|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86/HVM: adjust feature checking in MSR intercept handling
commit 6e0815a8d75f1cb90f84894346f9261814d7453a
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Wed Sep 7 12:35:40 2016 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Wed Sep 7 12:35:40 2016 +0200
x86/HVM: adjust feature checking in MSR intercept handling
Consistently consult hvm_cpuid(). With that, BNDCFGS gets better
handled outside of VMX specific code, just like XSS. Don't needlessly
check for MTRR support when the MSR being accessed clearly is not an
MTRR one.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 40 ++++++++++++++------
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 10 +++++
3 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 98f0740..787f055 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -309,6 +309,14 @@ int hvm_set_guest_pat(struct vcpu *v, u64 guest_pat)
return 1;
}
+bool hvm_set_guest_bndcfgs(struct vcpu *v, u64 val)
+{
+ return hvm_funcs.set_guest_bndcfgs &&
+ is_canonical_address(val) &&
+ !(val & IA32_BNDCFGS_RESERVED) &&
+ hvm_funcs.set_guest_bndcfgs(v, val);
+}
+
/*
* Get the ratio to scale host TSC frequency to gtsc_khz. zero will be
* returned if TSC scaling is unavailable or ratio cannot be handled
@@ -3667,28 +3675,30 @@ int hvm_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t
*msr_content)
{
struct vcpu *v = current;
uint64_t *var_range_base, *fixed_range_base;
- bool_t mtrr;
- unsigned int edx, index;
+ bool mtrr = false;
int ret = X86EMUL_OKAY;
var_range_base = (uint64_t *)v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr.var_ranges;
fixed_range_base = (uint64_t *)v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr.fixed_ranges;
- hvm_cpuid(1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &edx);
- mtrr = !!(edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MTRR));
+ if ( msr == MSR_MTRRcap ||
+ (msr >= MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(0) && msr <= MSR_MTRRdefType) )
+ {
+ unsigned int edx;
+
+ hvm_cpuid(1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &edx);
+ if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MTRR) )
+ mtrr = true;
+ }
switch ( msr )
{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, index;
+
case MSR_EFER:
*msr_content = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_efer;
break;
- case MSR_IA32_XSS:
- if ( !cpu_has_xsaves )
- goto gp_fault;
- *msr_content = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_xss;
- break;
-
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
*msr_content = _hvm_rdtsc_intercept();
break;
@@ -3754,6 +3764,22 @@ int hvm_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t
*msr_content)
*msr_content = var_range_base[index];
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_XSS:
+ ecx = 1;
+ hvm_cpuid(XSTATE_CPUID, &eax, NULL, &ecx, NULL);
+ if ( !(eax & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) )
+ goto gp_fault;
+ *msr_content = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_xss;
+ break;
+
+ case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+ ecx = 0;
+ hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, &ecx, NULL);
+ if ( !(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MPX)) ||
+ !hvm_get_guest_bndcfgs(v, msr_content) )
+ goto gp_fault;
+ break;
+
case MSR_K8_ENABLE_C1E:
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
/*
@@ -3790,15 +3816,20 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t
msr_content,
bool_t may_defer)
{
struct vcpu *v = current;
- bool_t mtrr;
- unsigned int edx, index;
+ bool mtrr = false;
int ret = X86EMUL_OKAY;
HVMTRACE_3D(MSR_WRITE, msr,
(uint32_t)msr_content, (uint32_t)(msr_content >> 32));
- hvm_cpuid(1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &edx);
- mtrr = !!(edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MTRR));
+ if ( msr >= MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(0) && msr <= MSR_MTRRdefType )
+ {
+ unsigned int edx;
+
+ hvm_cpuid(1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &edx);
+ if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MTRR) )
+ mtrr = true;
+ }
if ( may_defer && unlikely(monitored_msr(v->domain, msr)) )
{
@@ -3815,18 +3846,13 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t
msr_content,
switch ( msr )
{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, index;
+
case MSR_EFER:
if ( hvm_set_efer(msr_content) )
return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
break;
- case MSR_IA32_XSS:
- /* No XSS features currently supported for guests. */
- if ( !cpu_has_xsaves || msr_content != 0 )
- goto gp_fault;
- v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_xss = msr_content;
- break;
-
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
hvm_set_guest_tsc(v, msr_content);
break;
@@ -3863,9 +3889,8 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t
msr_content,
break;
case MSR_MTRRcap:
- if ( !mtrr )
- goto gp_fault;
goto gp_fault;
+
case MSR_MTRRdefType:
if ( !mtrr )
goto gp_fault;
@@ -3905,6 +3930,23 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t
msr_content,
goto gp_fault;
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_XSS:
+ ecx = 1;
+ hvm_cpuid(XSTATE_CPUID, &eax, NULL, &ecx, NULL);
+ /* No XSS features currently supported for guests. */
+ if ( !(eax & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) || msr_content != 0 )
+ goto gp_fault;
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_xss = msr_content;
+ break;
+
+ case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+ ecx = 0;
+ hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, &ecx, NULL);
+ if ( !(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MPX)) ||
+ !hvm_set_guest_bndcfgs(v, msr_content) )
+ goto gp_fault;
+ break;
+
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
/* ignore the write */
break;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 306f482..2759e6f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1224,6 +1224,28 @@ static int vmx_get_guest_pat(struct vcpu *v, u64 *gpat)
return 1;
}
+static bool vmx_set_guest_bndcfgs(struct vcpu *v, u64 val)
+{
+ ASSERT(cpu_has_mpx && cpu_has_vmx_mpx);
+
+ vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
+ __vmwrite(GUEST_BNDCFGS, val);
+ vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool vmx_get_guest_bndcfgs(struct vcpu *v, u64 *val)
+{
+ ASSERT(cpu_has_mpx && cpu_has_vmx_mpx);
+
+ vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
+ __vmread(GUEST_BNDCFGS, val);
+ vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static void vmx_handle_cd(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long value)
{
if ( !paging_mode_hap(v->domain) )
@@ -2323,6 +2345,12 @@ const struct hvm_function_table * __init start_vmx(void)
if ( cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling )
vmx_function_table.tsc_scaling.ratio_frac_bits = 48;
+ if ( cpu_has_mpx && cpu_has_vmx_mpx )
+ {
+ vmx_function_table.set_guest_bndcfgs = vmx_set_guest_bndcfgs;
+ vmx_function_table.get_guest_bndcfgs = vmx_get_guest_bndcfgs;
+ }
+
setup_vmcs_dump();
return &vmx_function_table;
@@ -2650,11 +2678,6 @@ static int vmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr,
uint64_t *msr_content)
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
__vmread(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, msr_content);
break;
- case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
- if ( !cpu_has_mpx || !cpu_has_vmx_mpx )
- goto gp_fault;
- __vmread(GUEST_BNDCFGS, msr_content);
- break;
case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC...MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
if ( !nvmx_msr_read_intercept(msr, msr_content) )
@@ -2881,13 +2904,6 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr,
uint64_t msr_content)
break;
}
- case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
- if ( !cpu_has_mpx || !cpu_has_vmx_mpx ||
- !is_canonical_address(msr_content) ||
- (msr_content & IA32_BNDCFGS_RESERVED) )
- goto gp_fault;
- __vmwrite(GUEST_BNDCFGS, msr_content);
- break;
case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC...MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
if ( !nvmx_msr_write_intercept(msr, msr_content) )
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
index 5d463e0..81b60d5 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ struct hvm_function_table {
int (*get_guest_pat)(struct vcpu *v, u64 *);
int (*set_guest_pat)(struct vcpu *v, u64);
+ bool (*get_guest_bndcfgs)(struct vcpu *v, u64 *);
+ bool (*set_guest_bndcfgs)(struct vcpu *v, u64);
+
void (*set_tsc_offset)(struct vcpu *v, u64 offset, u64 at_tsc);
void (*inject_trap)(const struct hvm_trap *trap);
@@ -383,6 +386,13 @@ static inline unsigned long hvm_get_shadow_gs_base(struct
vcpu *v)
return hvm_funcs.get_shadow_gs_base(v);
}
+static inline bool hvm_get_guest_bndcfgs(struct vcpu *v, u64 *val)
+{
+ return hvm_funcs.get_guest_bndcfgs &&
+ hvm_funcs.get_guest_bndcfgs(v, val);
+}
+
+bool hvm_set_guest_bndcfgs(struct vcpu *v, u64 val);
#define has_hvm_params(d) \
((d)->arch.hvm_domain.params != NULL)
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master
_______________________________________________
Xen-changelog mailing list
Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog
|
 |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |