[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.1] x86/xsave: fix information leak on AMD CPUs
commit c3401c1aece47dc5388184c9b6a3527655d5bbdf Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Tue Jun 4 09:38:49 2013 +0200 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Tue Jun 4 09:38:49 2013 +0200 x86/xsave: fix information leak on AMD CPUs Just like for FXSAVE/FXRSTOR, XSAVE/XRSTOR also don't save/restore the last instruction and operand pointers as well as the last opcode if there's no pending unmasked exception (see CVE-2006-1056 and commit 9747:4d667a139318). While the FXSR solution sits in the save path, I prefer to have this in the restore path because there the handling is simpler (namely in the context of the pending changes to properly save the selector values for 32-bit guest code). Also this is using FFREE instead of EMMS, as it doesn't seem unlikely that in the future we may see CPUs with x87 and SSE/AVX but no MMX support. The goal here anyway is just to avoid an FPU stack overflow. I would have preferred to use FFREEP instead of FFREE (freeing two stack slots at once), but AMD doesn't document that instruction. This is CVE-2013-2076 / XSA-52. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx> master commit: 8dcf9f0113454f233089e8e5bb3970d891928410 master date: 2013-06-04 09:26:54 +0200 --- xen/arch/x86/i387.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/i387.c b/xen/arch/x86/i387.c index 585b8c9..6e22eba 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/i387.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/i387.c @@ -44,6 +44,21 @@ static void xrstor(struct vcpu *v) { struct xsave_struct *ptr = v->arch.xsave_area; + /* + * AMD CPUs don't save/restore FDP/FIP/FOP unless an exception + * is pending. Clear the x87 state here by setting it to fixed + * values. The hypervisor data segment can be sometimes 0 and + * sometimes new user value. Both should be ok. Use the FPU saved + * data block as a safe address because it should be in L1. + */ + if ( (ptr->xsave_hdr.xstate_bv & XSTATE_FP) && + !(ptr->fpu_sse.fsw & 0x0080) && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ) + asm volatile ( "fnclex\n\t" /* clear exceptions */ + "ffree %%st(7)\n\t" /* clear stack tag */ + "fildl %0" /* load to clear state */ + : : "m" (ptr->fpu_sse) ); + asm volatile ( ".byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xae,0x2f" : -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.1 _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog
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