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[Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.11] IOMMU: default to always quarantining PCI devices



commit 1d6777df453eae5fbc9d58cb1139b2ebcdae4a09
Author:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Nov 26 14:24:44 2019 +0100
Commit:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Nov 26 14:24:44 2019 +0100

    IOMMU: default to always quarantining PCI devices
    
    XSA-302 relies on the use of libxl's "assignable-add" feature to prepare
    devices to be assigned to untrusted guests.
    
    Unfortunately, this is not considered a strictly required step for
    device assignment. The PCI passthrough documentation on the wiki
    describes alternate ways of preparing devices for assignment, and
    libvirt uses its own ways as well. Hosts where these alternate methods
    are used will still leave the system in a vulnerable state after the
    device comes back from a guest.
    
    Default to always quarantining PCI devices, but provide a command line
    option to revert back to prior behavior (such that people who both
    sufficiently trust their guests and want to be able to use devices in
    Dom0 again after they had been in use by a guest wouldn't need to
    "manually" move such devices back from DomIO to Dom0).
    
    This is XSA-306.
    
    Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>
    master commit: ba2ab00bbb8c74e311a252d816d68dee47c779a0
    master date: 2019-11-26 14:15:01 +0100
---
 docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 11 ++++++++++-
 xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c     |  3 +++
 xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c       |  3 ++-
 xen/include/xen/iommu.h             |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown 
b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
index 8084862f60..d09f35723a 100644
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
@@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@ detection of systems known to misbehave upon accesses to 
that port.
 > Default: `new` unless directed-EOI is supported
 
 ### iommu
-> `= List of [ <boolean> | force | required | intremap | intpost | qinval | 
snoop | sharept | dom0-passthrough | dom0-strict | amd-iommu-perdev-intremap | 
workaround_bios_bug | igfx | crash-disable | verbose | debug ]`
+> `= List of [ <boolean> | force | required | quarantine | intremap | intpost 
| qinval | snoop | sharept | dom0-passthrough | dom0-strict | 
amd-iommu-perdev-intremap | workaround_bios_bug | igfx | crash-disable | 
verbose | debug ]`
 
 > Sub-options:
 
@@ -1157,6 +1157,15 @@ detection of systems known to misbehave upon accesses to 
that port.
 >> Don't continue booting unless IOMMU support is found and can be initialized
 >> successfully.
 
+> `quarantine`
+
+> Default: `true`
+
+>> Control Xen's behavior when de-assigning devices from guests.  If enabled,
+>> Xen always quarantines such devices; they must be explicitly assigned back
+>> to Dom0 before they can be used there again.  If disabled, Xen will only
+>> quarantine devices the toolstack hass arranged for getting quarantined.
+
 > `intremap`
 
 > Default: `true`
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
index 8027d96f1c..132bbb3762 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ custom_param("iommu", parse_iommu_param);
 bool_t __initdata iommu_enable = 1;
 bool_t __read_mostly iommu_enabled;
 bool_t __read_mostly force_iommu;
+bool __read_mostly iommu_quarantine = true;
 bool_t __hwdom_initdata iommu_dom0_strict;
 bool_t __read_mostly iommu_verbose;
 bool_t __read_mostly iommu_workaround_bios_bug;
@@ -99,6 +100,8 @@ static int __init parse_iommu_param(const char *s)
         else if ( !cmdline_strcmp(s, "force") ||
                   !cmdline_strcmp(s, "required") )
             force_iommu = val;
+        else if ( !cmdline_strcmp(s, "quarantine") )
+            iommu_quarantine = val;
         else if ( !cmdline_strcmp(s, "workaround_bios_bug") )
             iommu_workaround_bios_bug = val;
         else if ( !cmdline_strcmp(s, "igfx") )
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
index b7b8aea9a3..482ee1633e 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -1511,7 +1511,8 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 
devfn)
         return -ENODEV;
 
     /* De-assignment from dom_io should de-quarantine the device */
-    target = (pdev->quarantine && pdev->domain != dom_io) ?
+    target = ((pdev->quarantine || iommu_quarantine) &&
+              pdev->domain != dom_io) ?
         dom_io : hardware_domain;
 
     while ( pdev->phantom_stride )
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/iommu.h b/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
index 33c8b221dc..235d2a620b 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #include <asm/iommu.h>
 
 extern bool_t iommu_enable, iommu_enabled;
-extern bool_t force_iommu, iommu_verbose;
+extern bool force_iommu, iommu_quarantine, iommu_verbose;
 extern bool_t iommu_workaround_bios_bug, iommu_igfx, iommu_passthrough;
 extern bool_t iommu_snoop, iommu_qinval, iommu_intremap, iommu_intpost;
 extern bool_t iommu_hap_pt_share;
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.11

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