[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen staging-4.6] x86/spec_ctrl: Explicitly set Xen's default MSR_SPEC_CTRL value
commit 342a02fcd9e40e4acbe0ab24b8788e6e4d22a457 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Tue May 29 11:06:30 2018 +0200 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Tue May 29 11:06:30 2018 +0200 x86/spec_ctrl: Explicitly set Xen's default MSR_SPEC_CTRL value With the impending ability to disable MSR_SPEC_CTRL handling on a per-guest-type basis, the first exit-from-guest may not have the side effect of loading Xen's choice of value. Explicitly set Xen's default during the BSP and AP boot paths. For the BSP however, delay setting a non-zero MSR_SPEC_CTRL default until after dom0 has been constructed when safe to do so. Oracle report that this speeds up boots of some hardware by 50s. "when safe to do so" is based on whether we are virtualised. A native boot won't have any other code running in a position to mount an attack. Reported-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: cb8c12020307b39a89273d7699e89000451987ab master date: 2018-05-16 12:19:10 +0100 --- xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 7 +++++++ xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c | 8 ++++++++ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h | 1 + xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c index 606a57a1ae..c3adee57cd 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c @@ -1538,6 +1538,13 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p) setup_io_bitmap(dom0); + if ( bsp_delay_spec_ctrl ) + { + get_cpu_info()->spec_ctrl_flags &= ~SCF_use_shadow; + barrier(); + wrmsrl(MSR_SPEC_CTRL, default_xen_spec_ctrl); + } + /* Jump to the 1:1 virtual mappings of cpu0_stack. */ asm volatile ("mov %[stk], %%rsp; jmp %c[fn]" :: [stk] "g" (__va(__pa(get_stack_bottom()))), diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c index b69d63ad09..7f57dcf3e9 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c @@ -379,6 +379,14 @@ void start_secondary(void *unused) else microcode_resume_cpu(cpu); + /* + * If MSR_SPEC_CTRL is available, apply Xen's default setting and discard + * any firmware settings. Note: MSR_SPEC_CTRL may only become available + * after loading microcode. + */ + if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) ) + wrmsrl(MSR_SPEC_CTRL, default_xen_spec_ctrl); + smp_callin(); setup_secondary_APIC_clock(); diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c index fece1056b9..844a22f9be 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ static int8_t __initdata opt_ibrs = -1; static bool_t __initdata opt_rsb_pv = 1; static bool_t __initdata opt_rsb_hvm = 1; bool_t __read_mostly opt_ibpb = 1; + +bool_t __initdata bsp_delay_spec_ctrl; uint8_t __read_mostly default_xen_spec_ctrl; uint8_t __read_mostly default_spec_ctrl_flags; @@ -331,6 +333,36 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_IDLE, boot_cpu_data.x86_capability); print_details(thunk, caps); + + /* + * If MSR_SPEC_CTRL is available, apply Xen's default setting and discard + * any firmware settings. For performance reasons, when safe to do so, we + * delay applying non-zero settings until after dom0 has been constructed. + * + * "when safe to do so" is based on whether we are virtualised. A native + * boot won't have any other code running in a position to mount an + * attack. + */ + if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) ) + { + bsp_delay_spec_ctrl = !cpu_has_hypervisor && default_xen_spec_ctrl; + + /* + * If delaying MSR_SPEC_CTRL setup, use the same mechanism as + * spec_ctrl_enter_idle(), by using a shadow value of zero. + */ + if ( bsp_delay_spec_ctrl ) + { + struct cpu_info *info = get_cpu_info(); + + info->shadow_spec_ctrl = 0; + barrier(); + info->spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_use_shadow; + barrier(); + } + + wrmsrl(MSR_SPEC_CTRL, bsp_delay_spec_ctrl ? 0 : default_xen_spec_ctrl); + } } static void __init __maybe_unused build_assertions(void) diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h index 3aaa6c8078..22429db282 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h @@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ #define cpu_has_svm boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SVM) #define cpu_has_vmx boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMXE) +#define cpu_has_hypervisor boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) #define cpu_has_cpuid_faulting boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULTING) #define cpu_has_lfence_dispatch boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH) diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h index ec943e18e3..d36f0e92a8 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ void init_speculation_mitigations(void); extern bool_t opt_ibpb; + +extern bool_t bsp_delay_spec_ctrl; extern uint8_t default_xen_spec_ctrl; extern uint8_t default_spec_ctrl_flags; -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.6 _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog
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