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[Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86/hvm: Fix boundary check in hvmemul_insn_fetch()



commit 5a992b670bff697c40b513c9e037598ba35ca7d4
Author:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Jul 25 19:48:43 2017 +0100
Commit:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Thu Jul 27 11:39:57 2017 +0100

    x86/hvm: Fix boundary check in hvmemul_insn_fetch()
    
    c/s 0943a03037 added some extra protection for overflowing the emulation
    instruction cache, but Coverity points out that boundary condition is off by
    one when memcpy()'ing out of the buffer.
    
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
index 99fc4ca..087425f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
@@ -958,8 +958,8 @@ int hvmemul_insn_fetch(
              * Will we overflow insn_buf[]?  This shouldn't be able to happen,
              * which means something went wrong with instruction decoding...
              */
-            if ( insn_off > sizeof(hvmemul_ctxt->insn_buf) ||
-                 (insn_off + bytes) > sizeof(hvmemul_ctxt->insn_buf) )
+            if ( insn_off >= sizeof(hvmemul_ctxt->insn_buf) ||
+                 (insn_off + bytes) >= sizeof(hvmemul_ctxt->insn_buf) )
             {
                 ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
                 return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master

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