[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.9] x86/pagewalk: Fix pagewalk's handling of instruction fetches
commit 96689c61f445650a595e79e72b4884d21c0868eb Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Tue May 23 16:32:30 2017 +0000 Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Fri Jun 2 11:27:48 2017 +0100 x86/pagewalk: Fix pagewalk's handling of instruction fetches Despite the claim in the comment (which was based partly on the code already being like that, and mistaken reasoning because of Xen leaking NX into guest context), reality differs. Use of the SMAP feature without NX, or in a 2-level guest, demonstrate an observable difference between reads and instruction fetches, despite PFEC_insn_fetch not being reported in the #PF error code. This demonstrates that instruction fetches are distinguished from data reads even without PFEC_insn_fetch being reported. Alter the pagewalk logic to keep the pagewalk insn_fetch input intact, but only conditionally report insn_fetch in the error code. This logic is more in line with the Intel SDM text: * I/D flag (bit 4). This flag is 1 if (1) the access causing the page-fault exception was an instruction fetch; and (2) either (a) CR4.SMEP = 1; or (b) both (i) CR4.PAE = 1 (either PAE paging or 4-level paging is in use); and (ii) IA32_EFER.NXE = 1. Otherwise, the flag is 0. This flag describes the access causing the page-fault exception, not the access rights specified by paging. and the AMD SDM text: * I/D - Bit 4. If this bit is set to 1, it indicates that the access that caused the page fault was an instruction fetch. Otherwise, this bit is cleared to 0. This bit is only defined if no-execute feature is enabled (EFER.NXE=1 && CR4.PAE=1). Curiously, the AMD manual doesn't mention SMEP despite some Fam16h processors and all Fam17h processors supporting it. Experimentally, it behaves as described by Intel. In addition, add some extra clarification and sanity checking around the use of NX for the access checks, where it might be reserved. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> (cherry picked from commit a0b40c3e08bb81192063f97089cb8c3849b8cfa0) --- xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c index 5c6a85b..6055fec 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c @@ -114,22 +114,18 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, ASSERT(!(walk & PFEC_implicit) || !(walk & (PFEC_insn_fetch | PFEC_user_mode))); - /* - * PFEC_insn_fetch is only used as an input to pagetable walking if NX or - * SMEP are enabled. Otherwise, instruction fetches are indistinguishable - * from data reads. - * - * This property can be demonstrated on real hardware by having NX and - * SMEP inactive, but SMAP active, and observing that EFLAGS.AC determines - * whether a pagefault occures for supervisor execution on user mappings. - */ - if ( !(guest_nx_enabled(v) || guest_smep_enabled(v)) ) - walk &= ~PFEC_insn_fetch; - perfc_incr(guest_walk); memset(gw, 0, sizeof(*gw)); gw->va = va; - gw->pfec = walk & (PFEC_insn_fetch | PFEC_user_mode | PFEC_write_access); + gw->pfec = walk & (PFEC_user_mode | PFEC_write_access); + + /* + * PFEC_insn_fetch is only reported if NX or SMEP are enabled. Hardware + * still distingueses instruction fetches during determination of access + * rights. + */ + if ( guest_nx_enabled(v) || guest_smep_enabled(v) ) + gw->pfec |= (walk & PFEC_insn_fetch); #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 3 /* PAE or 64... */ #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 /* 64-bit only... */ @@ -360,11 +356,19 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, gw->pfec |= PFEC_page_present; /* - * The pagetable walk has returned a successful translation. Now check - * access rights to see whether the access should succeed. + * The pagetable walk has returned a successful translation (i.e. All PTEs + * are present and have no reserved bits set). Now check access rights to + * see whether the access should succeed. */ ar = (ar_and & AR_ACCUM_AND) | (ar_or & AR_ACCUM_OR); + /* + * Sanity check. If EFER.NX is disabled, _PAGE_NX_BIT is reserved and + * should have caused a translation failure before we get here. + */ + if ( ar & _PAGE_NX_BIT ) + ASSERT(guest_nx_enabled(v)); + #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 /* 64-bit only... */ /* * If all access checks are thus far ok, check Protection Key for 64bit -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.9 _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog
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