FILENO);
     if (stderrfd != -1)
         dup2(stderrfd, STDERR_FILENO);
-    for (i = 4; i < 256; i++)
-        close(i);
+
+    if (stdinfd != -1)
+        close(stdinfd);
+    if (stdoutfd != -1 && stdoutfd != stdinfd)
+        close(stdoutfd);
+    if (stderrfd != -1 && stderrfd != stdinfd && stderrfd != stdoutfd)
+        close(stderrfd);
+
+    check_open_fds(arg0);
 
     signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
     /* in case our caller set it to IGN.  subprocesses are entitled
@@ -148,6 +200,7 @@
     }
 
     /* we are now the intermediate process */
+    if (for_spawn) close(pipes[0]);
 
     child = fork();
     if (child == -1)
diff -r e38f655a7245 -r 2e4d29c1c585 tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
--- a/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c  Tue May 24 16:15:53 2011 +0100
+++ b/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c  Tue May 24 16:18:19 2011 +0100
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@
     fl.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
     fl.l_start = 0;
     fl.l_len = 0;
-    fd_lock = open(lockfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, S_IWUSR);
+    fd_lock = open(lockfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_CLOEXEC, S_IWUSR);
     if (fd_lock < 0) {
         fprintf(stderr, "cannot open the lockfile %s errno=%d\n", lockfile, 
errno);
         return ERROR_FAIL;

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