[Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.7] x86/pv: _toggle_guest_pt() may not skip TLB flush for shadow mode guests

[patchbot@xxxxxxx]

commit 88f936d44d2e34ca2d0827cc828ea9d3aeef3fe8
Author:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Mar 5 15:57:42 2019 +0100
Commit:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Mar 5 15:57:42 2019 +0100

    x86/pv: _toggle_guest_pt() may not skip TLB flush for shadow mode guests
    
    For shadow mode guests (e.g. PV ones forced into that mode as L1TF
    mitigation, or during migration) update_cr3() -> sh_update_cr3() may
    result in a change to the (shadow) root page table (compared to the
    previous one when running the same vCPU with the same PCID). This can,
    first and foremost, be a result of memory pressure on the shadow memory
    pool of the domain. Shadow code legitimately relies on the original
    (prior to commit 5c81d260c2 ["xen/x86: use PCID feature"]) behavior of
    the subsequent CR3 write to flush the TLB of entries still left from
    walks with an earlier, different (shadow) root page table.
    
    Restore the flushing behavior, also for the second CR3 write on the exit
    path to guest context when XPTI is active. For the moment accept that
    this will introduce more flushes than are strictly necessary - no flush
    would be needed when the (shadow) root page table doesn't actually
    change, but this information isn't readily (i.e. without introducing a
    layering violation) available here.
    
    This is XSA-294.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    master commit: 329b00e4d49f70185561d7cc4b076c77869888a0
    master date: 2019-03-05 13:54:42 +0100
---
 xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c
index 04cc60dd1f..37a33828cb 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <asm/event.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/shadow.h>
 #include <asm/shared.h>
 #include <asm/hvm/hvm.h>
 #include <asm/hvm/support.h>
@@ -282,6 +283,8 @@ void toggle_guest_mode(struct vcpu *v)
 void toggle_guest_pt(struct vcpu *v)
 {
     const struct domain *d = v->domain;
+    struct cpu_info *cpu_info = get_cpu_info();
+    unsigned long cr3;
 
     if ( is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v) )
         return;
@@ -290,16 +293,28 @@ void toggle_guest_pt(struct vcpu *v)
     update_cr3(v);
     if ( d->arch.pv_domain.xpti )
     {
-        struct cpu_info *cpu_info = get_cpu_info();
-
         cpu_info->root_pgt_changed = 1;
         cpu_info->pv_cr3 = __pa(this_cpu(root_pgt)) |
                            (d->arch.pv_domain.pcid
                             ? get_pcid_bits(v, 1) : 0);
     }
 
-    /* Don't flush user global mappings from the TLB. Don't tick TLB clock. */
-    write_cr3(v->arch.cr3);
+    /*
+     * Don't flush user global mappings from the TLB. Don't tick TLB clock.
+     *
+     * In shadow mode, though, update_cr3() may need to be accompanied by a
+     * TLB flush (for just the incoming PCID), as the top level page table may
+     * have changed behind our backs. To be on the safe side, suppress the
+     * no-flush unconditionally in this case. The XPTI CR3 write, if enabled,
+     * will then need to be a flushing one too.
+     */
+    cr3 = v->arch.cr3;
+    if ( shadow_mode_enabled(d) )
+    {
+        cr3 &= ~X86_CR3_NOFLUSH;
+        cpu_info->pv_cr3 &= ~X86_CR3_NOFLUSH;
+    }
+    write_cr3(cr3);
 
     if ( !(v->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode) )
         return;
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.7

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