[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[Xen-changelog] [qemu-xen-unstable] fdc: force the fifo access to be in bounds of the allocated buffer



commit 4de1422ea306832b6ef2cba34e9febb73dd139a7
Author:     Petr Matousek <pmatouse@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Wed May 6 09:48:59 2015 +0200
Commit:     Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Wed May 27 16:47:38 2015 +0100

    fdc: force the fifo access to be in bounds of the allocated buffer
    
    During processing of certain commands such as FD_CMD_READ_ID and
    FD_CMD_DRIVE_SPECIFICATION_COMMAND the fifo memory access could
    get out of bounds leading to memory corruption with values coming
    from the guest.
    
    Fix this by making sure that the index is always bounded by the
    allocated memory.
    
    This is XSA-133 / CVE-2015-3456.
    
    Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 hw/fdc.c |   17 +++++++++++------
 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/hw/fdc.c b/hw/fdc.c
index b00a4ec..aba02e4 100644
--- a/hw/fdc.c
+++ b/hw/fdc.c
@@ -1318,7 +1318,7 @@ static uint32_t fdctrl_read_data (fdctrl_t *fdctrl)
 {
     fdrive_t *cur_drv;
     uint32_t retval = 0;
-    int pos;
+    uint32_t pos;
 
     cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
     fdctrl->dsr &= ~FD_DSR_PWRDOWN;
@@ -1327,8 +1327,8 @@ static uint32_t fdctrl_read_data (fdctrl_t *fdctrl)
         return 0;
     }
     pos = fdctrl->data_pos;
+    pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
     if (fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_NONDMA) {
-        pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
         if (pos == 0) {
             if (fdctrl->data_pos != 0)
                 if (!fdctrl_seek_to_next_sect(fdctrl, cur_drv)) {
@@ -1673,10 +1673,13 @@ static void fdctrl_handle_option (fdctrl_t *fdctrl, int 
direction)
 static void fdctrl_handle_drive_specification_command (fdctrl_t *fdctrl, int 
direction)
 {
     fdrive_t *cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
+    uint32_t pos;
 
-    if (fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos - 1] & 0x80) {
+    pos = fdctrl->data_pos - 1;
+    pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
+    if (fdctrl->fifo[pos] & 0x80) {
         /* Command parameters done */
-        if (fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos - 1] & 0x40) {
+        if (fdctrl->fifo[pos] & 0x40) {
             fdctrl->fifo[0] = fdctrl->fifo[1];
             fdctrl->fifo[2] = 0;
             fdctrl->fifo[3] = 0;
@@ -1771,7 +1774,7 @@ static uint8_t command_to_handler[256];
 static void fdctrl_write_data (fdctrl_t *fdctrl, uint32_t value)
 {
     fdrive_t *cur_drv;
-    int pos;
+    uint32_t pos;
 
     /* Reset mode */
     if (!(fdctrl->dor & FD_DOR_nRESET)) {
@@ -1817,7 +1820,9 @@ static void fdctrl_write_data (fdctrl_t *fdctrl, uint32_t 
value)
     }
 
     FLOPPY_DPRINTF("%s: %02x\n", __func__, value);
-    fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos++] = value;
+    pos = fdctrl->data_pos++;
+    pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
+    fdctrl->fifo[pos] = value;
     if (fdctrl->data_pos == fdctrl->data_len) {
         /* We now have all parameters
          * and will be able to treat the command
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/qemu-xen-unstable.git

_______________________________________________
Xen-changelog mailing list
Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog


 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.