[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen staging] xen/arm: Kconfig: Move HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR under "Architecture features"
commit 54cf710d74720a94b9d9a7e58abbe2831e70a37b Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Tue Jun 12 12:36:41 2018 +0100 Commit: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> CommitDate: Fri Jun 22 02:59:43 2018 +0100 xen/arm: Kconfig: Move HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR under "Architecture features" At the moment, HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is not in any section making impossible for the user to unselect it. Also, it looks like we require to use 'expert = "y"' for showing the option in expert mode. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/arm/Kconfig | 34 +++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig b/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig index 2cbe9dd43b..06ba4a4d6e 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -81,6 +81,23 @@ config ARM_SSBD If unsure, say Y. +config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT = "y" + default y + help + Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on + being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by + executing aliasing branches in the attacker context. Such attacks + can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch + predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations. + + This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the + branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific + instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system + firmware. + + If unsure, say Y. + endmenu menu "ARM errata workaround via the alternative framework" @@ -195,23 +212,6 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_834220 endmenu -config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR - bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT - default y - help - Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on - being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by - executing aliasing branches in the attacker context. Such attacks - can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch - predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations. - - This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the - branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific - instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system - firmware. - - If unsure, say Y. - config ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR def_bool y if ARM_64 && HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog
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