[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen-4.1-testing] x86/physdev: Range check pirq parameter from guests
# HG changeset patch # User Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> # Date 1352892906 0 # Node ID 210f16b6509b7462481da2e64e4fe20efcdb899d # Parent 701f5e3321c13e2b07708dcdc224472051038ca4 x86/physdev: Range check pirq parameter from guests Otherwise Xen will read beyond either end of the struct domain.arch.pirq_emuirq array, usually resulting in a fatal page fault. This vulnerability was introduced by c/s 23241:d21100f1d00e, which adds a call to domain_pirq_to_emuirq() which uses the guest provided pirq value before range checking it, and was fixed by c/s 23573:584c2e5e03d9 which changed the behaviour of the domain_pirq_to_emuirq() macro to use radix trees instead of a flat array. This is XSA-21 / CVE-2012-4536. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- diff -r 701f5e3321c1 -r 210f16b6509b xen/arch/x86/physdev.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c Wed Nov 14 11:33:36 2012 +0000 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c Wed Nov 14 11:35:06 2012 +0000 @@ -234,6 +234,10 @@ static int physdev_unmap_pirq(struct phy if ( ret ) return ret; + ret = -EINVAL; + if ( unmap->pirq < 0 || unmap->pirq >= d->nr_pirqs ) + goto free_domain; + if ( is_hvm_domain(d) ) { spin_lock(&d->event_lock); _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog
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