[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.11] xen/arm: mm: Set-up page permission for Xen mappings earlier on
commit 6c33308a8dbb990e89fa7809e47b900570e67723 Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Thu Nov 29 11:37:43 2018 +0000 Commit: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Thu Jun 6 15:18:26 2019 -0700 xen/arm: mm: Set-up page permission for Xen mappings earlier on Xen mapping is first create using a 2MB page and then shatterred in 4KB page for fine-graine permission. However, it is not safe to break-down superpage page without going to an intermediate step invalidating the entry. As we are changing Xen mappings, we cannot go through the intermediate step. The only solution is to create Xen mapping using 4KB entries directly. As the Xen should always access the mappings according with the runtime permission, it is then possible to set-up the permissions while create the mapping. We are still playing with the fire as there are still some break-before-make issue in setup_pagetables (i.e switch between 2 sets of page-tables). But it should slightly be better than the current state. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Reported-by: Shameerali Kolothum Thodi <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@xxxxxxxxxx> Reported-by: Jan-Peter Larsson <Jan-Peter.Larsson@xxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Shameer Kolothum <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@xxxxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@xxxxxxxxxxx> (cherry picked from commit 00c96d77422a4b84247bec5dadf434363d312cac) --- xen/arch/arm/mm.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c index a6de77c28c..bdf427ca64 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c @@ -649,11 +649,31 @@ void __init setup_pagetables(unsigned long boot_phys_offset, paddr_t xen_paddr) } #endif + /* Break up the Xen mapping into 4k pages and protect them separately. */ + for ( i = 0; i < LPAE_ENTRIES; i++ ) + { + mfn_t mfn = mfn_add(maddr_to_mfn(xen_paddr), i); + unsigned long va = XEN_VIRT_START + (i << PAGE_SHIFT); + + if ( !is_kernel(va) ) + break; + pte = mfn_to_xen_entry(mfn, MT_NORMAL); + pte.pt.table = 1; /* 4k mappings always have this bit set */ + if ( is_kernel_text(va) || is_kernel_inittext(va) ) + { + pte.pt.xn = 0; + pte.pt.ro = 1; + } + if ( is_kernel_rodata(va) ) + pte.pt.ro = 1; + xen_xenmap[i] = pte; + } + /* Initialise xen second level entries ... */ /* ... Xen's text etc */ - pte = mfn_to_xen_entry(maddr_to_mfn(xen_paddr), MT_NORMAL); - pte.pt.xn = 0;/* Contains our text mapping! */ + pte = pte_of_xenaddr((vaddr_t)xen_xenmap); + pte.pt.table = 1; xen_second[second_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)] = pte; /* ... Fixmap */ @@ -693,31 +713,6 @@ void __init setup_pagetables(unsigned long boot_phys_offset, paddr_t xen_paddr) clear_table(boot_second); clear_table(boot_third); - /* Break up the Xen mapping into 4k pages and protect them separately. */ - for ( i = 0; i < LPAE_ENTRIES; i++ ) - { - mfn_t mfn = mfn_add(maddr_to_mfn(xen_paddr), i); - unsigned long va = XEN_VIRT_START + (i << PAGE_SHIFT); - if ( !is_kernel(va) ) - break; - pte = mfn_to_xen_entry(mfn, MT_NORMAL); - pte.pt.table = 1; /* 4k mappings always have this bit set */ - if ( is_kernel_text(va) || is_kernel_inittext(va) ) - { - pte.pt.xn = 0; - pte.pt.ro = 1; - } - if ( is_kernel_rodata(va) ) - pte.pt.ro = 1; - write_pte(xen_xenmap + i, pte); - /* No flush required here as page table is not hooked in yet. */ - } - - pte = pte_of_xenaddr((vaddr_t)xen_xenmap); - pte.pt.table = 1; - write_pte(xen_second + second_linear_offset(XEN_VIRT_START), pte); - /* TLBFLUSH and ISB would be needed here, but wait until we set WXN */ - /* From now on, no mapping may be both writable and executable. */ WRITE_SYSREG32(READ_SYSREG32(SCTLR_EL2) | SCTLR_WXN, SCTLR_EL2); /* Flush everything after setting WXN bit. */ -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.11 _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog
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