[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen-4.2-testing] tmem: only allow tmem control operations from privileged domains
# HG changeset patch # User Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> # Date 1348567759 -7200 # Node ID e0dc63c822b2825e84eee3b49cd05052cb0059d3 # Parent 3462914d95d32d5657de1fad8fd79547c696f081 tmem: only allow tmem control operations from privileged domains This is part of XSA-15 / CVE-2012-3497. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> xen-unstable changeset: 25850:0dba5a888655 xen-unstable date: Tue Sep 11 12:06:30 UTC 2012 --- diff -r 3462914d95d3 -r e0dc63c822b2 xen/common/tmem.c --- a/xen/common/tmem.c Wed Sep 19 17:33:05 2012 +0200 +++ b/xen/common/tmem.c Tue Sep 25 12:09:19 2012 +0200 @@ -2541,10 +2541,8 @@ static NOINLINE int do_tmem_control(stru OID *oidp = (OID *)(&op->u.ctrl.oid[0]); if (!tmh_current_is_privileged()) - { - /* don't fail... mystery: sometimes dom0 fails here */ - /* return -EPERM; */ - } + return -EPERM; + switch(subop) { case TMEMC_THAW: _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog
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