|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen staging-4.8] x86/hvm: Disallow unknown MSR_EFER bits
commit b149b06b1eb5fdc11ef2dfe0af9ce41fc119b5ab
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Mon Jul 30 12:10:18 2018 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Mon Jul 30 12:10:18 2018 +0200
x86/hvm: Disallow unknown MSR_EFER bits
It turns out that nothing ever prevented HVM guests from trying to set
unknown
EFER bits. Generally, this results in a vmentry failure.
For Intel hardware, all implemented bits are covered by the checks.
For AMD hardware, the only EFER bit which isn't covered by the checks is TCE
(which AFAICT is specific to AMD Fam15/16 hardware). We never advertise TCE
in CPUID, but it isn't a security problem to have TCE unexpected enabled in
guest context.
Disallow the setting of bits outside of the EFER_KNOWN_MASK, which prevents
any vmentry failures for guests, yielding #GP instead.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
master commit: ef0269c6215d642a709866f04ba1a1f9f13f3614
master date: 2018-07-24 11:25:53 +0100
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 3 +++
xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 298d5ed0c8..56823bd616 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -935,6 +935,9 @@ const char *hvm_efer_valid(const struct vcpu *v, uint64_t
value,
{
unsigned int ext1_ecx = 0, ext1_edx = 0;
+ if ( value & ~EFER_KNOWN_MASK )
+ return "Unknown bits set";
+
if ( cr0_pg < 0 && !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) )
{
unsigned int level;
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
index 9969504fe1..e7b0be5483 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
#define EFER_LMSLE (1<<_EFER_LMSLE)
#define EFER_FFXSE (1<<_EFER_FFXSE)
+#define EFER_KNOWN_MASK (EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA |
EFER_NX | \
+ EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE | EFER_FFXSE)
+
/* Speculation Controls. */
#define MSR_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048
#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.8
_______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |