[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen master] xen/arm: p2m: Don't use default access permission when shattering a superpage
commit 97323702bf101615cfdcf329913094c4cc82bf99 Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Fri Jul 29 19:53:19 2016 +0100 Commit: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Thu Aug 4 11:25:05 2016 -0700 xen/arm: p2m: Don't use default access permission when shattering a superpage The following message flood the console when memaccess is enabled on various platforms: traps.c:2510:d1v0 HSR=0x9383004f pc=0xffff000008b7d4c4 gva=0xffff000008eeb8e0 gpa=0x0000004903f8e0 This is because a data abort from a guest was received due to a permission fault but memaccess thought there are no permission fault. On ARM, memaccess permissions are stored in a radix tree because there are not enough available bits in the p2m entry to store the access restriction. When memaccess is restricting the access (i.e any other access than p2m_access_rwx), the access will be added in the radix tree using the GFN as a key. This will be done for all 4KB pages. This means that memaccess has to shatter all the superpages in a given region to set the permission on a 4KB granularity. Currently, when a superpage is shattered, the new entries are using the value p2m->default_access which will restrict permission (because memaccess has been enabled). However the radix tree does not yet contain an entry for this GFN. If a guest VCPU is running at the same time and trying to access the modified region, it will result to a stage-2 permission fault. As the radix tree does not yet contain an entry for the GFN, memaccess will deduce that the fault was not valid and a data abort will be injecting to the guest (and crash it). Furthermore, the permission may be restricted outside of the requested region if it is only a subset of a 1GB/2MB superpage. The two issues can be fixed by re-using the permission of the superpage entry and override the necessary fields. This is not a problem because memaccess cannot work on superpage. Lastly, document the code which call mfn_to_p2m_entry when creating a the p2m entry for a table to explain that create the p2m entry to page table to explain that permission are ignored by the hardware (See D4.3.1 in ARM DDI 0487A.j). so the value of the parameter 'access' of mfn_to_p2m_entry does not matter. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c index 40a0b80..d60fbbf 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c @@ -434,7 +434,6 @@ static int p2m_create_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m, lpae_t *entry, p = __map_domain_page(page); if ( splitting ) { - p2m_type_t t = entry->p2m.type; mfn_t mfn = _mfn(entry->p2m.base); int i; @@ -444,15 +443,20 @@ static int p2m_create_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m, lpae_t *entry, */ for ( i=0 ; i < LPAE_ENTRIES; i++ ) { - pte = mfn_to_p2m_entry(mfn_add(mfn, i << (level_shift - LPAE_SHIFT)), - t, p2m->default_access); + /* + * Use the content of the superpage entry and override + * the necessary fields. So the correct permissions are + * kept. + */ + pte = *entry; + pte.p2m.base = mfn_x(mfn_add(mfn, + i << (level_shift - LPAE_SHIFT))); /* * First and second level super pages set p2m.table = 0, but * third level entries set table = 1. */ - if ( level_shift - LPAE_SHIFT ) - pte.p2m.table = 0; + pte.p2m.table = !(level_shift - LPAE_SHIFT); write_pte(&p[i], pte); } @@ -467,6 +471,10 @@ static int p2m_create_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m, lpae_t *entry, unmap_domain_page(p); + /* + * The access value does not matter because the hardware will ignore + * the permission fields for table entry. + */ pte = mfn_to_p2m_entry(_mfn(page_to_mfn(page)), p2m_invalid, p2m->default_access); -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog
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