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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen-4.1-testing] libxc: builder: limit maximum size of kernel/ramdisk.
# HG changeset patch
# User Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
# Date 1351264204 -3600
# Node ID 69d1cc78a5bd066ca84019512c6e3d60c1a3fef4
# Parent a15596a619ed738c163c08d3ec275c8880890c52
libxc: builder: limit maximum size of kernel/ramdisk.
Allowing user supplied kernels of arbitrary sizes, especially during
decompression, can swallow up dom0 memory leading to either virtual
address space exhaustion in the builder process or allocation
failures/OOM killing of both toolstack and unrelated processes.
We disable these checks when building in a stub domain for pvgrub
since this uses the guest's own memory and is isolated.
Decompression of gzip compressed kernels and ramdisks has been safe
since 14954:58205257517d (Xen 3.1.0 onwards).
This is XSA-25 / CVE-2012-4544.
Also make explicit checks for buffer overflows in various
decompression routines. These were already ruled out due to other
properties of the code but check them as a belt-and-braces measure.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[ Includes 25589:60f09d1ab1fe for CVE-2012-2625 ]
---
diff -r a15596a619ed -r 69d1cc78a5bd stubdom/grub/kexec.c
--- a/stubdom/grub/kexec.c Thu Oct 04 10:44:43 2012 +0200
+++ b/stubdom/grub/kexec.c Fri Oct 26 16:10:04 2012 +0100
@@ -137,6 +137,10 @@ void kexec(void *kernel, long kernel_siz
dom = xc_dom_allocate(xc_handle, cmdline, features);
dom->allocate = kexec_allocate;
+ /* We are using guest owned memory, therefore no limits. */
+ xc_dom_kernel_max_size(dom, 0);
+ xc_dom_ramdisk_max_size(dom, 0);
+
dom->kernel_blob = kernel;
dom->kernel_size = kernel_size;
diff -r a15596a619ed -r 69d1cc78a5bd tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h Thu Oct 04 10:44:43 2012 +0200
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h Fri Oct 26 16:10:04 2012 +0100
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ struct xc_dom_image {
void *ramdisk_blob;
size_t ramdisk_size;
+ size_t max_kernel_size;
+ size_t max_ramdisk_size;
+
/* arguments and parameters */
char *cmdline;
uint32_t f_requested[XENFEAT_NR_SUBMAPS];
@@ -175,6 +178,23 @@ void xc_dom_release_phys(struct xc_dom_i
void xc_dom_release(struct xc_dom_image *dom);
int xc_dom_mem_init(struct xc_dom_image *dom, unsigned int mem_mb);
+/* Set this larger if you have enormous ramdisks/kernels. Note that
+ * you should trust all kernels not to be maliciously large (e.g. to
+ * exhaust all dom0 memory) if you do this (see CVE-2012-4544 /
+ * XSA-25). You can also set the default independently for
+ * ramdisks/kernels in xc_dom_allocate() or call
+ * xc_dom_{kernel,ramdisk}_max_size.
+ */
+#ifndef XC_DOM_DECOMPRESS_MAX
+#define XC_DOM_DECOMPRESS_MAX (1024*1024*1024) /* 1GB */
+#endif
+
+int xc_dom_kernel_check_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz);
+int xc_dom_kernel_max_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz);
+
+int xc_dom_ramdisk_check_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz);
+int xc_dom_ramdisk_max_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz);
+
size_t xc_dom_check_gzip(xc_interface *xch,
void *blob, size_t ziplen);
int xc_dom_do_gunzip(xc_interface *xch,
@@ -224,7 +244,8 @@ void xc_dom_log_memory_footprint(struct
void *xc_dom_malloc(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t size);
void *xc_dom_malloc_page_aligned(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t size);
void *xc_dom_malloc_filemap(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
- const char *filename, size_t * size);
+ const char *filename, size_t * size,
+ const size_t max_size);
char *xc_dom_strdup(struct xc_dom_image *dom, const char *str);
/* --- alloc memory pool ------------------------------------------- */
diff -r a15596a619ed -r 69d1cc78a5bd tools/libxc/xc_dom_bzimageloader.c
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_bzimageloader.c Thu Oct 04 10:44:43 2012 +0200
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_bzimageloader.c Fri Oct 26 16:10:04 2012 +0100
@@ -47,13 +47,19 @@ static int xc_try_bzip2_decode(
char *out_buf;
char *tmp_buf;
int retval = -1;
- int outsize;
+ unsigned int outsize;
uint64_t total;
stream.bzalloc = NULL;
stream.bzfree = NULL;
stream.opaque = NULL;
+ if ( dom->kernel_size == 0)
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: Input is 0 size");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
ret = BZ2_bzDecompressInit(&stream, 0, 0);
if ( ret != BZ_OK )
{
@@ -66,6 +72,17 @@ static int xc_try_bzip2_decode(
* the input buffer to start, and we'll realloc as needed.
*/
outsize = dom->kernel_size;
+
+ /*
+ * stream.avail_in and outsize are unsigned int, while kernel_size
+ * is a size_t. Check we aren't overflowing.
+ */
+ if ( outsize != dom->kernel_size )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: Input too large");
+ goto bzip2_cleanup;
+ }
+
out_buf = malloc(outsize);
if ( out_buf == NULL )
{
@@ -98,13 +115,20 @@ static int xc_try_bzip2_decode(
if ( stream.avail_out == 0 )
{
/* Protect against output buffer overflow */
- if ( outsize > INT_MAX / 2 )
+ if ( outsize > UINT_MAX / 2 )
{
DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: output buffer overflow");
free(out_buf);
goto bzip2_cleanup;
}
+ if ( xc_dom_kernel_check_size(dom, outsize * 2) )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: output too large");
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto bzip2_cleanup;
+ }
+
tmp_buf = realloc(out_buf, outsize * 2);
if ( tmp_buf == NULL )
{
@@ -172,9 +196,15 @@ static int xc_try_lzma_decode(
unsigned char *out_buf;
unsigned char *tmp_buf;
int retval = -1;
- int outsize;
+ size_t outsize;
const char *msg;
+ if ( dom->kernel_size == 0)
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("LZMA: Input is 0 size");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
ret = lzma_alone_decoder(&stream, 128*1024*1024);
if ( ret != LZMA_OK )
{
@@ -251,13 +281,20 @@ static int xc_try_lzma_decode(
if ( stream.avail_out == 0 )
{
/* Protect against output buffer overflow */
- if ( outsize > INT_MAX / 2 )
+ if ( outsize > SIZE_MAX / 2 )
{
DOMPRINTF("LZMA: output buffer overflow");
free(out_buf);
goto lzma_cleanup;
}
+ if ( xc_dom_kernel_check_size(dom, outsize * 2) )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("LZMA: output too large");
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto lzma_cleanup;
+ }
+
tmp_buf = realloc(out_buf, outsize * 2);
if ( tmp_buf == NULL )
{
@@ -327,6 +364,12 @@ static int xc_try_lzo1x_decode(
0x89, 0x4c, 0x5a, 0x4f, 0x00, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a
};
+ /*
+ * lzo_uint should match size_t. Check that this is the case to be
+ * sure we won't overflow various lzo_uint fields.
+ */
+ XC_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(lzo_uint) != sizeof(size_t));
+
ret = lzo_init();
if ( ret != LZO_E_OK )
{
@@ -406,6 +449,14 @@ static int xc_try_lzo1x_decode(
if ( src_len <= 0 || src_len > dst_len || src_len > left )
break;
+ msg = "Output buffer overflow";
+ if ( *size > SIZE_MAX - dst_len )
+ break;
+
+ msg = "Decompressed image too large";
+ if ( xc_dom_kernel_check_size(dom, *size + dst_len) )
+ break;
+
msg = "Failed to (re)alloc memory";
tmp_buf = realloc(out_buf, *size + dst_len);
if ( tmp_buf == NULL )
diff -r a15596a619ed -r 69d1cc78a5bd tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c Thu Oct 04 10:44:43 2012 +0200
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c Fri Oct 26 16:10:04 2012 +0100
@@ -159,7 +159,8 @@ void *xc_dom_malloc_page_aligned(struct
}
void *xc_dom_malloc_filemap(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
- const char *filename, size_t * size)
+ const char *filename, size_t * size,
+ const size_t max_size)
{
struct xc_dom_mem *block = NULL;
int fd = -1;
@@ -171,6 +172,13 @@ void *xc_dom_malloc_filemap(struct xc_do
lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
*size = lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END);
+ if ( max_size && *size > max_size )
+ {
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "tried to map file which is too large");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
block = malloc(sizeof(*block));
if ( block == NULL )
goto err;
@@ -222,6 +230,40 @@ char *xc_dom_strdup(struct xc_dom_image
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* decompression buffer sizing */
+int xc_dom_kernel_check_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz)
+{
+ /* No limit */
+ if ( !dom->max_kernel_size )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( sz > dom->max_kernel_size )
+ {
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INVALID_KERNEL,
+ "kernel image too large");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int xc_dom_ramdisk_check_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz)
+{
+ /* No limit */
+ if ( !dom->max_ramdisk_size )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( sz > dom->max_ramdisk_size )
+ {
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INVALID_KERNEL,
+ "ramdisk image too large");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* read files, copy memory blocks, with transparent gunzip */
size_t xc_dom_check_gzip(xc_interface *xch, void *blob, size_t ziplen)
@@ -235,7 +277,7 @@ size_t xc_dom_check_gzip(xc_interface *x
gzlen = blob + ziplen - 4;
unziplen = gzlen[3] << 24 | gzlen[2] << 16 | gzlen[1] << 8 | gzlen[0];
- if ( (unziplen < 0) || (unziplen > (1024*1024*1024)) ) /* 1GB limit */
+ if ( (unziplen < 0) || (unziplen > XC_DOM_DECOMPRESS_MAX) )
{
xc_dom_printf
(xch,
@@ -288,6 +330,9 @@ int xc_dom_try_gunzip(struct xc_dom_imag
if ( unziplen == 0 )
return 0;
+ if ( xc_dom_kernel_check_size(dom, unziplen) )
+ return 0;
+
unzip = xc_dom_malloc(dom, unziplen);
if ( unzip == NULL )
return -1;
@@ -588,6 +633,9 @@ struct xc_dom_image *xc_dom_allocate(xc_
memset(dom, 0, sizeof(*dom));
dom->xch = xch;
+ dom->max_kernel_size = XC_DOM_DECOMPRESS_MAX;
+ dom->max_ramdisk_size = XC_DOM_DECOMPRESS_MAX;
+
if ( cmdline )
dom->cmdline = xc_dom_strdup(dom, cmdline);
if ( features )
@@ -608,10 +656,25 @@ struct xc_dom_image *xc_dom_allocate(xc_
return NULL;
}
+int xc_dom_kernel_max_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz)
+{
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: kernel_max_size=%zx", __FUNCTION__, sz);
+ dom->max_kernel_size = sz;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int xc_dom_ramdisk_max_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz)
+{
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: ramdisk_max_size=%zx", __FUNCTION__, sz);
+ dom->max_ramdisk_size = sz;
+ return 0;
+}
+
int xc_dom_kernel_file(struct xc_dom_image *dom, const char *filename)
{
DOMPRINTF("%s: filename=\"%s\"", __FUNCTION__, filename);
- dom->kernel_blob = xc_dom_malloc_filemap(dom, filename, &dom->kernel_size);
+ dom->kernel_blob = xc_dom_malloc_filemap(dom, filename, &dom->kernel_size,
+ dom->max_kernel_size);
if ( dom->kernel_blob == NULL )
return -1;
return xc_dom_try_gunzip(dom, &dom->kernel_blob, &dom->kernel_size);
@@ -621,7 +684,9 @@ int xc_dom_ramdisk_file(struct xc_dom_im
{
DOMPRINTF("%s: filename=\"%s\"", __FUNCTION__, filename);
dom->ramdisk_blob =
- xc_dom_malloc_filemap(dom, filename, &dom->ramdisk_size);
+ xc_dom_malloc_filemap(dom, filename, &dom->ramdisk_size,
+ dom->max_ramdisk_size);
+
if ( dom->ramdisk_blob == NULL )
return -1;
// return xc_dom_try_gunzip(dom, &dom->ramdisk_blob, &dom->ramdisk_size);
@@ -781,7 +846,11 @@ int xc_dom_build_image(struct xc_dom_ima
void *ramdiskmap;
unziplen = xc_dom_check_gzip(dom->xch, dom->ramdisk_blob,
dom->ramdisk_size);
+ if ( xc_dom_ramdisk_check_size(dom, unziplen) != 0 )
+ unziplen = 0;
+
ramdisklen = unziplen ? unziplen : dom->ramdisk_size;
+
if ( xc_dom_alloc_segment(dom, &dom->ramdisk_seg, "ramdisk", 0,
ramdisklen) != 0 )
goto err;
diff -r a15596a619ed -r 69d1cc78a5bd tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
--- a/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub Thu Oct 04 10:44:43 2012 +0200
+++ b/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub Fri Oct 26 16:10:04 2012 +0100
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import grub.LiloConf
import grub.ExtLinuxConf
PYGRUB_VER = 0.6
+FS_READ_MAX = 1024 * 1024
def enable_cursor(ison):
if ison:
@@ -421,7 +422,8 @@ class Grub:
if self.__dict__.get('cf', None) is None:
raise RuntimeError, "couldn't find bootloader config file in the
image provided."
f = fs.open_file(self.cf.filename)
- buf = f.read()
+ # limit read size to avoid pathological cases
+ buf = f.read(FS_READ_MAX)
del f
self.cf.parse(buf)
@@ -670,6 +672,37 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
def usage():
print >> sys.stderr, "Usage: %s [-q|--quiet] [-i|--interactive]
[-n|--not-really] [--output=] [--kernel=] [--ramdisk=] [--args=] [--entry=]
[--output-directory=] [--output-format=sxp|simple|simple0] <image>"
%(sys.argv[0],)
+ def copy_from_image(fs, file_to_read, file_type, output_directory,
+ not_really):
+ if not_really:
+ if fs.file_exists(file_to_read):
+ return "<%s:%s>" % (file_type, file_to_read)
+ else:
+ sys.exit("The requested %s file does not exist" % file_type)
+ try:
+ datafile = fs.open_file(file_to_read)
+ except Exception, e:
+ print >>sys.stderr, e
+ sys.exit("Error opening %s in guest" % file_to_read)
+ (tfd, ret) = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="boot_"+file_type+".",
+ dir=output_directory)
+ dataoff = 0
+ while True:
+ data = datafile.read(FS_READ_MAX, dataoff)
+ if len(data) == 0:
+ os.close(tfd)
+ del datafile
+ return ret
+ try:
+ os.write(tfd, data)
+ except Exception, e:
+ print >>sys.stderr, e
+ os.close(tfd)
+ os.unlink(ret)
+ del datafile
+ sys.exit("Error writing temporary copy of "+file_type)
+ dataoff += len(data)
+
try:
opts, args = getopt.gnu_getopt(sys.argv[1:], 'qinh::',
["quiet", "interactive", "not-really",
"help",
@@ -786,24 +819,18 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
if not fs:
raise RuntimeError, "Unable to find partition containing kernel"
- if not_really:
- bootcfg["kernel"] = "<kernel:%s>" % chosencfg["kernel"]
- else:
- data = fs.open_file(chosencfg["kernel"]).read()
- (tfd, bootcfg["kernel"]) = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="boot_kernel.",
- dir=output_directory)
- os.write(tfd, data)
- os.close(tfd)
+ bootcfg["kernel"] = copy_from_image(fs, chosencfg["kernel"], "kernel",
+ output_directory, not_really)
if chosencfg["ramdisk"]:
- if not_really:
- bootcfg["ramdisk"] = "<ramdisk:%s>" % chosencfg["ramdisk"]
- else:
- data = fs.open_file(chosencfg["ramdisk"],).read()
- (tfd, bootcfg["ramdisk"]) = tempfile.mkstemp(
- prefix="boot_ramdisk.", dir=output_directory)
- os.write(tfd, data)
- os.close(tfd)
+ try:
+ bootcfg["ramdisk"] = copy_from_image(fs, chosencfg["ramdisk"],
+ "ramdisk", output_directory,
+ not_really)
+ except:
+ if not not_really:
+ os.unlink(bootcfg["kernel"])
+ raise
else:
initrd = None
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