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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen-unstable] x86/kexec: Change NMI and MCE handling on kexec path
# HG changeset patch
# User Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
# Date 1355409571 0
# Node ID f50aab21f9f2ca3411df7881b2b92293b3af3771
# Parent 3dbd0a9be0cc730a1869d2d82b0fd6286af35533
x86/kexec: Change NMI and MCE handling on kexec path
Experimentally, certain crash kernels will triple fault very early
after starting if started with NMIs disabled. This was discovered
when experimenting with a debug keyhandler which deliberately created
a reentrant NMI, causing stack corruption.
Because of this discovered bug, and that the future changes to the NMI
handling will make the kexec path more fragile, take the time now to
bullet-proof the kexec behaviour to be safer in more circumstances.
This patch adds three new low level routines:
* nmi_crash
This is a special NMI handler for using during a kexec crash.
* enable_nmis
This function enables NMIs by executing an iret-to-self, to
disengage the hardware NMI latch.
* trap_nop
This is a no op handler which irets immediately. It is not
declared
with ENTRY() to avoid the extra alignment overhead.
And adds three new IDT entry helper routines:
* _write_gate_lower
This is a substitute for using cmpxchg16b to update a 128bit
structure at once. It assumes that the top 64 bits are unchanged
(and ASSERT()s the fact) and performs a regular write on the lower
64 bits.
* _set_gate_lower
This is functionally equivalent to the already present
_set_gate(), except it uses _write_gate_lower rather than updating
both 64bit values.
* _update_gate_addr_lower
This is designed to update an IDT entry handler only, without
altering any other settings in the entry. It also uses
_write_gate_lower.
The IDT entry helpers are required because:
* Is it unsafe to attempt a disable/update/re-enable cycle on the
NMI or MCE IDT entries.
* We need to be able to update NMI handlers without changing the IST
entry.
As a result, the new behaviour of the kexec_crash path is:
nmi_shootdown_cpus() will:
* Disable the crashing cpus NMI/MCE interrupt stack tables.
Disabling the stack tables removes race conditions which would
lead
to corrupt exception frames and infinite loops. As this pcpu is
never planning to execute a sysret back to a pv vcpu, the update
is
safe from a security point of view.
* Swap the NMI trap handlers.
The crashing pcpu gets the nop handler, to prevent it getting
stuck in
an NMI context, causing a hang instead of crash. The non-crashing
pcpus all get the nmi_crash handler which is designed never to
return.
do_nmi_crash() will:
* Save the crash notes and shut the pcpu down.
There is now an extra per-cpu variable to prevent us from
executing this multiple times. In the case where we reenter
midway through, attempt the whole operation again in preference to
not completing it in the first place.
* Set up another NMI at the LAPIC.
Even when the LAPIC has been disabled, the ID and command
registers are still usable. As a result, we can deliberately
queue up a new NMI to re-interrupt us later if NMIs get unlatched.
Because of the call to __stop_this_cpu(), we have to hand craft
self_nmi() to be safe from General Protection Faults.
* Fall into infinite loop.
machine_kexec() will:
* Swap the MCE handlers to be a nop.
We cannot prevent MCEs from being delivered when we pass off to
the crash kernel, and the less Xen context is being touched the
better.
* Explicitly enable NMIs.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
Minor style changes.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
---
diff -r 3dbd0a9be0cc -r f50aab21f9f2 xen/arch/x86/crash.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/crash.c Thu Dec 13 12:10:14 2012 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/crash.c Thu Dec 13 14:39:31 2012 +0000
@@ -32,41 +32,130 @@
static atomic_t waiting_for_crash_ipi;
static unsigned int crashing_cpu;
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(bool_t, crash_save_done);
-static int crash_nmi_callback(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, int cpu)
+/* This becomes the NMI handler for non-crashing CPUs, when Xen is crashing. */
+void __attribute__((noreturn)) do_nmi_crash(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
- /* Don't do anything if this handler is invoked on crashing cpu.
- * Otherwise, system will completely hang. Crashing cpu can get
- * an NMI if system was initially booted with nmi_watchdog parameter.
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+ /* nmi_shootdown_cpus() should ensure that this assertion is correct. */
+ ASSERT(cpu != crashing_cpu);
+
+ /* Save crash information and shut down CPU. Attempt only once. */
+ if ( !this_cpu(crash_save_done) )
+ {
+ /* Disable the interrupt stack table for the MCE handler. This
+ * prevents race conditions between clearing MCIP and receving a
+ * new MCE, during which the exception frame would be clobbered
+ * and the MCE handler fall into an infinite loop. We are soon
+ * going to disable the NMI watchdog, so the loop would not be
+ * caught.
+ *
+ * We do not need to change the NMI IST, as the nmi_crash
+ * handler is immue to corrupt exception frames, by virtue of
+ * being designed never to return.
+ *
+ * This update is safe from a security point of view, as this
+ * pcpu is never going to try to sysret back to a PV vcpu.
+ */
+ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_NONE);
+
+ kexec_crash_save_cpu();
+ __stop_this_cpu();
+
+ this_cpu(crash_save_done) = 1;
+ atomic_dec(&waiting_for_crash_ipi);
+ }
+
+ /* Poor mans self_nmi(). __stop_this_cpu() has reverted the LAPIC
+ * back to its boot state, so we are unable to rely on the regular
+ * apic_* functions, due to 'x2apic_enabled' being possibly wrong.
+ * (The likely scenario is that we have reverted from x2apic mode to
+ * xapic, at which point #GPFs will occur if we use the apic_*
+ * functions)
+ *
+ * The ICR and APIC ID of the LAPIC are still valid even during
+ * software disable (Intel SDM Vol 3, 10.4.7.2). As a result, we
+ * can deliberately queue up another NMI at the LAPIC which will not
+ * be delivered as the hardware NMI latch is currently in effect.
+ * This means that if NMIs become unlatched (e.g. following a
+ * non-fatal MCE), the LAPIC will force us back here rather than
+ * wandering back into regular Xen code.
*/
- if ( cpu == crashing_cpu )
- return 1;
- local_irq_disable();
+ switch ( current_local_apic_mode() )
+ {
+ u32 apic_id;
- kexec_crash_save_cpu();
+ case APIC_MODE_X2APIC:
+ apic_id = apic_rdmsr(APIC_ID);
- __stop_this_cpu();
+ apic_wrmsr(APIC_ICR, APIC_DM_NMI | APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL
+ | ((u64)apic_id << 32));
+ break;
- atomic_dec(&waiting_for_crash_ipi);
+ case APIC_MODE_XAPIC:
+ apic_id = GET_xAPIC_ID(apic_mem_read(APIC_ID));
+
+ while ( apic_mem_read(APIC_ICR) & APIC_ICR_BUSY )
+ cpu_relax();
+
+ apic_mem_write(APIC_ICR2, apic_id << 24);
+ apic_mem_write(APIC_ICR, APIC_DM_NMI | APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
for ( ; ; )
halt();
-
- return 1;
}
static void nmi_shootdown_cpus(void)
{
unsigned long msecs;
+ int i, cpu = smp_processor_id();
local_irq_disable();
- crashing_cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ crashing_cpu = cpu;
local_irq_count(crashing_cpu) = 0;
atomic_set(&waiting_for_crash_ipi, num_online_cpus() - 1);
- /* Would it be better to replace the trap vector here? */
- set_nmi_callback(crash_nmi_callback);
+
+ /* Change NMI trap handlers. Non-crashing pcpus get nmi_crash which
+ * invokes do_nmi_crash (above), which cause them to write state and
+ * fall into a loop. The crashing pcpu gets the nop handler to
+ * cause it to return to this function ASAP.
+ */
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_cpu_ids; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( idt_tables[i] == NULL )
+ continue;
+
+ if ( i == cpu )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Disable the interrupt stack tables for this cpu's MCE and NMI
+ * handlers, and alter the NMI handler to have no operation.
+ * Disabling the stack tables prevents stack corruption race
+ * conditions, while changing the handler helps prevent cascading
+ * faults; we are certainly going to crash by this point.
+ *
+ * This update is safe from a security point of view, as this pcpu
+ * is never going to try to sysret back to a PV vcpu.
+ */
+ _set_gate_lower(&idt_tables[i][TRAP_nmi], 14, 0, &trap_nop);
+ set_ist(&idt_tables[i][TRAP_machine_check], IST_NONE);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Do not update stack table for other pcpus. */
+ _update_gate_addr_lower(&idt_tables[i][TRAP_nmi], &nmi_crash);
+ }
+ }
+
/* Ensure the new callback function is set before sending out the NMI. */
wmb();
diff -r 3dbd0a9be0cc -r f50aab21f9f2 xen/arch/x86/machine_kexec.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/machine_kexec.c Thu Dec 13 12:10:14 2012 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/machine_kexec.c Thu Dec 13 14:39:31 2012 +0000
@@ -81,12 +81,34 @@ void machine_kexec(xen_kexec_image_t *im
.base = (unsigned long)(boot_cpu_gdt_table - FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_ENTRY),
.limit = LAST_RESERVED_GDT_BYTE
};
+ int i;
/* We are about to permenantly jump out of the Xen context into the kexec
* purgatory code. We really dont want to be still servicing interupts.
*/
local_irq_disable();
+ /* Now regular interrupts are disabled, we need to reduce the impact
+ * of interrupts not disabled by 'cli'.
+ *
+ * The NMI handlers have already been set up nmi_shootdown_cpus(). All
+ * pcpus other than us have the nmi_crash handler, while we have the nop
+ * handler.
+ *
+ * The MCE handlers touch extensive areas of Xen code and data. At this
+ * point, there is nothing we can usefully do, so set the nop handler.
+ */
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_cpu_ids; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( idt_tables[i] == NULL )
+ continue;
+ _update_gate_addr_lower(&idt_tables[i][TRAP_machine_check], &trap_nop);
+ }
+
+ /* Explicitly enable NMIs on this CPU. Some crashdump kernels do
+ * not like running with NMIs disabled. */
+ enable_nmis();
+
/*
* compat_machine_kexec() returns to idle pagetables, which requires us
* to be running on a static GDT mapping (idle pagetables have no GDT
diff -r 3dbd0a9be0cc -r f50aab21f9f2 xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S Thu Dec 13 12:10:14 2012 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S Thu Dec 13 14:39:31 2012 +0000
@@ -635,11 +635,44 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
movl $TRAP_nmi,4(%rsp)
jmp handle_ist_exception
+ENTRY(nmi_crash)
+ pushq $0
+ movl $TRAP_nmi,4(%rsp)
+ SAVE_ALL
+ movq %rsp,%rdi
+ callq do_nmi_crash /* Does not return */
+ ud2
+
ENTRY(machine_check)
pushq $0
movl $TRAP_machine_check,4(%rsp)
jmp handle_ist_exception
+/* Enable NMIs. No special register assumptions. Only %rax is not preserved.
*/
+ENTRY(enable_nmis)
+ movq %rsp, %rax /* Grab RSP before pushing */
+
+ /* Set up stack frame */
+ pushq $0 /* SS */
+ pushq %rax /* RSP */
+ pushfq /* RFLAGS */
+ pushq $__HYPERVISOR_CS /* CS */
+ leaq 1f(%rip),%rax
+ pushq %rax /* RIP */
+
+ iretq /* Disable the hardware NMI latch */
+1:
+ retq
+
+/* No op trap handler. Required for kexec crash path. This is not
+ * declared with the ENTRY() macro to avoid wasted alignment space.
+ */
+.globl trap_nop
+trap_nop:
+ iretq
+
+
+
.section .rodata, "a", @progbits
ENTRY(exception_table)
diff -r 3dbd0a9be0cc -r f50aab21f9f2 xen/include/asm-x86/desc.h
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/desc.h Thu Dec 13 12:10:14 2012 +0000
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/desc.h Thu Dec 13 14:39:31 2012 +0000
@@ -106,6 +106,21 @@ typedef struct {
u64 a, b;
} idt_entry_t;
+/* Write the lower 64 bits of an IDT Entry. This relies on the upper 32
+ * bits of the address not changing, which is a safe assumption as all
+ * functions we are likely to load will live inside the 1GB
+ * code/data/bss address range.
+ *
+ * Ideally, we would use cmpxchg16b, but this is not supported on some
+ * old AMD 64bit capable processors, and has no safe equivalent.
+ */
+static inline void _write_gate_lower(volatile idt_entry_t *gate,
+ const idt_entry_t *new)
+{
+ ASSERT(gate->b == new->b);
+ gate->a = new->a;
+}
+
#define _set_gate(gate_addr,type,dpl,addr) \
do { \
(gate_addr)->a = 0; \
@@ -122,6 +137,36 @@ do {
(1UL << 47); \
} while (0)
+static inline void _set_gate_lower(idt_entry_t *gate, unsigned long type,
+ unsigned long dpl, void *addr)
+{
+ idt_entry_t idte;
+ idte.b = gate->b;
+ idte.a =
+ (((unsigned long)(addr) & 0xFFFF0000UL) << 32) |
+ ((unsigned long)(dpl) << 45) |
+ ((unsigned long)(type) << 40) |
+ ((unsigned long)(addr) & 0xFFFFUL) |
+ ((unsigned long)__HYPERVISOR_CS64 << 16) |
+ (1UL << 47);
+ _write_gate_lower(gate, &idte);
+}
+
+/* Update the lower half handler of an IDT Entry, without changing any
+ * other configuration. */
+static inline void _update_gate_addr_lower(idt_entry_t *gate, void *addr)
+{
+ idt_entry_t idte;
+ idte.a = gate->a;
+
+ idte.b = ((unsigned long)(addr) >> 32);
+ idte.a &= 0x0000FFFFFFFF0000ULL;
+ idte.a |= (((unsigned long)(addr) & 0xFFFF0000UL) << 32) |
+ ((unsigned long)(addr) & 0xFFFFUL);
+
+ _write_gate_lower(gate, &idte);
+}
+
#define _set_tssldt_desc(desc,addr,limit,type) \
do { \
(desc)[0].b = (desc)[1].b = 0; \
diff -r 3dbd0a9be0cc -r f50aab21f9f2 xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h Thu Dec 13 12:10:14 2012 +0000
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h Thu Dec 13 14:39:31 2012 +0000
@@ -527,6 +527,7 @@ void do_ ## _name(struct cpu_user_regs *
DECLARE_TRAP_HANDLER(divide_error);
DECLARE_TRAP_HANDLER(debug);
DECLARE_TRAP_HANDLER(nmi);
+DECLARE_TRAP_HANDLER(nmi_crash);
DECLARE_TRAP_HANDLER(int3);
DECLARE_TRAP_HANDLER(overflow);
DECLARE_TRAP_HANDLER(bounds);
@@ -545,6 +546,9 @@ DECLARE_TRAP_HANDLER(alignment_check);
DECLARE_TRAP_HANDLER(spurious_interrupt_bug);
#undef DECLARE_TRAP_HANDLER
+void trap_nop(void);
+void enable_nmis(void);
+
void syscall_enter(void);
void sysenter_entry(void);
void sysenter_eflags_saved(void);
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