[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen staging] common/domain: block speculative out-of-bound accesses
commit f8303458ae80062dfc60d0efd36198cc17a12ecf Author: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Thu Mar 14 13:57:00 2019 +0100 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Fri Apr 5 12:19:03 2019 +0200 common/domain: block speculative out-of-bound accesses When issuing a vcpu_op hypercall, guests have control over the vcpuid variable. In the old code, this allowed to perform speculative out-of-bound accesses. To block this, we make use of the domain_vcpu function. This is part of the speculative hardening effort. Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> --- xen/common/domain.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c index a1f8bb4f2f..88bbe984bc 100644 --- a/xen/common/domain.c +++ b/xen/common/domain.c @@ -1364,7 +1364,7 @@ long do_vcpu_op(int cmd, unsigned int vcpuid, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) struct vcpu *v; long rc = 0; - if ( vcpuid >= d->max_vcpus || (v = d->vcpu[vcpuid]) == NULL ) + if ( (v = domain_vcpu(d, vcpuid)) == NULL ) return -ENOENT; switch ( cmd ) -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog
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