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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen master] evtchn: block speculative out-of-bound accesses
commit 443d3ab6daee9bf77ec1cb2ea7e252fb0ce616a8
Author: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Feb 26 16:57:18 2019 +0100
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Feb 26 16:57:18 2019 +0100
evtchn: block speculative out-of-bound accesses
Guests can issue event channel interaction with guest specified data.
To avoid speculative out-of-bound accesses, we use the nospec macros,
or the domain_vcpu function. Where appropriate, we use the vcpu_id of
the seleceted vcpu instead of the parameter that can be influenced by
the guest, so that only one access needs to be protected.
This is part of the speculative hardening effort.
Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
---
xen/common/event_channel.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++-----------
xen/common/event_fifo.c | 13 ++++++++++---
xen/include/xen/event.h | 5 +++--
3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/event_channel.c b/xen/common/event_channel.c
index 6fbe346490..e86e2bfab0 100644
--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
@@ -365,11 +365,16 @@ int evtchn_bind_virq(evtchn_bind_virq_t *bind,
evtchn_port_t port)
if ( (virq < 0) || (virq >= ARRAY_SIZE(v->virq_to_evtchn)) )
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Make sure the guest controlled value virq is bounded even during
+ * speculative execution.
+ */
+ virq = array_index_nospec(virq, ARRAY_SIZE(v->virq_to_evtchn));
+
if ( virq_is_global(virq) && (vcpu != 0) )
return -EINVAL;
- if ( (vcpu < 0) || (vcpu >= d->max_vcpus) ||
- ((v = d->vcpu[vcpu]) == NULL) )
+ if ( (v = domain_vcpu(d, vcpu)) == NULL )
return -ENOENT;
spin_lock(&d->event_lock);
@@ -418,8 +423,7 @@ static long evtchn_bind_ipi(evtchn_bind_ipi_t *bind)
int port, vcpu = bind->vcpu;
long rc = 0;
- if ( (vcpu < 0) || (vcpu >= d->max_vcpus) ||
- (d->vcpu[vcpu] == NULL) )
+ if ( domain_vcpu(d, vcpu) == NULL )
return -ENOENT;
spin_lock(&d->event_lock);
@@ -930,8 +934,10 @@ long evtchn_bind_vcpu(unsigned int port, unsigned int
vcpu_id)
struct domain *d = current->domain;
struct evtchn *chn;
long rc = 0;
+ struct vcpu *v;
- if ( (vcpu_id >= d->max_vcpus) || (d->vcpu[vcpu_id] == NULL) )
+ /* Use the vcpu info to prevent speculative out-of-bound accesses */
+ if ( (v = domain_vcpu(d, vcpu_id)) == NULL )
return -ENOENT;
spin_lock(&d->event_lock);
@@ -955,22 +961,22 @@ long evtchn_bind_vcpu(unsigned int port, unsigned int
vcpu_id)
{
case ECS_VIRQ:
if ( virq_is_global(chn->u.virq) )
- chn->notify_vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+ chn->notify_vcpu_id = v->vcpu_id;
else
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
case ECS_UNBOUND:
case ECS_INTERDOMAIN:
- chn->notify_vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+ chn->notify_vcpu_id = v->vcpu_id;
break;
case ECS_PIRQ:
- if ( chn->notify_vcpu_id == vcpu_id )
+ if ( chn->notify_vcpu_id == v->vcpu_id )
break;
unlink_pirq_port(chn, d->vcpu[chn->notify_vcpu_id]);
- chn->notify_vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+ chn->notify_vcpu_id = v->vcpu_id;
pirq_set_affinity(d, chn->u.pirq.irq,
- cpumask_of(d->vcpu[vcpu_id]->processor));
- link_pirq_port(port, chn, d->vcpu[vcpu_id]);
+ cpumask_of(v->processor));
+ link_pirq_port(port, chn, v);
break;
default:
rc = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/xen/common/event_fifo.c b/xen/common/event_fifo.c
index c49f446754..3eecab3f22 100644
--- a/xen/common/event_fifo.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_fifo.c
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ static inline event_word_t *evtchn_fifo_word_from_port(const
struct domain *d,
*/
smp_rmb();
- p = port / EVTCHN_FIFO_EVENT_WORDS_PER_PAGE;
+ p = array_index_nospec(port / EVTCHN_FIFO_EVENT_WORDS_PER_PAGE,
+ d->evtchn_fifo->num_evtchns);
w = port % EVTCHN_FIFO_EVENT_WORDS_PER_PAGE;
return d->evtchn_fifo->event_array[p] + w;
@@ -516,14 +517,20 @@ int evtchn_fifo_init_control(struct evtchn_init_control
*init_control)
gfn = init_control->control_gfn;
offset = init_control->offset;
- if ( vcpu_id >= d->max_vcpus || !d->vcpu[vcpu_id] )
+ if ( (v = domain_vcpu(d, vcpu_id)) == NULL )
return -ENOENT;
- v = d->vcpu[vcpu_id];
/* Must not cross page boundary. */
if ( offset > (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(evtchn_fifo_control_block_t)) )
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Make sure the guest controlled value offset is bounded even during
+ * speculative execution.
+ */
+ offset = array_index_nospec(offset,
+ PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(evtchn_fifo_control_block_t) +
1);
+
/* Must be 8-bytes aligned. */
if ( offset & (8 - 1) )
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/event.h b/xen/include/xen/event.h
index 46508878bb..e91097d77e 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/event.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/event.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <xen/smp.h>
#include <xen/softirq.h>
#include <xen/bitops.h>
+#include <xen/nospec.h>
#include <asm/event.h>
/*
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ void arch_evtchn_inject(struct vcpu *v);
* The first bucket is directly accessed via d->evtchn.
*/
#define group_from_port(d, p) \
- ((d)->evtchn_group[(p) / EVTCHNS_PER_GROUP])
+ array_access_nospec((d)->evtchn_group, (p) / EVTCHNS_PER_GROUP)
#define bucket_from_port(d, p) \
((group_from_port(d, p))[((p) % EVTCHNS_PER_GROUP) / EVTCHNS_PER_BUCKET])
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ static inline bool_t port_is_valid(struct domain *d,
unsigned int p)
static inline struct evtchn *evtchn_from_port(struct domain *d, unsigned int p)
{
if ( p < EVTCHNS_PER_BUCKET )
- return &d->evtchn[p];
+ return &d->evtchn[array_index_nospec(p, EVTCHNS_PER_BUCKET)];
return bucket_from_port(d, p) + (p % EVTCHNS_PER_BUCKET);
}
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master
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