[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.2] x86/HVM: restrict HVMOP_set_mem_type
commit 560d630110f9f11fe6a0bd18522d0e2bea9ab401 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Tue Apr 29 15:31:28 2014 +0200 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Tue Apr 29 15:31:28 2014 +0200 x86/HVM: restrict HVMOP_set_mem_type Permitting arbitrary type changes here has the potential of creating present P2M (and hence EPT/NPT/IOMMU) entries pointing to an invalid MFN (INVALID_MFN truncated to the respective hardware structure field's width). This would become a problem the latest when something real sat at the end of the physical address space; I'm suspecting though that other things might break with such bogus entries. Along with that drop a bogus (and otherwise becoming stale) log message. Afaict the similar operation in p2m_set_mem_access() is safe. This is XSA-92. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> master commit: 83bb5eb4d340acebf27b34108fb1dae062146a68 master date: 2014-04-29 15:11:31 +0200 --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 6 ++---- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index ed8ef64..a0e7d79 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -4245,12 +4245,10 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(void) arg) rc = -EINVAL; goto param_fail4; } - if ( p2m_is_grant(t) ) + if ( !p2m_is_ram(t) && + (!p2m_is_hole(t) || a.hvmmem_type != HVMMEM_mmio_dm) ) { put_gfn(d, pfn); - gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, - "type for pfn 0x%lx changed to grant while " - "we were working?\n", pfn); goto param_fail4; } else -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.2 _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog
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