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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen staging-4.8] x86/spec_ctrl: Updates to retpoline-safety decision making
commit 193130f53f2206354e9f4226a2b3566d472d1a2c
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Fri May 18 12:09:03 2018 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri May 18 12:09:03 2018 +0200
x86/spec_ctrl: Updates to retpoline-safety decision making
All of this is as recommended by the Intel whitepaper:
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/1d/46/Retpoline-A-Branch-Target-Injection-Mitigation.pdf
The 'RSB Alternative' bit in MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES may be set by a
hypervisor
to indicate that the virtual machine may migrate to a processor which isn't
retpoline-safe. Introduce a shortened name (to reduce code volume), treat
it
as authorative in retpoline_safe(), and print its value along with the other
ARCH_CAPS bits.
The exact processor models which do have RSB semantics which fall back to
BTB
predictions are enumerated, and include Kabylake and Coffeelake. Leave a
printk() in the default case to help identify cases which aren't covered.
The exact microcode versions from Broadwell RSB-safety are taken from the
referenced microcode update file (adjusting for the known-bad microcode
versions). Despite the exact wording of the text, it is only Broadwell
processors which need a microcode check.
In practice, this means that all Broadwell hardware with up-to-date
microcode
will use retpoline in preference to IBRS, which will be a performance
improvement for desktop and server systems which would previously always opt
for IBRS over retpoline.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
x86/spec_ctrl: Fix typo in ARCH_CAPS decode
Reported-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
master commit: 1232378bd2fef45f613db049b33852fdf84d7ddf
master date: 2018-04-19 17:28:23 +0100
master commit: 27170adb54a558e11defcd51989326a9beb95afe
master date: 2018-04-24 13:34:12 +0100
---
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index 3c7447bfe6..fa67a0ffbd 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -97,12 +97,13 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "Speculative mitigation facilities:\n");
/* Hardware features which pertain to speculative mitigations. */
- printk(XENLOG_DEBUG " Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ printk(XENLOG_DEBUG " Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
(_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB)) ? " IBRS/IBPB" : "",
(_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) ? " STIBP" : "",
(e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) ? " IBPB" : "",
(caps & ARCH_CAPABILITIES_IBRS_ALL) ? " IBRS_ALL" : "",
- (caps & ARCH_CAPABILITIES_RDCL_NO) ? " RDCL_NO" : "");
+ (caps & ARCH_CAPABILITIES_RDCL_NO) ? " RDCL_NO" : "",
+ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA) ? " RSBA" : "");
/* Compiled-in support which pertains to BTI mitigations. */
if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) )
@@ -135,6 +136,20 @@ static bool __init retpoline_safe(void)
boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 )
return false;
+ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS) )
+ {
+ uint64_t caps;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, caps);
+
+ /*
+ * RBSA may be set by a hypervisor to indicate that we may move to a
+ * processor which isn't retpoline-safe.
+ */
+ if ( caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA )
+ return false;
+ }
+
switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
{
case 0x17: /* Penryn */
@@ -161,18 +176,40 @@ static bool __init retpoline_safe(void)
* versions.
*/
case 0x3d: /* Broadwell */
- return ucode_rev >= 0x28;
+ return ucode_rev >= 0x2a;
case 0x47: /* Broadwell H */
- return ucode_rev >= 0x1b;
+ return ucode_rev >= 0x1d;
case 0x4f: /* Broadwell EP/EX */
- return ucode_rev >= 0xb000025;
+ return ucode_rev >= 0xb000021;
case 0x56: /* Broadwell D */
- return false; /* TBD. */
+ switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_mask )
+ {
+ case 2: return ucode_rev >= 0x15;
+ case 3: return ucode_rev >= 0x7000012;
+ case 4: return ucode_rev >= 0xf000011;
+ case 5: return ucode_rev >= 0xe000009;
+ default:
+ printk("Unrecognised CPU stepping %#x - assuming not reptpoline
safe\n",
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_mask);
+ return false;
+ }
+ break;
/*
- * Skylake and later processors are not retpoline-safe.
+ * Skylake, Kabylake and Cannonlake processors are not retpoline-safe.
*/
+ case 0x4e:
+ case 0x55:
+ case 0x5e:
+ case 0x66:
+ case 0x67:
+ case 0x8e:
+ case 0x9e:
+ return false;
+
default:
+ printk("Unrecognised CPU model %#x - assuming not reptpoline safe\n",
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_model);
return false;
}
}
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
index dfc02ae2fd..e06a8fa97d 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#define MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
#define ARCH_CAPABILITIES_RDCL_NO (_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
#define ARCH_CAPABILITIES_IBRS_ALL (_AC(1, ULL) << 1)
+#define ARCH_CAPS_RSBA (_AC(1, ULL) << 2)
/* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.8
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