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[Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.5] xen: arm: correctly handle continuations for 64-bit guests



commit 1dcdf90a9f37e598e3f6c20ad96a551602777802
Author:     Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Thu Mar 26 10:54:04 2015 +0000
Commit:     Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Thu Apr 2 11:45:19 2015 +0100

    xen: arm: correctly handle continuations for 64-bit guests
    
    The 64-bit ABI is different to 32-bit:
    
     - uses x16 as the op register rather than r12.
     - arguments in x0..x5 and not r0..r5. Using rN here potentially
       truncates.
     - return value goes in x0, not r0.
    
    Hypercalls can only be made directly from kernel space, so checking
    the domain's size is sufficient.
    
    Spotted due to spurious -EFAULT when destroying a domain, due to the
    hypercall's pointer argument being truncated. I'm unclear why I am
    only seeing this now.
    
    Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx>
    (cherry picked from commit 7466b88ec2c59b1769da358bdc843bcabbee522c)
---
 xen/arch/arm/domain.c |   54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
index 7221bc8..47431bf 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
@@ -357,29 +357,57 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
     }
     else
     {
-        regs      = guest_cpu_user_regs();
-        regs->r12 = op;
+        regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
 
         /* Ensure the hypercall trap instruction is re-executed. */
         regs->pc -= 4;  /* re-execute 'hvc #XEN_HYPERCALL_TAG' */
 
-        for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_64
+        if ( !is_32bit_domain(current->domain) )
         {
-            arg = next_arg(p, args);
+            regs->x16 = op;
 
-            switch ( i )
+            for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
             {
-            case 0: regs->r0 = arg; break;
-            case 1: regs->r1 = arg; break;
-            case 2: regs->r2 = arg; break;
-            case 3: regs->r3 = arg; break;
-            case 4: regs->r4 = arg; break;
-            case 5: regs->r5 = arg; break;
+                arg = next_arg(p, args);
+
+                switch ( i )
+                {
+                case 0: regs->x0 = arg; break;
+                case 1: regs->x1 = arg; break;
+                case 2: regs->x2 = arg; break;
+                case 3: regs->x3 = arg; break;
+                case 4: regs->x4 = arg; break;
+                case 5: regs->x5 = arg; break;
+                }
             }
+
+            /* Return value gets written back to x0 */
+            rc = regs->x0;
         }
+        else
+#endif
+        {
+            regs->r12 = op;
 
-        /* Return value gets written back to r0 */
-        rc = regs->r0;
+            for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
+            {
+                arg = next_arg(p, args);
+
+                switch ( i )
+                {
+                case 0: regs->r0 = arg; break;
+                case 1: regs->r1 = arg; break;
+                case 2: regs->r2 = arg; break;
+                case 3: regs->r3 = arg; break;
+                case 4: regs->r4 = arg; break;
+                case 5: regs->r5 = arg; break;
+                }
+            }
+
+            /* Return value gets written back to r0 */
+            rc = regs->r0;
+        }
     }
 
     va_end(args);
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.5

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