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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86: allow disabling sm{e, a}p for Xen itself
commit 5fdea6577098eda065c794c79e1ae23f33f103af
Author: He Chen <he.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Mon Sep 5 12:49:43 2016 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Mon Sep 5 12:49:43 2016 +0200
x86: allow disabling sm{e,a}p for Xen itself
SMEP/SMAP is a security feature to prevent kernel executing/accessing
user address involuntarily, any such behavior will lead to a page fault.
SMEP/SMAP is open (in CR4) for both Xen and HVM guest in earlier code.
SMEP/SMAP bit set in Xen CR4 would enforce security checking for 32-bit
PV guest which will suffer unknown SMEP/SMAP page fault when guest
kernel attempt to access user address although SMEP/SMAP is close for
PV guests.
This patch introduces a new boot option value "hvm" for "sm{e,a}p", it
is going to diable SMEP/SMAP for Xen hypervisor while enable them for
HVM. In this way, 32-bit PV guest will not suffer SMEP/SMAP security
issue. Users can choose whether open SMEP/SMAP for Xen itself,
especially when they are going to run 32-bit PV guests.
Signed-off-by: He Chen <he.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[jbeulich: doc and style adjustments]
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 14 ++++----
xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h | 10 +++---
xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h | 4 +--
4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
index 3a250cb..3690041 100644
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
@@ -1427,19 +1427,21 @@ enabling more sockets and cores to go into deeper sleep
states.
Set the serial transmit buffer size.
-### smep
-> `= <boolean>`
+### smap
+> `= <boolean> | hvm`
> Default: `true`
-Flag to enable Supervisor Mode Execution Protection
+Flag to enable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention
+Use `smap=hvm` to allow SMAP use by HVM guests only.
-### smap
-> `= <boolean>`
+### smep
+> `= <boolean> | hvm`
> Default: `true`
-Flag to enable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention
+Flag to enable Supervisor Mode Execution Protection
+Use `smep=hvm` to allow SMEP use by HVM guests only.
### snb\_igd\_quirk
> `= <boolean> | cap | <integer>`
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index 8ae897a..27a0720 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -61,14 +61,6 @@ boolean_param("nosmp", opt_nosmp);
static unsigned int __initdata max_cpus;
integer_param("maxcpus", max_cpus);
-/* smep: Enable/disable Supervisor Mode Execution Protection (default on). */
-static bool_t __initdata opt_smep = 1;
-boolean_param("smep", opt_smep);
-
-/* smap: Enable/disable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (default on). */
-static bool_t __initdata opt_smap = 1;
-boolean_param("smap", opt_smap);
-
unsigned long __read_mostly cr4_pv32_mask;
/* Boot dom0 in pvh mode */
@@ -112,6 +104,58 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 __read_mostly boot_cpu_data = { 0, 0,
0, 0, -1 };
unsigned long __read_mostly mmu_cr4_features = XEN_MINIMAL_CR4;
+/* smep: Enable/disable Supervisor Mode Execution Protection (default on). */
+#define SMEP_HVM_ONLY (-1)
+static s8 __initdata opt_smep = 1;
+static void __init parse_smep_param(char *s)
+{
+ if ( !*s )
+ {
+ opt_smep = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ switch ( parse_bool(s) )
+ {
+ case 0:
+ opt_smep = 0;
+ return;
+ case 1:
+ opt_smep = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if ( !strcmp(s, "hvm") )
+ opt_smep = SMEP_HVM_ONLY;
+}
+custom_param("smep", parse_smep_param);
+
+/* smap: Enable/disable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (default on). */
+#define SMAP_HVM_ONLY (-1)
+static s8 __initdata opt_smap = 1;
+static void __init parse_smap_param(char *s)
+{
+ if ( !*s )
+ {
+ opt_smap = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ switch ( parse_bool(s) )
+ {
+ case 0:
+ opt_smap = 0;
+ return;
+ case 1:
+ opt_smap = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if ( !strcmp(s, "hvm") )
+ opt_smap = SMAP_HVM_ONLY;
+}
+custom_param("smap", parse_smap_param);
+
bool_t __read_mostly acpi_disabled;
bool_t __initdata acpi_force;
static char __initdata acpi_param[10] = "";
@@ -1404,12 +1448,16 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
if ( !opt_smep )
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMEP);
- if ( cpu_has_smep )
+ else if ( opt_smep == 1 )
+ __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMEP, boot_cpu_data.x86_capability);
+ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMEP) )
set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMEP);
if ( !opt_smap )
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
- if ( cpu_has_smap )
+ else if ( opt_smap == 1 )
+ __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMAP, boot_cpu_data.x86_capability);
+ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMAP) )
set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMAP);
cr4_pv32_mask = mmu_cr4_features & XEN_CR4_PV32_BITS;
@@ -1551,7 +1599,7 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
* This saves a large number of corner cases interactions with
* copy_from_user().
*/
- if ( cpu_has_smap )
+ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMAP) )
{
cr4_pv32_mask &= ~X86_CR4_SMAP;
write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_SMAP);
@@ -1571,7 +1619,7 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
bootstrap_map, cmdline) != 0)
panic("Could not set up DOM0 guest OS");
- if ( cpu_has_smap )
+ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMAP) )
{
write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_SMAP);
cr4_pv32_mask |= X86_CR4_SMAP;
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
index e36e78f..f1c6fa1 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ void ret_from_intr(void);
.popsection; \
.pushsection .altinstructions, "a"; \
altinstruction_entry 661b, 661b, X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS, 3, 0; \
- altinstruction_entry 661b, 662b, X86_FEATURE_SMAP, 3, 3; \
+ altinstruction_entry 661b, 662b, X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMAP, 3, 3; \
.popsection
#define ASM_STAC ASM_AC(STAC)
@@ -217,21 +217,21 @@ void ret_from_intr(void);
668: call cr4_pv32_restore; \
.section .altinstructions, "a"; \
altinstruction_entry 667b, 667b, X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS, 5, 0; \
- altinstruction_entry 667b, 668b, X86_FEATURE_SMEP, 5, 5; \
- altinstruction_entry 667b, 668b, X86_FEATURE_SMAP, 5, 5; \
+ altinstruction_entry 667b, 668b, X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMEP, 5, 5; \
+ altinstruction_entry 667b, 668b, X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMAP, 5, 5; \
.popsection
#else
static always_inline void clac(void)
{
/* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */
- alternative(ASM_NOP3, __stringify(__ASM_CLAC), X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
+ alternative(ASM_NOP3, __stringify(__ASM_CLAC), X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMAP);
}
static always_inline void stac(void)
{
/* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */
- alternative(ASM_NOP3, __stringify(__ASM_STAC), X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
+ alternative(ASM_NOP3, __stringify(__ASM_STAC), X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMAP);
}
#endif
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
index bcdf5d6..0f6810a 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(CPUID_FAULTING, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+ 6) /* cpuid
faulting */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(CLFLUSH_MONITOR, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+ 7) /* clflush reqd with
monitor */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(APERFMPERF, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+ 8) /* APERFMPERF */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(MFENCE_RDTSC, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+ 9) /* MFENCE synchronizes
RDTSC */
+XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SMEP, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+ 10) /* SMEP gets used by Xen
itself */
+XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SMAP, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+ 11) /* SMAP gets used by Xen
itself */
#define NCAPINTS (FSCAPINTS + 1) /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
@@ -66,8 +68,6 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(MFENCE_RDTSC, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+ 9) /*
MFENCE synchronizes RDTS
#define cpu_has_page1gb boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAGE1GB)
#define cpu_has_fsgsbase boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)
#define cpu_has_aperfmperf boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF)
-#define cpu_has_smep boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)
-#define cpu_has_smap boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP)
#define cpu_has_fpu_sel (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NO_FPU_SEL))
#define cpu_has_ffxsr ((boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) \
&& boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FFXSR))
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master
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