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[Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86/svm: Always intercept ICEBP



commit e2585f8c2e0d43d350503ff2b2be252adc6b7239
Author:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Mon Nov 25 19:33:36 2019 +0000
Commit:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Thu Nov 28 17:14:38 2019 +0000

    x86/svm: Always intercept ICEBP
    
    ICEBP isn't handled well by SVM.
    
    The VMexit state for a #DB-vectored TASK_SWITCH has %rip pointing to the
    appropriate instruction boundary (fault or trap, as appropriate), except for
    an ICEBP-induced #DB TASK_SWITCH, where %rip points at the ICEBP instruction
    rather than after it.  As ICEBP isn't distinguished in the vectoring event
    type, the state is ambiguous.
    
    To add to the confusion, an ICEBP which occurs due to Introspection
    intercepting the instruction, or from x86_emulate() will have %rip updated 
as
    a consequence of partial emulation required to inject an ICEBP event in the
    first place.
    
    We could in principle spot the non-injected case in the TASK_SWITCH handler,
    but this still results in complexity if the ICEBP instruction also has an
    Instruction Breakpoint active on it (which genuinely has fault semantics).
    
    Unconditionally intercept ICEBP.  This does have NRIPs support as it is an
    instruction intercept, which allows us to move %rip forwards appropriately
    before the TASK_SWITCH intercept is hit.  This makes #DB-vectored switches
    have consistent behaviour however the ICEBP #DB came about, and avoids 
special
    cases in the TASK_SWITCH intercept.
    
    This in turn allows for the removal of the conditional
    hvm_set_icebp_interception() logic used by the monitor subsystem, as ICEBP's
    will now always be submitted for monitoring checks.
    
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c    | 19 -------------------
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c   |  2 +-
 xen/arch/x86/monitor.c        |  3 ---
 xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 11 -----------
 4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 34 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
index 049b800e20..a7a79fcef7 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -173,24 +173,6 @@ static void svm_enable_msr_interception(struct domain *d, 
uint32_t msr)
         svm_intercept_msr(v, msr, MSR_INTERCEPT_WRITE);
 }
 
-static void svm_set_icebp_interception(struct domain *d, bool enable)
-{
-    const struct vcpu *v;
-
-    for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
-    {
-        struct vmcb_struct *vmcb = v->arch.hvm.svm.vmcb;
-        uint32_t intercepts = vmcb_get_general2_intercepts(vmcb);
-
-        if ( enable )
-            intercepts |= GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_ICEBP;
-        else
-            intercepts &= ~GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_ICEBP;
-
-        vmcb_set_general2_intercepts(vmcb, intercepts);
-    }
-}
-
 static void svm_save_dr(struct vcpu *v)
 {
     struct vmcb_struct *vmcb = v->arch.hvm.svm.vmcb;
@@ -2474,7 +2456,6 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __initdata 
svm_function_table = {
     .msr_read_intercept   = svm_msr_read_intercept,
     .msr_write_intercept  = svm_msr_write_intercept,
     .enable_msr_interception = svm_enable_msr_interception,
-    .set_icebp_interception = svm_set_icebp_interception,
     .set_rdtsc_exiting    = svm_set_rdtsc_exiting,
     .set_descriptor_access_exiting = svm_set_descriptor_access_exiting,
     .get_insn_bytes       = svm_get_insn_bytes,
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c
index 71ee7102f7..1fef0da22c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int construct_vmcb(struct vcpu *v)
         GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_STGI        | GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_CLGI        |
         GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_SKINIT      | GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_MWAIT       |
         GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_WBINVD      | GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_MONITOR     |
-        GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_XSETBV;
+        GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_XSETBV      | GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_ICEBP;
 
     /* Intercept all debug-register writes. */
     vmcb->_dr_intercepts = ~0u;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
index 3c42e21906..bbcb7536c7 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
@@ -301,9 +301,6 @@ int arch_monitor_domctl_event(struct domain *d,
         ad->monitor.debug_exception_sync = requested_status ?
                                             mop->u.debug_exception.sync :
                                             0;
-
-        hvm_set_icebp_interception(d, requested_status);
-
         domain_unpause(d);
         break;
     }
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
index 4cce59bb31..17fb7efa6e 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -206,7 +206,6 @@ struct hvm_function_table {
                                 bool_t access_w, bool_t access_x);
 
     void (*enable_msr_interception)(struct domain *d, uint32_t msr);
-    void (*set_icebp_interception)(struct domain *d, bool enable);
     bool_t (*is_singlestep_supported)(void);
 
     /* Alternate p2m */
@@ -615,16 +614,6 @@ static inline bool_t hvm_enable_msr_interception(struct 
domain *d, uint32_t msr)
     return 0;
 }
 
-static inline bool hvm_set_icebp_interception(struct domain *d, bool enable)
-{
-    if ( hvm_funcs.set_icebp_interception )
-    {
-        hvm_funcs.set_icebp_interception(d, enable);
-        return true;
-    }
-    return false;
-}
-
 static inline bool_t hvm_is_singlestep_supported(void)
 {
     return (hvm_funcs.is_singlestep_supported &&
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master

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