[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86: properly handle MSI-X unmask operation from guests
commit 74fd0036deb585a139b63b26db025805ecedc37a Author: Feng Wu <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Wed Nov 27 15:15:43 2013 +0100 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Wed Nov 27 15:15:43 2013 +0100 x86: properly handle MSI-X unmask operation from guests For a pass-through device with MSI-x capability, when guest tries to unmask the MSI-x interrupt for the passed through device, xen doesn't clear the mask bit for MSI-x in hardware in the following scenario, which will cause network disconnection: 1. Guest masks the MSI-x interrupt 2. Guest updates the address and data for it 3. Guest unmasks the MSI-x interrupt (This is the problematic step) In the step #3 above, Xen doesn't handle it well. When guest tries to unmask MSI-X interrupt, it traps to Xen, Xen just returns to Qemu if it notices that address or data has been modified by guest before, then Qemu will update Xen with the latest value of address/data by hypercall. However, in this whole process, the MSI-X interrupt unmask operation is missing, which means Xen doesn't clear the mask bit in hardware for the MSI-X interrupt, so it remains disabled, that is why it loses the network connection. This patch fixes this issue. Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx> Only latch the address if the guest really is unmasking the entry. Clean up the entire change. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c | 3 +++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/io.h | 1 + xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c index 15e0b4c..bf6309d 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c @@ -300,7 +300,10 @@ void hvm_io_assist(ioreq_t *p) } if ( p->state == STATE_IOREQ_NONE ) + { + msix_write_completion(curr); vcpu_end_shutdown_deferral(curr); + } } static int dpci_ioport_read(uint32_t mport, ioreq_t *p) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c index 4826b4a..10e5f34 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c @@ -293,7 +293,11 @@ static int msixtbl_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long address, /* exit to device model if address/data has been modified */ if ( test_and_clear_bit(nr_entry, &entry->table_flags) ) + { + if ( !(val & PCI_MSIX_VECTOR_BITMASK) ) + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hvm_io.msix_unmask_address = address; goto out; + } virt = msixtbl_addr_to_virt(entry, address); if ( !virt ) @@ -528,3 +532,15 @@ void msixtbl_pt_cleanup(struct domain *d) spin_unlock(&d->arch.hvm_domain.msixtbl_list_lock); local_irq_restore(flags); } + +void msix_write_completion(struct vcpu *v) +{ + unsigned long ctrl_address = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hvm_io.msix_unmask_address; + + if ( !ctrl_address ) + return; + + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hvm_io.msix_unmask_address = 0; + if ( msixtbl_write(v, ctrl_address, 4, 0) != X86EMUL_OKAY ) + gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "MSI-X write completion failure\n"); +} diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/io.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/io.h index 6f4cb96..86db58d 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/io.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/io.h @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ void hvm_interrupt_post(struct vcpu *v, int vector, int type); void hvm_io_assist(ioreq_t *p); void hvm_dpci_eoi(struct domain *d, unsigned int guest_irq, union vioapic_redir_entry *ent); +void msix_write_completion(struct vcpu *); struct hvm_hw_stdvga { uint8_t sr_index; diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h index a309389..4f45060 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h @@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ struct hvm_vcpu_io { * necessary retry through other than function return codes. */ bool_t mmio_retry, mmio_retrying; + + unsigned long msix_unmask_address; }; #define VMCX_EADDR (~0ULL) -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog
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