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[Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.5] VMX: correct feature checks for MPX



commit 11c0462417051f56be0537c8cbf5973b2c648c2a
Author:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Mon Sep 12 16:03:27 2016 +0200
Commit:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Mon Sep 12 16:03:27 2016 +0200

    VMX: correct feature checks for MPX
    
    Its VMCS field isn't tied to the respective base CPU feature flag but
    instead to a VMX specific one.
    
    Note that while the VMCS GUEST_BNDCFGS field exists if either of the
    two respective features is available, MPX continues to get exposed to
    guests only with both features present.
    
    Also add the so far missing handling of
    - GUEST_BNDCFGS in construct_vmcs()
    - MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS in vmx_msr_{read,write}_intercept()
    and mirror the extra correctness checks during MSR write to
    vmx_load_msr().
    
    Reported-by: "Rockosov, Dmitry" <dmitry.rockosov@xxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Tested-by: "Rockosov, Dmitry" <dmitry.rockosov@xxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    master commit: 68eb1a4d92be58e26bd11d02b8e0317bd56294ac
    master date: 2016-09-07 12:34:43 +0200
---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c             |  4 +---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c        |  2 ++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c         | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
 xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h |  3 +++
 xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h    |  5 ++++-
 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index d0905e7..255955b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4303,9 +4303,7 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsigned int *eax, 
unsigned int *ebx,
             *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
 
         /* Don't expose MPX to hvm when VMX support is not available */
-        if ( (count == 0) &&
-             (!(vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) ||
-              !(vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)) )
+        if ( (count == 0) && !cpu_has_vmx_mpx )
             *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MPX);
 
         /* Don't expose INVPCID to non-hap hvm. */
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
index b689e91..fe89fd7 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
@@ -1154,6 +1154,8 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
         __vmwrite(HOST_PAT, host_pat);
         __vmwrite(GUEST_PAT, guest_pat);
     }
+    if ( cpu_has_vmx_mpx )
+        __vmwrite(GUEST_BNDCFGS, 0);
 
     vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
index b707b4e..9181258 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -590,14 +590,14 @@ static int vmx_load_vmcs_ctxt(struct vcpu *v, struct 
hvm_hw_cpu *ctxt)
 
 static unsigned int __init vmx_init_msr(void)
 {
-    return !!cpu_has_mpx;
+    return cpu_has_mpx && cpu_has_vmx_mpx;
 }
 
 static void vmx_save_msr(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_msr *ctxt)
 {
     vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
 
-    if ( cpu_has_mpx )
+    if ( cpu_has_mpx && cpu_has_vmx_mpx )
     {
         __vmread(GUEST_BNDCFGS, &ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val);
         if ( ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val )
@@ -619,7 +619,9 @@ static int vmx_load_msr(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_msr 
*ctxt)
         switch ( ctxt->msr[i].index )
         {
         case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
-            if ( cpu_has_mpx )
+            if ( cpu_has_mpx && cpu_has_vmx_mpx &&
+                 is_canonical_address(ctxt->msr[i].val) &&
+                 !(ctxt->msr[i].val & IA32_BNDCFGS_RESERVED) )
                 __vmwrite(GUEST_BNDCFGS, ctxt->msr[i].val);
             else
                 err = -ENXIO;
@@ -2102,6 +2104,11 @@ static int vmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, 
uint64_t *msr_content)
     case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
         __vmread(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, msr_content);
         break;
+    case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+        if ( !cpu_has_mpx || !cpu_has_vmx_mpx )
+            goto gp_fault;
+        __vmread(GUEST_BNDCFGS, msr_content);
+        break;
     case IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR:
     case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC...MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
         if ( !nvmx_msr_read_intercept(msr, msr_content) )
@@ -2317,6 +2324,13 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, 
uint64_t msr_content)
 
         break;
     }
+    case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+        if ( !cpu_has_mpx || !cpu_has_vmx_mpx ||
+             !is_canonical_address(msr_content) ||
+             (msr_content & IA32_BNDCFGS_RESERVED) )
+            goto gp_fault;
+        __vmwrite(GUEST_BNDCFGS, msr_content);
+        break;
     case IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR:
     case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC...MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
         if ( !nvmx_msr_write_intercept(msr, msr_content) )
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h 
b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
index 6a99dca..0528e48 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -273,6 +273,9 @@ extern u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control;
     (vmx_pin_based_exec_control & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTERRUPT)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_vmcs_shadowing \
     (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMCS_SHADOWING)
+#define cpu_has_vmx_mpx \
+    ((vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) && \
+     (vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS))
 
 #define VMCS_RID_TYPE_MASK              0x80000000
 
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
index 83f2f70..dd19fde 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -56,7 +56,10 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_DS_AREA               0x00000600
 #define MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES     0x00000345
 
-#define MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS               0x00000D90
+#define MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS               0x00000d90
+#define IA32_BNDCFGS_ENABLE            0x00000001
+#define IA32_BNDCFGS_PRESERVE          0x00000002
+#define IA32_BNDCFGS_RESERVED          0x00000ffc
 
 #define MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000           0x00000250
 #define MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000           0x00000258
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.5

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