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[Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86/mm: merge ptwr and mmio_ro page fault handlers



commit c68a4ca4d26a1963d67a1d9a7c029c0207c10d3a
Author:     Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Fri Sep 1 15:35:39 2017 +0100
Commit:     Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri Sep 1 17:43:06 2017 +0100

    x86/mm: merge ptwr and mmio_ro page fault handlers
    
    Provide a unified entry to avoid going through pte look-up, decode and
    emulation cycle more than necessary. The path taken is determined by
    the faulting address.
    
    Note that the order of checks is changed in the new function, but the
    order of the checks is performed shouldn't matter.
    
    The sole caller is changed to use the new function.
    
    No functional change.
    
    Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/mm.c        | 210 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
 xen/arch/x86/traps.c     |  20 +++--
 xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h |   5 +-
 3 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
index 8831f06..4d76319 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -5177,86 +5177,40 @@ static const struct x86_emulate_ops ptwr_emulate_ops = {
 };
 
 /* Write page fault handler: check if guest is trying to modify a PTE. */
-int ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr,
-                       struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static int ptwr_do_page_fault(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+                              unsigned long addr, l1_pgentry_t pte)
 {
-    struct domain *d = v->domain;
-    struct page_info *page;
-    l1_pgentry_t      pte;
-    struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt ptwr_ctxt;
-    struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt = {
-       .regs = regs,
-       .vendor = d->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor,
-       .addr_size = is_pv_32bit_domain(d) ? 32 : BITS_PER_LONG,
-       .sp_size   = is_pv_32bit_domain(d) ? 32 : BITS_PER_LONG,
-       .lma       = !is_pv_32bit_domain(d),
-       .data      = &ptwr_ctxt,
+    struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt ptwr_ctxt = {
+        .cr2 = addr,
+        .pte = pte,
     };
+    struct page_info *page;
     int rc;
 
-    /* Attempt to read the PTE that maps the VA being accessed. */
-    pte = guest_get_eff_l1e(addr);
-
-    /* We are looking only for read-only mappings of p.t. pages. */
-    if ( ((l1e_get_flags(pte) & (_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_RW)) != _PAGE_PRESENT) ||
-         rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, l1e_get_pfn(pte)) ||
-         !get_page_from_mfn(l1e_get_mfn(pte), d) )
-        goto bail;
+    if ( !get_page_from_mfn(l1e_get_mfn(pte), current->domain) )
+        return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 
     page = l1e_get_page(pte);
     if ( !page_lock(page) )
     {
         put_page(page);
-        goto bail;
+        return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
     }
 
     if ( (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask) != PGT_l1_page_table )
     {
         page_unlock(page);
         put_page(page);
-        goto bail;
+        return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
     }
 
-    ptwr_ctxt.cr2 = addr;
-    ptwr_ctxt.pte = pte;
-
-    rc = x86_emulate(&ctxt, &ptwr_emulate_ops);
+    ctxt->data = &ptwr_ctxt;
+    rc = x86_emulate(ctxt, &ptwr_emulate_ops);
 
     page_unlock(page);
     put_page(page);
 
-    switch ( rc )
-    {
-    case X86EMUL_EXCEPTION:
-        /*
-         * This emulation only covers writes to pagetables which are marked
-         * read-only by Xen.  We tolerate #PF (in case a concurrent pagetable
-         * update has succeeded on a different vcpu).  Anything else is an
-         * emulation bug, or a guest playing with the instruction stream under
-         * Xen's feet.
-         */
-        if ( ctxt.event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION &&
-             ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault )
-            pv_inject_event(&ctxt.event);
-        else
-            gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
-                     "Unexpected event (type %u, vector %#x) from emulation\n",
-                     ctxt.event.type, ctxt.event.vector);
-
-        /* Fallthrough */
-    case X86EMUL_OKAY:
-
-        if ( ctxt.retire.singlestep )
-            pv_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_debug, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
-
-        /* Fallthrough */
-    case X86EMUL_RETRY:
-        perfc_incr(ptwr_emulations);
-        return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
-    }
-
- bail:
-    return 0;
+    return rc;
 }
 
 /*************************
@@ -5332,80 +5286,28 @@ static const struct x86_emulate_ops mmcfg_intercept_ops 
= {
 };
 
 /* Check if guest is trying to modify a r/o MMIO page. */
-int mmio_ro_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr,
-                          struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static int mmio_ro_do_page_fault(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+                                 unsigned long addr, l1_pgentry_t pte)
 {
-    l1_pgentry_t pte;
-    unsigned long mfn;
-    unsigned int addr_size = is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v) ? 32 : BITS_PER_LONG;
     struct mmio_ro_emulate_ctxt mmio_ro_ctxt = { .cr2 = addr };
-    struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt = {
-        .regs = regs,
-        .vendor = v->domain->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor,
-        .addr_size = addr_size,
-        .sp_size = addr_size,
-        .lma = !is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v),
-        .data = &mmio_ro_ctxt,
-    };
-    int rc;
+    mfn_t mfn = l1e_get_mfn(pte);
 
-    /* Attempt to read the PTE that maps the VA being accessed. */
-    pte = guest_get_eff_l1e(addr);
-
-    /* We are looking only for read-only mappings of MMIO pages. */
-    if ( ((l1e_get_flags(pte) & (_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_RW)) != _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-        return 0;
-
-    mfn = l1e_get_pfn(pte);
-    if ( mfn_valid(_mfn(mfn)) )
+    if ( mfn_valid(mfn) )
     {
-        struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(_mfn(mfn));
-        struct domain *owner = page_get_owner_and_reference(page);
+        struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
+        const struct domain *owner = page_get_owner_and_reference(page);
 
         if ( owner )
             put_page(page);
         if ( owner != dom_io )
-            return 0;
+            return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
     }
 
-    if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
-        return 0;
-
-    if ( pci_ro_mmcfg_decode(mfn, &mmio_ro_ctxt.seg, &mmio_ro_ctxt.bdf) )
-        rc = x86_emulate(&ctxt, &mmcfg_intercept_ops);
+    ctxt->data = &mmio_ro_ctxt;
+    if ( pci_ro_mmcfg_decode(mfn_x(mfn), &mmio_ro_ctxt.seg, &mmio_ro_ctxt.bdf) 
)
+        return x86_emulate(ctxt, &mmcfg_intercept_ops);
     else
-        rc = x86_emulate(&ctxt, &mmio_ro_emulate_ops);
-
-    switch ( rc )
-    {
-    case X86EMUL_EXCEPTION:
-        /*
-         * This emulation only covers writes to MMCFG space or read-only MFNs.
-         * We tolerate #PF (from hitting an adjacent page or a successful
-         * concurrent pagetable update).  Anything else is an emulation bug,
-         * or a guest playing with the instruction stream under Xen's feet.
-         */
-        if ( ctxt.event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION &&
-             ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault )
-            pv_inject_event(&ctxt.event);
-        else
-            gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
-                     "Unexpected event (type %u, vector %#x) from emulation\n",
-                     ctxt.event.type, ctxt.event.vector);
-
-        /* Fallthrough */
-    case X86EMUL_OKAY:
-
-        if ( ctxt.retire.singlestep )
-            pv_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_debug, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
-
-        /* Fallthrough */
-    case X86EMUL_RETRY:
-        perfc_incr(mmio_ro_emulations);
-        return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
+        return x86_emulate(ctxt, &mmio_ro_emulate_ops);
 }
 
 void *alloc_xen_pagetable(void)
@@ -6439,6 +6341,70 @@ void write_32bit_pse_identmap(uint32_t *l2)
                  _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE);
 }
 
+int pv_ro_page_fault(unsigned long addr, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+{
+    l1_pgentry_t pte;
+    const struct domain *currd = current->domain;
+    unsigned int addr_size = is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ? 32 : BITS_PER_LONG;
+    struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt = {
+        .regs      = regs,
+        .vendor    = currd->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor,
+        .addr_size = addr_size,
+        .sp_size   = addr_size,
+        .lma       = addr_size > 32,
+    };
+    int rc;
+    bool mmio_ro;
+
+    /* Attempt to read the PTE that maps the VA being accessed. */
+    pte = guest_get_eff_l1e(addr);
+
+    /* We are only looking for read-only mappings */
+    if ( ((l1e_get_flags(pte) & (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW)) != _PAGE_PRESENT) )
+        return 0;
+
+    mmio_ro = rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, l1e_get_pfn(pte));
+    if ( mmio_ro )
+        rc = mmio_ro_do_page_fault(&ctxt, addr, pte);
+    else
+        rc = ptwr_do_page_fault(&ctxt, addr, pte);
+
+    switch ( rc )
+    {
+    case X86EMUL_EXCEPTION:
+        /*
+         * This emulation covers writes to:
+         *  - L1 pagetables.
+         *  - MMCFG space or read-only MFNs.
+         * We tolerate #PF (from hitting an adjacent page or a successful
+         * concurrent pagetable update).  Anything else is an emulation bug,
+         * or a guest playing with the instruction stream under Xen's feet.
+         */
+        if ( ctxt.event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION &&
+             ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault )
+            pv_inject_event(&ctxt.event);
+        else
+            gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
+                     "Unexpected event (type %u, vector %#x) from emulation\n",
+                     ctxt.event.type, ctxt.event.vector);
+
+        /* Fallthrough */
+    case X86EMUL_OKAY:
+        if ( ctxt.retire.singlestep )
+            pv_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_debug, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
+
+        /* Fallthrough */
+    case X86EMUL_RETRY:
+        if ( mmio_ro )
+            perfc_incr(mmio_ro_emulations);
+        else
+            perfc_incr(ptwr_emulations);
+        return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Local variables:
  * mode: C
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index f525fa2..6091f23 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1308,16 +1308,18 @@ static int fixup_page_fault(unsigned long addr, struct 
cpu_user_regs *regs)
          !(regs->error_code & (PFEC_reserved_bit | PFEC_insn_fetch)) &&
          (regs->error_code & PFEC_write_access) )
     {
-        if ( VM_ASSIST(d, writable_pagetables) &&
-             /* Do not check if access-protection fault since the page may
-                legitimately be not present in shadow page tables */
-             (paging_mode_enabled(d) ||
-              (regs->error_code & PFEC_page_present)) &&
-             ptwr_do_page_fault(v, addr, regs) )
-            return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
+        bool ptwr, mmio_ro;
+
+        ptwr = VM_ASSIST(d, writable_pagetables) &&
+               /* Do not check if access-protection fault since the page may
+                  legitimately be not present in shadow page tables */
+               (paging_mode_enabled(d) ||
+                (regs->error_code & PFEC_page_present));
+
+        mmio_ro = is_hardware_domain(d) &&
+                  (regs->error_code & PFEC_page_present);
 
-        if ( is_hardware_domain(d) && (regs->error_code & PFEC_page_present) &&
-             mmio_ro_do_page_fault(v, addr, regs) )
+        if ( (ptwr || mmio_ro) && pv_ro_page_fault(addr, regs) )
             return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
     }
 
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
index 4c03a33..97647dc 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
@@ -511,10 +511,7 @@ extern int mmcfg_intercept_write(enum x86_segment seg,
 int pv_emul_cpuid(uint32_t leaf, uint32_t subleaf,
                   struct cpuid_leaf *res, struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
 
-int  ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *, unsigned long,
-                        struct cpu_user_regs *);
-int  mmio_ro_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *, unsigned long,
-                           struct cpu_user_regs *);
+int pv_ro_page_fault(unsigned long, struct cpu_user_regs *);
 
 int audit_adjust_pgtables(struct domain *d, int dir, int noisy);
 
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master

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