[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.9] x86/xpti: Hide almost all of .text and all .data/.rodata/.bss mappings
commit f7b80d2bcca612b72682c2ed8a07a860bc7eec92 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Tue Mar 20 14:31:33 2018 +0100 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Tue Mar 20 14:31:33 2018 +0100 x86/xpti: Hide almost all of .text and all .data/.rodata/.bss mappings The current XPTI implementation isolates the directmap (and therefore a lot of guest data), but a large quantity of CPU0's state (including its stack) remains visible. Furthermore, an attacker able to read .text is in a vastly superior position to normal when it comes to fingerprinting Xen for known vulnerabilities, or scanning for ROP/Spectre gadgets. Collect together the entrypoints in .text.entry (currently 3x4k frames, but can almost certainly be slimmed down), and create a common mapping which is inserted into each per-cpu shadow. The stubs are also inserted into this mapping by pointing at the in-use L2. This allows stubs allocated later (SMP boot, or CPU hotplug) to work without further changes to the common mappings. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> x86/xpti: really hide almost all of Xen image Commit 422588e885 ("x86/xpti: Hide almost all of .text and all .data/.rodata/.bss mappings") carefully limited the Xen image cloning to just entry code, but then overwrote the just allocated and populated L3 entry with the normal one again covering both Xen image and stubs. Drop the respective code in favor of an explicit clone_mapping() invocation. This in turn now requires setup_cpu_root_pgt() to run after stub setup in all cases. Additionally, with (almost) no unintended mappings left, the BSP's IDT now also needs to be page aligned. The moving ahead of cleanup_cpu_root_pgt() is not strictly necessary for functionality, but things are more logical this way, and we retain cleanup being done in the inverse order of setup. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> x86/traps: Put idt_table[] back into .bss c/s d1d6fc97d "x86/xpti: really hide almost all of Xen image" accidentially moved idt_table[] from .bss to .data by virtue of using the page_aligned section. We also have .bss.page_aligned, so use that. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 422588e88511d17984544c0f017a927de3315290 master date: 2018-02-15 11:08:27 +0000 master commit: d1d6fc97d66cf56847fc0bcc2ddc370707c22378 master date: 2018-03-06 16:46:27 +0100 master commit: 044fedfaa29b5d5774196e3fc7d955a48bfceac4 master date: 2018-03-09 15:42:24 +0000 --- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 3 -- xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 3 +- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S | 5 +++ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 15 ++++++--- xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S | 7 ++++ 6 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown index ff4c7dc883..dbea91ddaa 100644 --- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown +++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown @@ -1839,9 +1839,6 @@ mode. Override default selection of whether to isolate 64-bit PV guest page tables. -** WARNING: Not yet a complete isolation implementation, but better than -nothing. ** - ### xsave > `= <boolean>` diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c index 570b78f0a0..6390ffd7e1 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c @@ -644,13 +644,24 @@ static int clone_mapping(const void *ptr, root_pgentry_t *rpt) { unsigned long linear = (unsigned long)ptr, pfn; unsigned int flags; - l3_pgentry_t *pl3e = l4e_to_l3e(idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(linear)]) + - l3_table_offset(linear); + l3_pgentry_t *pl3e; l2_pgentry_t *pl2e; l1_pgentry_t *pl1e; - if ( linear < DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START ) - return 0; + /* + * Sanity check 'linear'. We only allow cloning from the Xen virtual + * range, and in particular, only from the directmap and .text ranges. + */ + if ( root_table_offset(linear) > ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT || + root_table_offset(linear) < ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT ) + return -EINVAL; + + if ( linear < XEN_VIRT_START || + (linear >= XEN_VIRT_END && linear < DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START) ) + return -EINVAL; + + pl3e = l4e_to_l3e(idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(linear)]) + + l3_table_offset(linear); flags = l3e_get_flags(*pl3e); ASSERT(flags & _PAGE_PRESENT); @@ -742,6 +753,10 @@ static __read_mostly int8_t opt_xpti = -1; boolean_param("xpti", opt_xpti); DEFINE_PER_CPU(root_pgentry_t *, root_pgt); +static root_pgentry_t common_pgt; + +extern const char _stextentry[], _etextentry[]; + static int setup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu) { root_pgentry_t *rpt; @@ -762,8 +777,23 @@ static int setup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu) idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(RO_MPT_VIRT_START)]; /* SH_LINEAR_PT inserted together with guest mappings. */ /* PERDOMAIN inserted during context switch. */ - rpt[root_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)] = - idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)]; + + /* One-time setup of common_pgt, which maps .text.entry and the stubs. */ + if ( unlikely(!root_get_intpte(common_pgt)) ) + { + const char *ptr; + + for ( rc = 0, ptr = _stextentry; + !rc && ptr < _etextentry; ptr += PAGE_SIZE ) + rc = clone_mapping(ptr, rpt); + + if ( rc ) + return rc; + + common_pgt = rpt[root_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)]; + } + + rpt[root_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)] = common_pgt; /* Install direct map page table entries for stack, IDT, and TSS. */ for ( off = rc = 0; !rc && off < STACK_SIZE; off += PAGE_SIZE ) @@ -773,6 +803,8 @@ static int setup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu) rc = clone_mapping(idt_tables[cpu], rpt); if ( !rc ) rc = clone_mapping(&per_cpu(init_tss, cpu), rpt); + if ( !rc ) + rc = clone_mapping((void *)per_cpu(stubs.addr, cpu), rpt); return rc; } @@ -781,6 +813,7 @@ static void cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu) { root_pgentry_t *rpt = per_cpu(root_pgt, cpu); unsigned int r; + unsigned long stub_linear = per_cpu(stubs.addr, cpu); if ( !rpt ) return; @@ -825,6 +858,16 @@ static void cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu) } free_xen_pagetable(rpt); + + /* Also zap the stub mapping for this CPU. */ + if ( stub_linear ) + { + l3_pgentry_t *l3t = l4e_to_l3e(common_pgt); + l2_pgentry_t *l2t = l3e_to_l2e(l3t[l3_table_offset(stub_linear)]); + l1_pgentry_t *l1t = l2e_to_l1e(l2t[l2_table_offset(stub_linear)]); + + l1t[l2_table_offset(stub_linear)] = l1e_empty(); + } } static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu) @@ -848,6 +891,8 @@ static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu) if ( per_cpu(scratch_cpumask, cpu) != &scratch_cpu0mask ) free_cpumask_var(per_cpu(scratch_cpumask, cpu)); + cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(cpu); + if ( per_cpu(stubs.addr, cpu) ) { unsigned long mfn = per_cpu(stubs.mfn, cpu); @@ -865,8 +910,6 @@ static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu) free_domheap_page(mfn_to_page(mfn)); } - cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(cpu); - order = get_order_from_pages(NR_RESERVED_GDT_PAGES); free_xenheap_pages(per_cpu(gdt_table, cpu), order); @@ -922,9 +965,6 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu) set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi], IST_NONE); set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_NONE); - if ( setup_cpu_root_pgt(cpu) ) - goto oom; - for ( stub_page = 0, i = cpu & ~(STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1); i < nr_cpu_ids && i <= (cpu | (STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1)); ++i ) if ( cpu_online(i) && cpu_to_node(i) == node ) @@ -938,6 +978,9 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu) goto oom; per_cpu(stubs.addr, cpu) = stub_page + STUB_BUF_CPU_OFFS(cpu); + if ( setup_cpu_root_pgt(cpu) ) + goto oom; + if ( secondary_socket_cpumask == NULL && (secondary_socket_cpumask = xzalloc(cpumask_t)) == NULL ) goto oom; diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c index b4c275aa56..b8f56d98da 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c @@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct desc_struct *, gdt_table); DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct desc_struct *, compat_gdt_table); /* Master table, used by CPU0. */ -idt_entry_t idt_table[IDT_ENTRIES]; +idt_entry_t __section(".bss.page_aligned") __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) + idt_table[IDT_ENTRIES]; /* Pointer to the IDT of every CPU. */ idt_entry_t *idt_tables[NR_CPUS] __read_mostly; diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S index 69ece970c9..f17851bdd6 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ #include <public/xen.h> #include <irq_vectors.h> + .section .text.entry, "ax", @progbits + ENTRY(entry_int82) ASM_CLAC pushq $0 @@ -267,6 +269,9 @@ ENTRY(compat_int80_direct_trap) call compat_create_bounce_frame jmp compat_test_all_events + /* compat_create_bounce_frame & helpers don't need to be in .text.entry */ + .text + /* CREATE A BASIC EXCEPTION FRAME ON GUEST OS (RING-1) STACK: */ /* {[ERRCODE,] EIP, CS, EFLAGS, [ESP, SS]} */ /* %rdx: trap_bounce, %rbx: struct vcpu */ diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S index 4d10627ceb..5820751937 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ #include <public/xen.h> #include <irq_vectors.h> + .section .text.entry, "ax", @progbits + /* %rbx: struct vcpu */ ENTRY(switch_to_kernel) leaq VCPU_trap_bounce(%rbx),%rdx @@ -354,6 +356,9 @@ int80_slow_path: subq $2,UREGS_rip(%rsp) jmp handle_exception_saved + /* create_bounce_frame & helpers don't need to be in .text.entry */ + .text + /* CREATE A BASIC EXCEPTION FRAME ON GUEST OS STACK: */ /* { RCX, R11, [ERRCODE,] RIP, CS, RFLAGS, RSP, SS } */ /* %rdx: trap_bounce, %rbx: struct vcpu */ @@ -484,6 +489,8 @@ ENTRY(dom_crash_sync_extable) jmp asm_domain_crash_synchronous /* Does not return */ .popsection + .section .text.entry, "ax", @progbits + ENTRY(common_interrupt) SAVE_ALL CLAC @@ -843,8 +850,7 @@ GLOBAL(trap_nop) -.section .rodata, "a", @progbits - + .pushsection .rodata, "a", @progbits ENTRY(exception_table) .quad do_trap .quad do_debug @@ -870,9 +876,10 @@ ENTRY(exception_table) .quad do_reserved_trap /* Architecturally reserved exceptions. */ .endr .size exception_table, . - exception_table + .popsection /* Table of automatically generated entry points. One per vector. */ - .section .init.rodata, "a", @progbits + .pushsection .init.rodata, "a", @progbits GLOBAL(autogen_entrypoints) /* pop into the .init.rodata section and record an entry point. */ .macro entrypoint ent @@ -881,7 +888,7 @@ GLOBAL(autogen_entrypoints) .popsection .endm - .text + .popsection autogen_stubs: /* Automatically generated stubs. */ vec = 0 diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S index e635b0edfe..48673c46aa 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S +++ b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S @@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ SECTIONS _stext = .; /* Text and read-only data */ *(.text) *(.text.__x86_indirect_thunk_*) + + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); + _stextentry = .; + *(.text.entry) + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); + _etextentry = .; + *(.text.cold) *(.text.unlikely) *(.fixup) -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.9 _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog
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