[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen staging-4.9] x86/mm: Clean up trailing whitespace
commit ff4fdf048ef68ef7d45864569f4938ec45b80a6a Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Wed Oct 16 09:16:15 2019 +0100 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Mon Nov 4 15:01:03 2019 +0100 x86/mm: Clean up trailing whitespace Sometime between 4.9 and 4.10 someone cleaned up all the trailing whitespace in mm.c; applying this patch now makes all futher patches much cleaner. No functional change. Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c index 54cfebbe91..f10d823f8e 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c @@ -1,48 +1,48 @@ /****************************************************************************** * arch/x86/mm.c - * + * * Copyright (c) 2002-2005 K A Fraser * Copyright (c) 2004 Christian Limpach - * + * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. - * + * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. - * + * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ /* * A description of the x86 page table API: - * + * * Domains trap to do_mmu_update with a list of update requests. * This is a list of (ptr, val) pairs, where the requested operation * is *ptr = val. - * + * * Reference counting of pages: * ---------------------------- * Each page has two refcounts: tot_count and type_count. - * + * * TOT_COUNT is the obvious reference count. It counts all uses of a * physical page frame by a domain, including uses as a page directory, * a page table, or simple mappings via a PTE. This count prevents a * domain from releasing a frame back to the free pool when it still holds * a reference to it. - * + * * TYPE_COUNT is more subtle. A frame can be put to one of three * mutually-exclusive uses: it might be used as a page directory, or a * page table, or it may be mapped writable by the domain [of course, a * frame may not be used in any of these three ways!]. - * So, type_count is a count of the number of times a frame is being + * So, type_count is a count of the number of times a frame is being * referred to in its current incarnation. Therefore, a page can only * change its type when its type count is zero. - * + * * Pinning the page type: * ---------------------- * The type of a page can be pinned/unpinned with the commands @@ -51,20 +51,20 @@ * This is useful to prevent a page's type count falling to zero, at which * point safety checks would need to be carried out next time the count * is increased again. - * + * * A further note on writable page mappings: * ----------------------------------------- * For simplicity, the count of writable mappings for a page may not * correspond to reality. The 'writable count' is incremented for every * PTE which maps the page with the _PAGE_RW flag set. However, for * write access to be possible the page directory entry must also have - * its _PAGE_RW bit set. We do not check this as it complicates the + * its _PAGE_RW bit set. We do not check this as it complicates the * reference counting considerably [consider the case of multiple * directory entries referencing a single page table, some with the RW * bit set, others not -- it starts getting a bit messy]. * In normal use, this simplification shouldn't be a problem. * However, the logic can be added if required. - * + * * One more note on read-only page mappings: * ----------------------------------------- * We want domains to be able to map pages for read-only access. The @@ -73,10 +73,10 @@ * However, domains have free access to rings 1 & 2 of the Intel * privilege model. In terms of page protection, these are considered * to be part of 'supervisor mode'. The WP bit in CR0 controls whether - * read-only restrictions are respected in supervisor mode -- if the + * read-only restrictions are respected in supervisor mode -- if the * bit is clear then any mapped page is writable. - * - * We get round this by always setting the WP bit and disallowing + * + * We get round this by always setting the WP bit and disallowing * updates to it. This is very unlikely to cause a problem for guest * OS's, which will generally use the WP bit to simplify copy-on-write * implementation (in that case, OS wants a fault when it writes to @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ void __init arch_init_memory(void) */ dom_io = domain_create(DOMID_IO, DOMCRF_dummy, 0, NULL); BUG_ON(IS_ERR(dom_io)); - + /* * Initialise our COW domain. * This domain owns sharable pages. @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ void __init arch_init_memory(void) /* First 1MB of RAM is historically marked as I/O. */ for ( i = 0; i < 0x100; i++ ) share_xen_page_with_guest(mfn_to_page(i), dom_io, XENSHARE_writable); - + /* Any areas not specified as RAM by the e820 map are considered I/O. */ for ( i = 0, pfn = 0; pfn < max_page; i++ ) { @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ void __init arch_init_memory(void) */ iostart_pfn = max_t(unsigned long, pfn, 1UL << (20 - PAGE_SHIFT)); ioend_pfn = min(rstart_pfn, 16UL << (20 - PAGE_SHIFT)); - if ( iostart_pfn < ioend_pfn ) + if ( iostart_pfn < ioend_pfn ) destroy_xen_mappings((unsigned long)mfn_to_virt(iostart_pfn), (unsigned long)mfn_to_virt(ioend_pfn)); @@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ int page_is_ram_type(unsigned long mfn, unsigned long mem_type) /* unknown */ continue; } - + /* Test the range. */ if ( (e820.map[i].addr <= maddr) && ((e820.map[i].addr + e820.map[i].size) >= (maddr + PAGE_SIZE)) ) @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ void write_ptbase(struct vcpu *v) /* * Should be called after CR3 is updated. - * + * * Uses values found in vcpu->arch.(guest_table and guest_table_user), and * for HVM guests, arch.monitor_table and hvm's guest CR3. * @@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ static int get_page_from_pagenr(unsigned long page_nr, struct domain *d) static int __get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, int preemptible); -static int get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(unsigned long page_nr, +static int get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(unsigned long page_nr, unsigned long type, struct domain *d, int partial, @@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ get_page_from_l1e( pg_owner = real_pg_owner; } - /* Extra paranoid check for shared memory. Writable mappings + /* Extra paranoid check for shared memory. Writable mappings * disallowed (unshare first!) */ if ( (l1f & _PAGE_RW) && (real_pg_owner == dom_cow) ) goto could_not_pin; @@ -1411,12 +1411,12 @@ void put_page_from_l1e(l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner) * Check if this is a mapping that was established via a grant reference. * If it was then we should not be here: we require that such mappings are * explicitly destroyed via the grant-table interface. - * + * * The upshot of this is that the guest can end up with active grants that * it cannot destroy (because it no longer has a PTE to present to the * grant-table interface). This can lead to subtle hard-to-catch bugs, * hence a special grant PTE flag can be enabled to catch the bug early. - * + * * (Note that the undestroyable active grants are not a security hole in * Xen. All active grants can safely be cleaned up when the domain dies.) */ @@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ void put_page_from_l1e(l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner) /* Remember we didn't take a type-count of foreign writable mappings * to paging-external domains */ - if ( (l1e_get_flags(l1e) & _PAGE_RW) && + if ( (l1e_get_flags(l1e) & _PAGE_RW) && ((l1e_owner == pg_owner) || !paging_mode_external(pg_owner)) ) { put_page_and_type(page); @@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ void put_page_from_l1e(l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner) else { /* We expect this is rare so we blow the entire shadow LDT. */ - if ( unlikely(((page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask) == + if ( unlikely(((page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_seg_desc_page)) && unlikely(((page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_count_mask) != 0)) && (l1e_owner == pg_owner) ) @@ -1541,7 +1541,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn, { int rc = 1; - if ( (l4e_get_flags(l4e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) && + if ( (l4e_get_flags(l4e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) && (l4e_get_pfn(l4e) != pfn) ) { struct page_info *pg = l4e_get_page(l4e); @@ -2100,8 +2100,8 @@ void page_unlock(struct page_info *page) /* How to write an entry to the guest pagetables. * Returns 0 for failure (pointer not valid), 1 for success. */ -static inline int update_intpte(intpte_t *p, - intpte_t old, +static inline int update_intpte(intpte_t *p, + intpte_t old, intpte_t new, unsigned long mfn, struct vcpu *v, @@ -2273,8 +2273,8 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, l1_pgentry_t nl1e, /* Update the L2 entry at pl2e to new value nl2e. pl2e is within frame pfn. */ -static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl2e, - l2_pgentry_t nl2e, +static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl2e, + l2_pgentry_t nl2e, unsigned long pfn, int preserve_ad, struct vcpu *vcpu) @@ -2338,8 +2338,8 @@ static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl2e, } /* Update the L3 entry at pl3e to new value nl3e. pl3e is within frame pfn. */ -static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl3e, - l3_pgentry_t nl3e, +static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl3e, + l3_pgentry_t nl3e, unsigned long pfn, int preserve_ad, struct vcpu *vcpu) @@ -2412,8 +2412,8 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl3e, } /* Update the L4 entry at pl4e to new value nl4e. pl4e is within frame pfn. */ -static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl4e, - l4_pgentry_t nl4e, +static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl4e, + l4_pgentry_t nl4e, unsigned long pfn, int preserve_ad, struct vcpu *vcpu) @@ -2580,7 +2580,7 @@ struct domain *page_get_owner_and_reference(struct page_info *page) x = y; /* * Count == 0: Page is not allocated, so we cannot take a reference. - * Count == -1: Reference count would wrap, which is invalid. + * Count == -1: Reference count would wrap, which is invalid. * Count == -2: Remaining unused ref is reserved for get_page_light(). */ if ( unlikely(((x + 2) & PGC_count_mask) <= 2) ) @@ -2668,7 +2668,7 @@ static int alloc_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, rc = alloc_segdesc_page(page); break; default: - printk("Bad type in alloc_page_type %lx t=%" PRtype_info " c=%lx\n", + printk("Bad type in alloc_page_type %lx t=%" PRtype_info " c=%lx\n", type, page->u.inuse.type_info, page->count_info); rc = -EINVAL; @@ -2929,8 +2929,8 @@ static int __get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, if ( (x & PGT_type_mask) != type ) { /* - * On type change we check to flush stale TLB entries. This - * may be unnecessary (e.g., page was GDT/LDT) but those + * On type change we check to flush stale TLB entries. This + * may be unnecessary (e.g., page was GDT/LDT) but those * circumstances should be very rare. */ cpumask_t *mask = this_cpu(scratch_cpumask); @@ -3880,7 +3880,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op( else rc = -EPERM; break; - + case MMUEXT_INVLPG_ALL: if ( unlikely(d != pg_owner) ) rc = -EPERM; @@ -4414,7 +4414,7 @@ static int create_grant_pte_mapping( gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Could not get page for normal update\n"); return GNTST_general_error; } - + mfn = page_to_mfn(page); va = map_domain_page(_mfn(mfn)); va = (void *)((unsigned long)va + ((unsigned long)pte_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)); @@ -4438,7 +4438,7 @@ static int create_grant_pte_mapping( page_unlock(page); rc = GNTST_general_error; goto failed; - } + } page_unlock(page); @@ -4480,7 +4480,7 @@ static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping( gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Could not get page for normal update\n"); return GNTST_general_error; } - + mfn = page_to_mfn(page); va = map_domain_page(_mfn(mfn)); va = (void *)((unsigned long)va + ((unsigned long)addr & ~PAGE_MASK)); @@ -4499,7 +4499,7 @@ static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping( } ol1e = *(l1_pgentry_t *)va; - + /* * Check that the PTE supplied actually maps frame (with appropriate * permissions). @@ -4525,8 +4525,8 @@ static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping( /* Delete pagetable entry. */ if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY - (l1, - (l1_pgentry_t *)va, ol1e, l1e_empty(), mfn, + (l1, + (l1_pgentry_t *)va, ol1e, l1e_empty(), mfn, d->vcpu[0] /* Change if we go to per-vcpu shadows. */, 0)) ) { @@ -4554,7 +4554,7 @@ static int create_grant_va_mapping( unsigned long gl1mfn; struct page_info *l1pg; int okay; - + adjust_guest_l1e(nl1e, d); pl1e = guest_map_l1e(va, &gl1mfn); @@ -4607,7 +4607,7 @@ static int replace_grant_va_mapping( unsigned long gl1mfn; struct page_info *l1pg; int rc = 0; - + pl1e = guest_map_l1e(addr, &gl1mfn); if ( !pl1e ) { @@ -4707,7 +4707,7 @@ static int create_grant_p2m_mapping(uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame, return GNTST_okay; } -int create_grant_host_mapping(uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame, +int create_grant_host_mapping(uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame, unsigned int flags, unsigned int cache_flags) { l1_pgentry_t pte; @@ -4777,7 +4777,7 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping( struct page_info *l1pg; int rc; unsigned int grant_pte_flags; - + if ( paging_mode_external(current->domain) ) return replace_grant_p2m_mapping(addr, frame, new_addr, flags); @@ -4803,7 +4803,7 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping( if ( !new_addr ) return destroy_grant_pte_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags, curr->domain); - + return GNTST_general_error; } @@ -5198,7 +5198,7 @@ void destroy_gdt(struct vcpu *v) } -long set_gdt(struct vcpu *v, +long set_gdt(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long *frames, unsigned int entries) { @@ -5260,7 +5260,7 @@ long do_set_gdt(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_ulong_t) frame_list, /* Rechecked in set_gdt, but ensures a sane limit for copy_from_user(). */ if ( entries > FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_ENTRY ) return -EINVAL; - + if ( copy_from_guest(frames, frame_list, nr_pages) ) return -EFAULT; @@ -5553,7 +5553,7 @@ long arch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) rcu_unlock_domain(d); return -ENOMEM; } - + if ( copy_from_guest(e820, fmap.map.buffer, fmap.map.nr_entries) ) { xfree(e820); @@ -5712,7 +5712,7 @@ long arch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) rc = -EINVAL; goto pod_target_out_unlock; } - + rc = p2m_pod_set_mem_target(d, target.target_pages); } @@ -5734,7 +5734,7 @@ long arch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) goto pod_target_out_unlock; } } - + pod_target_out_unlock: rcu_unlock_domain(d); return rc; @@ -5980,7 +5980,7 @@ static const struct x86_emulate_ops ptwr_emulate_ops = { }; /* Write page fault handler: check if guest is trying to modify a PTE. */ -int ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr, +int ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr, struct cpu_user_regs *regs) { struct domain *d = v->domain; -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.9 _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog
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