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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86/hvm: add SMAP support to HVM guest
commit 58658992c16e330b89c0403bd5c3f68f8926419d
Author: Feng Wu <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Mon May 12 17:04:50 2014 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Mon May 12 17:04:50 2014 +0200
x86/hvm: add SMAP support to HVM guest
Intel new CPU supports SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention).
SMAP prevents supervisor-mode accesses to any linear address with
a valid translation for which the U/S flag (bit 2) is 1 in every
paging-structure entry controlling the translation for the linear
address.
Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 3 +++
xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index f2bd84b..b69f164 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -3460,6 +3460,9 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsigned int *eax,
unsigned int *ebx,
if ( (count == 0) && !cpu_has_smep )
*ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP);
+ if ( (count == 0) && !cpu_has_smap )
+ *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
+
/* Don't expose MPX to hvm when VMX support is not available */
if ( (count == 0) &&
(!(vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) ||
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
index 70460b6..bb38fda 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
guest_l4e_t *l4p;
#endif
uint32_t gflags, mflags, iflags, rc = 0;
- int smep;
+ bool_t smep = 0, smap = 0;
bool_t pse1G = 0, pse2M = 0;
p2m_query_t qt = P2M_ALLOC | P2M_UNSHARE;
@@ -159,13 +159,33 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
mflags = mandatory_flags(v, pfec);
iflags = (_PAGE_NX_BIT | _PAGE_INVALID_BITS);
- /* SMEP: kernel-mode instruction fetches from user-mode mappings
- * should fault. Unlike NX or invalid bits, we're looking for _all_
- * entries in the walk to have _PAGE_USER set, so we need to do the
- * whole walk as if it were a user-mode one and then invert the answer. */
- smep = (is_hvm_vcpu(v) && hvm_smep_enabled(v)
- && (pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch) && !(pfec & PFEC_user_mode) );
- if ( smep )
+ if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) && !(pfec & PFEC_user_mode) )
+ {
+ struct segment_register seg;
+ const struct cpu_user_regs *regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
+
+ hvm_get_segment_register(v, x86_seg_ss, &seg);
+
+ /* SMEP: kernel-mode instruction fetches from user-mode mappings
+ * should fault. Unlike NX or invalid bits, we're looking for _all_
+ * entries in the walk to have _PAGE_USER set, so we need to do the
+ * whole walk as if it were a user-mode one and then invert the
answer. */
+ smep = hvm_smep_enabled(v) && (pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch);
+
+ /*
+ * SMAP: kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode mappings should fault
+ * A fault is considered as a SMAP violation if the following
+ * conditions come true:
+ * - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4
+ * - A user page is accessed
+ * - CPL = 3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC is clear
+ * - Page fault in kernel mode
+ */
+ smap = hvm_smap_enabled(v) &&
+ ((seg.attr.fields.dpl == 3) || !(regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC));
+ }
+
+ if ( smep || smap )
mflags |= _PAGE_USER;
#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 3 /* PAE or 64... */
@@ -338,8 +358,8 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 /* 64-bit only... */
set_ad:
#endif
- /* Now re-invert the user-mode requirement for SMEP. */
- if ( smep )
+ /* Now re-invert the user-mode requirement for SMEP and SMAP */
+ if ( smep || smap )
rc ^= _PAGE_USER;
/* Go back and set accessed and dirty bits only if the walk was a
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
index 251625d..b5a56e0 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -265,6 +265,8 @@ int hvm_girq_dest_2_vcpu_id(struct domain *d, uint8_t dest,
uint8_t dest_mode);
(hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_PAE))
#define hvm_smep_enabled(v) \
(hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_SMEP))
+#define hvm_smap_enabled(v) \
+ (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_SMAP))
#define hvm_nx_enabled(v) \
(!!((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_efer & EFER_NX))
@@ -366,17 +368,30 @@ static inline int hvm_event_pending(struct vcpu *v)
static inline bool_t hvm_vcpu_has_smep(void)
{
- unsigned int eax, ebx;
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx = 0;
hvm_cpuid(0, &eax, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (eax < 7)
+ if ( eax < 7 )
return 0;
- hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, NULL, NULL);
+ hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, &ecx, NULL);
return !!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP));
}
+static inline bool_t hvm_vcpu_has_smap(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx = 0;
+
+ hvm_cpuid(0, &eax, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if ( eax < 7 )
+ return 0;
+
+ hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, &ecx, NULL);
+ return !!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP));
+}
+
/* These reserved bits in lower 32 remain 0 after any load of CR0 */
#define HVM_CR0_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS \
(~((unsigned long) \
@@ -397,6 +412,7 @@ static inline bool_t hvm_vcpu_has_smep(void)
X86_CR4_MCE | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | \
X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | \
(hvm_vcpu_has_smep() ? X86_CR4_SMEP : 0) | \
+ (hvm_vcpu_has_smap() ? X86_CR4_SMAP : 0) | \
(cpu_has_fsgsbase ? X86_CR4_FSGSBASE : 0) | \
((nestedhvm_enabled((_v)->domain) && cpu_has_vmx)\
? X86_CR4_VMXE : 0) | \
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master
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