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[Xen-changelog] [xen staging] common/memory: block speculative out-of-bound accesses



commit dfdf4780487aeb3e983a1a23d5114246e55e8168
Author:     Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Thu Mar 14 13:56:00 2019 +0100
Commit:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri Apr 5 12:17:53 2019 +0200

    common/memory: block speculative out-of-bound accesses
    
    The get_page_from_gfn method returns a pointer to a page that belongs
    to a gfn. Before returning the pointer, the gfn is checked for being
    valid. Under speculation, these checks can be bypassed, so that
    the function get_page is still executed partially. Consequently, the
    function page_get_owner_and_reference might be executed partially as
    well. In this function, the computed pointer is accessed, resulting in
    a speculative out-of-bound address load. As the gfn can be controlled by
    a guest, this access is problematic.
    
    To mitigate the root cause, an lfence instruction is added via the
    evaluate_nospec macro. To make the protection generic, we do not
    introduce the lfence instruction for this single check, but add it to
    the mfn_valid function. This way, other potentially problematic accesses
    are protected as well.
    
    This is part of the speculative hardening effort.
    
    Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/common/pdx.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/common/pdx.c b/xen/common/pdx.c
index 1a2100c9d9..50c21b6bf8 100644
--- a/xen/common/pdx.c
+++ b/xen/common/pdx.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <xen/init.h>
 #include <xen/mm.h>
 #include <xen/bitops.h>
+#include <xen/nospec.h>
 
 /* Parameters for PFN/MADDR compression. */
 unsigned long __read_mostly max_pdx;
@@ -33,8 +34,9 @@ unsigned long __read_mostly pdx_group_valid[BITS_TO_LONGS(
 
 bool __mfn_valid(unsigned long mfn)
 {
-    return likely(mfn < max_page) &&
-           likely(!(mfn & pfn_hole_mask)) &&
+    if ( unlikely(evaluate_nospec(mfn >= max_page)) )
+        return false;
+    return likely(!(mfn & pfn_hole_mask)) &&
            likely(test_bit(pfn_to_pdx(mfn) / PDX_GROUP_COUNT,
                            pdx_group_valid));
 }
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging

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