[Xen-changelog] [xen master] VT-d: extend error report masking workaround to newer chipsets

[patchbot@xxxxxxx]

commit 04734664eb20c3bf239e473af182bb7ab901d779
Author:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue May 20 15:54:01 2014 +0200
Commit:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue May 20 15:54:01 2014 +0200

    VT-d: extend error report masking workaround to newer chipsets
    
    Add two more PCI IDs to the set that has been taken care of with a
    different workaround long before XSA-59, and (for constency with the
    newer workarounds) log a message here too.
    
    Also move the function wide comment to the cases it applies to; this
    should really have been done by d061d200 ("VT-d: suppress UR signaling
    for server chipsets").
    
    This is CVE-2013-3495 / XSA-59.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@xxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@xxxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c |   16 ++++++++++------
 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c 
b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
index 7cbe0ad..d917b2f 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
@@ -379,12 +379,6 @@ void me_wifi_quirk(struct domain *domain, u8 bus, u8 
devfn, int map)
     }
 }
 
-/*
- * Mask reporting Intel VT-d faults to IOH core logic:
- *   - Some platform escalates VT-d faults to platform errors 
- *   - This can cause system failure upon non-fatal VT-d faults
- *   - Potential security issue if malicious guest trigger VT-d faults
- */
 void pci_vtd_quirk(const struct pci_dev *pdev)
 {
     int seg = pdev->seg;
@@ -402,10 +396,20 @@ void pci_vtd_quirk(const struct pci_dev *pdev)
 
     switch ( pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, dev, func, PCI_DEVICE_ID) )
     {
+    /*
+     * Mask reporting Intel VT-d faults to IOH core logic:
+     *   - Some platform escalates VT-d faults to platform errors.
+     *   - This can cause system failure upon non-fatal VT-d faults.
+     *   - Potential security issue if malicious guest trigger VT-d faults.
+     */
+    case 0x0e28: /* Xeon-E5v2 (IvyBridge) */
     case 0x342e: /* Tylersburg chipset (Nehalem / Westmere systems) */
+    case 0x3728: /* Xeon C5500/C3500 (JasperForest) */
     case 0x3c28: /* Sandybridge */
         val = pci_conf_read32(seg, bus, dev, func, 0x1AC);
         pci_conf_write32(seg, bus, dev, func, 0x1AC, val | (1 << 31));
+        printk(XENLOG_INFO "Masked VT-d error signaling on 
%04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
+               seg, bus, dev, func);
         break;
 
     /* Tylersburg (EP)/Boxboro (MP) chipsets (NHM-EP/EX, WSM-EP/EX) */
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master

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