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[Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.6] gnttab: fix pin count / page reference race



commit 9454e3030ae0835c11aa66471238a9e09db5074e
Author:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Oct 24 16:51:51 2017 +0200
Commit:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Oct 24 16:51:51 2017 +0200

    gnttab: fix pin count / page reference race
    
    Dropping page references before decrementing pin counts is a bad idea
    if assumptions are being made that a non-zero pin count implies a valid
    page. Fix the order of operations in gnttab_copy_release_buf(), but at
    the same time also remove the assertion that was found to trigger:
    map_grant_ref() also has the potential of causing a race here, and
    changing the order of operations there would likely be quite a bit more
    involved.
    
    This is CVE-2017-15597 / XSA-236.
    
    Reported-by: Pawel Wieczorkiewicz <wipawel@xxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    master commit: e008f7619dcd6d549727c9635b3f9f3c7ee483ed
    master date: 2017-10-24 16:01:33 +0200
---
 xen/common/grant_table.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
index 6755728..b946250 100644
--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
@@ -2317,9 +2317,20 @@ __acquire_grant_for_copy(
         td = page_get_owner_and_reference(*page);
         /*
          * act->pin being non-zero should guarantee the page to have a
-         * non-zero refcount and hence a valid owner.
+         * non-zero refcount and hence a valid owner (matching the one on
+         * record), with one exception: If the owning domain is dying we
+         * had better not make implications from pin count (map_grant_ref()
+         * updates pin counts before obtaining page references, for
+         * example).
          */
-        ASSERT(td);
+        if ( td != rd || rd->is_dying )
+        {
+            if ( td )
+                put_page(*page);
+            *page = NULL;
+            rc = GNTST_bad_domain;
+            goto unlock_out_clear;
+        }
     }
 
     act->pin += readonly ? GNTPIN_hstr_inc : GNTPIN_hstw_inc;
@@ -2438,6 +2449,11 @@ static void gnttab_copy_release_buf(struct 
gnttab_copy_buf *buf)
         unmap_domain_page(buf->virt);
         buf->virt = NULL;
     }
+    if ( buf->have_grant )
+    {
+        __release_grant_for_copy(buf->domain, buf->ptr.u.ref, buf->read_only);
+        buf->have_grant = 0;
+    }
     if ( buf->have_type )
     {
         put_page_type(buf->page);
@@ -2448,11 +2464,6 @@ static void gnttab_copy_release_buf(struct 
gnttab_copy_buf *buf)
         put_page(buf->page);
         buf->page = NULL;
     }
-    if ( buf->have_grant )
-    {
-        __release_grant_for_copy(buf->domain, buf->ptr.u.ref, buf->read_only);
-        buf->have_grant = 0;
-    }
 }
 
 static int gnttab_copy_claim_buf(const struct gnttab_copy *op,
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.6

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