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[Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.2] VT-d: suppress UR signaling for desktop chipsets



commit b9aea2a228b614fdb3aa9e143bf329ef71352b4d
Author:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Fri May 23 15:35:45 2014 +0200
Commit:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri May 23 15:35:45 2014 +0200

    VT-d: suppress UR signaling for desktop chipsets
    
    Unsupported Requests can be signaled for malformed writes to the MSI
    address region, e.g. due to buggy or malicious DMA set up to that
    region. These should normally result in IOMMU faults, but don't on
    the desktop chipsets dealt with here.
    
    This is CVE-2013-3495 / XSA-59.
    
    Note that in the backported version the clearing of the fixmap entry
    is commented out - it's not strictly needed, as we don't re-use the
    fixmap slot (and if we did it would still caue no problems), but causes
    a problem in map_pages_to_xen(), which wants to flush the cache for the
    page in question, but that works only when the page is still mapped.
    Fixing this will need to be a separate patch (coming through -unstable)
    though.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Don Dugger <donald.d.dugger@xxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@xxxxxxxxx>
    master commit: d6cb14b34ffc2a830022d059f1aa22bf19dcf55f
    master date: 2014-04-25 12:12:38 +0200
---
 xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c |   34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c 
b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
index 767c96a..f300c6c 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
@@ -391,13 +391,12 @@ void me_wifi_quirk(struct domain *domain, u8 bus, u8 
devfn, int map)
  */
 void __init pci_vtd_quirk(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
     int seg = pdev->seg;
     int bus = pdev->bus;
     int dev = PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn);
     int func = PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn);
-    int pos;
-    u32 val;
+    u64 bar;
+    paddr_t pa;
 
     if ( pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, dev, func, PCI_VENDOR_ID) !=
          PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL )
@@ -405,6 +404,10 @@ void __init pci_vtd_quirk(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 
     switch ( pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, dev, func, PCI_DEVICE_ID) )
     {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+        int pos;
+        u32 val;
+
     case 0x342e: /* Tylersburg chipset (Nehalem / Westmere systems) */
     case 0x3c28: /* Sandybridge */
         val = pci_conf_read32(seg, bus, dev, func, 0x1AC);
@@ -459,6 +462,29 @@ void __init pci_vtd_quirk(struct pci_dev *pdev)
         printk(XENLOG_INFO "Masked UR signaling on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
                seg, bus, dev, func);
         break;
-    }
 #endif
+
+    case 0x100: case 0x104: case 0x108: /* Sandybridge */
+    case 0x150: case 0x154: case 0x158: /* Ivybridge */
+    case 0xa04: /* Haswell ULT */
+    case 0xc00: case 0xc04: case 0xc08: /* Haswell */
+        bar = pci_conf_read32(seg, bus, dev, func, 0x6c);
+        bar = (bar << 32) | pci_conf_read32(seg, bus, dev, func, 0x68);
+        pa = bar & 0x7fffff000; /* bits 12...38 */
+        if ( (bar & 1) && pa &&
+             page_is_ram_type(paddr_to_pfn(pa), RAM_TYPE_RESERVED) )
+        {
+            u32 __iomem *va = (void __iomem 
*)fix_to_virt(FIX_IOMMU_MMIO_BASE_0);
+
+            set_fixmap_nocache(FIX_IOMMU_MMIO_BASE_0, pa);
+            __set_bit(0x1c8 * 8 + 20, va);
+            /* __set_fixmap(FIX_IOMMU_MMIO_BASE_0, 0, 0); */
+            printk(XENLOG_INFO "Masked UR signaling on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
+                   seg, bus, dev, func);
+        }
+        else
+            printk(XENLOG_WARNING "Bogus DMIBAR %#"PRIx64" on 
%04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
+                   bar, seg, bus, dev, func);
+        break;
+    }
 }
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.2

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