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[Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.9] x86emul/fuzz: add rudimentary limit checking



commit 02188ac44fcdd60fe6c55243c19ec5a49a22d9a4
Author:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Oct 24 16:12:30 2017 +0200
Commit:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Oct 24 16:12:30 2017 +0200

    x86emul/fuzz: add rudimentary limit checking
    
    fuzz_insn_fetch() is the only data access helper where it is possible
    to see offsets larger than 4Gb in 16- or 32-bit modes, as we leave the
    incoming rIP untouched in the emulator itself. The check is needed here
    as otherwise, after successfully fetching insn bytes, we may end up
    zero-extending EIP soon after complete_insn, which collides with the
    X86EMUL_EXCEPTION-conditional respective ASSERT() in
    x86_emulate_wrapper(). (NB: put_rep_prefix() is what allows
    complete_insn to be reached with rc set to other than X86EMUL_OKAY or
    X86EMUL_DONE. See also commit 53f87c03b4 ["x86emul: generalize
    exception handling for rep_* hooks"].)
    
    Add assert()-s for all other (data) access routines, as effective
    address generation in the emulator ought to guarantee in-range values.
    For them to not trigger, several adjustments to the emulator's address
    calculations are needed: While the DstBitBase one is really mandatory,
    the specification allows for either original or new behavior for two-
    part accesses. Observed behavior on real hardware, however, is for such
    accesses to silently wrap at the 2^^32 boundary in other than 64-bit
    mode, just like they do at the 2^^64 boundary in 64-bit mode, which our
    code is now being brought in line with. While adding truncate_ea()
    invocations there, also convert open coded instances of it.
    
    Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    master commit: 7869e2bafe11094260a69a31cb07d17901d07b8b
    master date: 2017-10-09 16:01:22 +0200
---
 tools/fuzz/x86_instruction_emulator/fuzz-emul.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
 xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c          | 22 +++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/fuzz/x86_instruction_emulator/fuzz-emul.c 
b/tools/fuzz/x86_instruction_emulator/fuzz-emul.c
index aadbb40..6ddb743 100644
--- a/tools/fuzz/x86_instruction_emulator/fuzz-emul.c
+++ b/tools/fuzz/x86_instruction_emulator/fuzz-emul.c
@@ -139,7 +139,18 @@ static int fuzz_read(
     struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
     /* Reads expected for all user and system segments. */
-    assert(is_x86_user_segment(seg) || is_x86_system_segment(seg));
+    if ( is_x86_user_segment(seg) )
+        assert(ctxt->addr_size == 64 || !(offset >> 32));
+    else if ( seg == x86_seg_tr )
+        /*
+         * The TSS is special in that accesses below the segment base are
+         * possible, as the Interrupt Redirection Bitmap starts 32 bytes
+         * ahead of the I/O Bitmap, regardless of the value of the latter.
+         */
+        assert((long)offset < 0 ? (long)offset > -32 : !(offset >> 17));
+    else
+        assert(is_x86_system_segment(seg) &&
+               (ctxt->lma ? offset <= 0x10007 : !(offset >> 16)));
 
     return data_read(ctxt, seg, "read", p_data, bytes);
 }
@@ -162,6 +173,13 @@ static int fuzz_insn_fetch(
 {
     assert(seg == x86_seg_cs);
 
+    /* Minimal segment limit checking, until full one is being put in place. */
+    if ( ctxt->addr_size < 64 && (offset >> 32) )
+    {
+        x86_emul_hw_exception(13, 0, ctxt);
+        return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
+    }
+
     /*
      * Zero-length instruction fetches are made at the destination of jumps,
      * to perform segmentation checks.  No data needs returning.
@@ -232,6 +250,7 @@ static int fuzz_rep_ins(
     struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
     assert(dst_seg == x86_seg_es);
+    assert(ctxt->addr_size == 64 || !(dst_offset >> 32));
 
     return _fuzz_rep_read(ctxt, "rep_ins", reps);
 }
@@ -247,6 +266,7 @@ static int fuzz_rep_movs(
 {
     assert(is_x86_user_segment(src_seg));
     assert(dst_seg == x86_seg_es);
+    assert(ctxt->addr_size == 64 || !((src_offset | dst_offset) >> 32));
 
     return _fuzz_rep_read(ctxt, "rep_movs", reps);
 }
@@ -260,6 +280,7 @@ static int fuzz_rep_outs(
     struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
     assert(is_x86_user_segment(src_seg));
+    assert(ctxt->addr_size == 64 || !(src_offset >> 32));
 
     return _fuzz_rep_write(ctxt, "rep_outs", reps);
 }
@@ -277,6 +298,7 @@ static int fuzz_rep_stos(
      * for CLZERO.
      */
     assert(is_x86_user_segment(seg));
+    assert(ctxt->addr_size == 64 || !(offset >> 32));
 
     return _fuzz_rep_write(ctxt, "rep_stos", reps);
 }
@@ -290,6 +312,7 @@ static int fuzz_write(
 {
     /* Writes not expected for any system segments. */
     assert(is_x86_user_segment(seg));
+    assert(ctxt->addr_size == 64 || !(offset >> 32));
 
     return maybe_fail(ctxt, "write", true);
 }
@@ -306,8 +329,10 @@ static int fuzz_cmpxchg(
      * Cmpxchg expected for user segments, and setting accessed/busy bits in
      * GDT/LDT enties, but not expected for any IDT or TR accesses.
      */
-    assert(is_x86_user_segment(seg) ||
-           seg == x86_seg_gdtr || seg == x86_seg_ldtr);
+    if ( is_x86_user_segment(seg) )
+        assert(ctxt->addr_size == 64 || !(offset >> 32));
+    else
+        assert((seg == x86_seg_gdtr || seg == x86_seg_ldtr) && !(offset >> 
16));
 
     return maybe_fail(ctxt, "cmpxchg", true);
 }
@@ -319,6 +344,7 @@ static int fuzz_invlpg(
 {
     /* invlpg(), unlike all other hooks, may be called with x86_seg_none. */
     assert(is_x86_user_segment(seg) || seg == x86_seg_none);
+    assert(ctxt->addr_size == 64 || !(offset >> 32));
 
     return maybe_fail(ctxt, "invlpg", false);
 }
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c 
b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
index 5066410..5ef14a9 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
@@ -1249,10 +1249,10 @@ static void __put_rep_prefix(
 
 /* Clip maximum repetitions so that the index register at most just wraps. */
 #define truncate_ea_and_reps(ea, reps, bytes_per_rep) ({                  \
-    unsigned long todo__, ea__ = truncate_word(ea, ad_bytes);             \
+    unsigned long todo__, ea__ = truncate_ea(ea);                         \
     if ( !(_regs.eflags & X86_EFLAGS_DF) )                                \
-        todo__ = truncate_word(-(ea), ad_bytes) / (bytes_per_rep);        \
-    else if ( truncate_word((ea) + (bytes_per_rep) - 1, ad_bytes) < ea__ )\
+        todo__ = truncate_ea(-ea__) / (bytes_per_rep);                    \
+    else if ( truncate_ea(ea__ + (bytes_per_rep) - 1) < ea__ )            \
         todo__ = 1;                                                       \
     else                                                                  \
         todo__ = ea__ / (bytes_per_rep) + 1;                              \
@@ -3128,6 +3128,7 @@ x86_emulate(
                     op_bytes + (((-src.val - 1) >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1L));
             else
                 ea.mem.off += (src.val >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1L);
+            ea.mem.off = truncate_ea(ea.mem.off);
         }
 
         /* Bit index always truncated to within range. */
@@ -3346,7 +3347,7 @@ x86_emulate(
         unsigned long src_val2;
         int lb, ub, idx;
         generate_exception_if(src.type != OP_MEM, EXC_UD);
-        if ( (rc = read_ulong(src.mem.seg, src.mem.off + op_bytes,
+        if ( (rc = read_ulong(src.mem.seg, truncate_ea(src.mem.off + op_bytes),
                               &src_val2, op_bytes, ctxt, ops)) )
             goto done;
         ub  = (op_bytes == 2) ? (int16_t)src_val2 : (int32_t)src_val2;
@@ -3896,7 +3897,7 @@ x86_emulate(
         seg = (b & 1) * 3; /* es = 0, ds = 3 */
     les:
         generate_exception_if(src.type != OP_MEM, EXC_UD);
-        if ( (rc = read_ulong(src.mem.seg, src.mem.off + src.bytes,
+        if ( (rc = read_ulong(src.mem.seg, truncate_ea(src.mem.off + 
src.bytes),
                               &dst.val, 2, ctxt, ops)) != X86EMUL_OKAY )
             goto done;
         ASSERT(is_x86_user_segment(seg));
@@ -4930,7 +4931,8 @@ x86_emulate(
         case 5: /* jmp (far, absolute indirect) */
             generate_exception_if(src.type != OP_MEM, EXC_UD);
 
-            if ( (rc = read_ulong(src.mem.seg, src.mem.off + op_bytes,
+            if ( (rc = read_ulong(src.mem.seg,
+                                  truncate_ea(src.mem.off + op_bytes),
                                   &imm2, 2, ctxt, ops)) )
                 goto done;
             imm1 = src.val;
@@ -5117,8 +5119,8 @@ x86_emulate(
             }
             if ( (rc = ops->write(ea.mem.seg, ea.mem.off, &sreg.limit,
                                   2, ctxt)) != X86EMUL_OKAY ||
-                 (rc = ops->write(ea.mem.seg, ea.mem.off + 2, &sreg.base,
-                                  op_bytes, ctxt)) != X86EMUL_OKAY )
+                 (rc = ops->write(ea.mem.seg, truncate_ea(ea.mem.off + 2),
+                                  &sreg.base, op_bytes, ctxt)) != X86EMUL_OKAY 
)
                 goto done;
             break;
 
@@ -5128,9 +5130,9 @@ x86_emulate(
             generate_exception_if(!mode_ring0(), EXC_GP, 0);
             fail_if(ops->write_segment == NULL);
             memset(&sreg, 0, sizeof(sreg));
-            if ( (rc = read_ulong(ea.mem.seg, ea.mem.off+0,
+            if ( (rc = read_ulong(ea.mem.seg, ea.mem.off,
                                   &limit, 2, ctxt, ops)) ||
-                 (rc = read_ulong(ea.mem.seg, ea.mem.off+2,
+                 (rc = read_ulong(ea.mem.seg, truncate_ea(ea.mem.off + 2),
                                   &base, mode_64bit() ? 8 : 4, ctxt, ops)) )
                 goto done;
             generate_exception_if(!is_canonical_address(base), EXC_GP, 0);
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.9

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