[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen-unstable] x86: slightly improve stack trace on debug builds
# HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> # Date 1348653218 -7200 # Node ID b83f414ccf7a6e4e077a10bc422cf3f6c7d30566 # Parent 4876f914a8a08773597cbe2b567808a91494af8f x86: slightly improve stack trace on debug builds As was rather obvious from crashes recently happening in stage testing, the debug hypervisor, in that special case, has a drawback compared to the non-debug one: When a call through a bad pointer happens, there's no frame, and the top level (and frequently most important for analysis) stack entry would get skipped: (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.3-unstable x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]---- (XEN) CPU: 1 (XEN) RIP: e008:[<0000000000000000>] ??? (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010046 CONTEXT: hypervisor (XEN) rax: 0000000000000008 rbx: 0000000000000001 rcx: 0000000000000003 (XEN) rdx: 0000003db54eb700 rsi: 7fffffffffffffff rdi: 0000000000000001 (XEN) rbp: ffff8302357e7ee0 rsp: ffff8302357e7e58 r8: 0000000000000000 (XEN) r9: 000000000000003e r10: ffff8302357e7f18 r11: ffff8302357e7f18 (XEN) r12: ffff8302357ee340 r13: ffff82c480263980 r14: ffff8302357ee3d0 (XEN) r15: 0000000000000001 cr0: 000000008005003b cr4: 00000000000026f0 (XEN) cr3: 00000000bf473000 cr2: 0000000000000000 (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008 (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff8302357e7e58: (XEN) ffff82c4801a3d05 ffff8302357eca70 0000000800000020 ffff82c4802ead60 (XEN) 0000000000000001 ffff8302357e7ea0 ffff82c48016bf07 0000000000000000 (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff8302357e7ee0 fffff830fffff830 0000000000000046 (XEN) ffff8302357e7f18 ffff82c480263980 ffff8302357e7f18 0000000000000000 (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff8302357e7f10 ffff82c48015c2be 8302357dc0000fff ... (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<0000000000000000>] ??? (XEN) [<ffff82c48015c2be>] idle_loop+0x6c/0x7a (XEN) (XEN) Pagetable walk from 0000000000000000: Since the bad pointer is being printed anyway (as part of the register state), replace it with the top of stack value in such a case. With the introduction of is_active_kernel_text(), use it also at the (few) other suitable places (I intentionally didn't replace the use in xen/arch/arm/mm.c - while it would be functionally correct, the dependency on system_state wouldn't be from an abstract perspective). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> --- diff -r 4876f914a8a0 -r b83f414ccf7a xen/arch/x86/traps.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c Wed Sep 26 11:52:03 2012 +0200 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c Wed Sep 26 11:53:38 2012 +0200 @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static void show_trace(struct cpu_user_r while ( ((long)stack & (STACK_SIZE-BYTES_PER_LONG)) != 0 ) { addr = *stack++; - if ( is_kernel_text(addr) || is_kernel_inittext(addr) ) + if ( is_active_kernel_text(addr) ) { printk("[<%p>]", _p(addr)); print_symbol(" %s\n ", addr); @@ -217,8 +217,16 @@ static void show_trace(struct cpu_user_r printk("Xen call trace:\n "); - printk("[<%p>]", _p(regs->eip)); - print_symbol(" %s\n ", regs->eip); + /* + * If RIP is not pointing into hypervisor code then someone may have + * called into oblivion. Peek to see if they left a return address at + * top of stack. + */ + addr = is_active_kernel_text(regs->eip) || + !is_active_kernel_text(*ESP_BEFORE_EXCEPTION(regs)) ? + regs->eip : *ESP_BEFORE_EXCEPTION(regs); + printk("[<%p>]", _p(addr)); + print_symbol(" %s\n ", addr); /* Bounds for range of valid frame pointer. */ low = (unsigned long)(ESP_BEFORE_EXCEPTION(regs) - 2); @@ -322,7 +330,7 @@ void show_stack_overflow(unsigned int cp while ( ((long)stack & (STACK_SIZE-BYTES_PER_LONG)) != 0 ) { addr = *stack++; - if ( is_kernel_text(addr) || is_kernel_inittext(addr) ) + if ( is_active_kernel_text(addr) ) { printk("%p: [<%p>]", stack, _p(addr)); print_symbol(" %s\n ", addr); diff -r 4876f914a8a0 -r b83f414ccf7a xen/common/symbols.c --- a/xen/common/symbols.c Wed Sep 26 11:52:03 2012 +0200 +++ b/xen/common/symbols.c Wed Sep 26 11:53:38 2012 +0200 @@ -93,6 +93,12 @@ static unsigned int get_symbol_offset(un return name - symbols_names; } +bool_t is_active_kernel_text(unsigned long addr) +{ + return (is_kernel_text(addr) || + (system_state == SYS_STATE_boot && is_kernel_inittext(addr))); +} + const char *symbols_lookup(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *symbolsize, unsigned long *offset, @@ -104,7 +110,7 @@ const char *symbols_lookup(unsigned long namebuf[KSYM_NAME_LEN] = 0; namebuf[0] = 0; - if (!is_kernel_text(addr) && !is_kernel_inittext(addr)) + if (!is_active_kernel_text(addr)) return NULL; /* do a binary search on the sorted symbols_addresses array */ diff -r 4876f914a8a0 -r b83f414ccf7a xen/include/xen/kernel.h --- a/xen/include/xen/kernel.h Wed Sep 26 11:52:03 2012 +0200 +++ b/xen/include/xen/kernel.h Wed Sep 26 11:53:38 2012 +0200 @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ * 'kernel.h' contains some often-used function prototypes etc */ +#include <xen/types.h> + /* * min()/max() macros that also do * strict type-checking.. See the @@ -95,5 +97,7 @@ extern enum system_state { SYS_STATE_resume } system_state; +bool_t is_active_kernel_text(unsigned long addr); + #endif /* _LINUX_KERNEL_H */ _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog
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