[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86/p2m: fix PoD accounting in guest_physmap_add_entry()



commit aea270e3f7c0db696c88a0e94b1ece7abd339c84
Author:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Fri Feb 21 17:09:28 2020 +0100
Commit:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri Feb 21 17:14:38 2020 +0100

    x86/p2m: fix PoD accounting in guest_physmap_add_entry()
    
    The initial observation was that the mfn_valid() check comes too late:
    Neither mfn_add() nor mfn_to_page() (let alone de-referencing the
    result of the latter) are valid for MFNs failing this check. Move it up
    and - noticing that there's no caller doing so - also add an assertion
    that this should never produce "false" here.
    
    In turn this would have meant that the "else" to that if() could now go
    away, which didn't seem right at all. And indeed, considering callers
    like memory_exchange() or various grant table functions, the PoD
    accounting should have been outside of that if() from the very
    beginning.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 32 ++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index 263e6b4db8..3457877bfe 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -876,6 +876,12 @@ guest_physmap_add_entry(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, mfn_t 
mfn,
     if ( p2m_is_foreign(t) )
         return -EINVAL;
 
+    if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) )
+    {
+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        return -EINVAL;
+    }
+
     p2m_lock(p2m);
 
     P2M_DEBUG("adding gfn=%#lx mfn=%#lx\n", gfn_x(gfn), mfn_x(mfn));
@@ -976,12 +982,13 @@ guest_physmap_add_entry(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, 
mfn_t mfn,
     }
 
     /* Now, actually do the two-way mapping */
-    if ( mfn_valid(mfn) )
+    rc = p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn, page_order, t, p2m->default_access);
+    if ( rc == 0 )
     {
-        rc = p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn, page_order, t,
-                           p2m->default_access);
-        if ( rc )
-            goto out; /* Failed to update p2m, bail without updating m2p. */
+        pod_lock(p2m);
+        p2m->pod.entry_count -= pod_count;
+        BUG_ON(p2m->pod.entry_count < 0);
+        pod_unlock(p2m);
 
         if ( !p2m_is_grant(t) )
         {
@@ -990,22 +997,7 @@ guest_physmap_add_entry(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, mfn_t 
mfn,
                                   gfn_x(gfn_add(gfn, i)));
         }
     }
-    else
-    {
-        gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Adding bad mfn to p2m map (%#lx -> %#lx)\n",
-                 gfn_x(gfn), mfn_x(mfn));
-        rc = p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, INVALID_MFN, page_order,
-                           p2m_invalid, p2m->default_access);
-        if ( rc == 0 )
-        {
-            pod_lock(p2m);
-            p2m->pod.entry_count -= pod_count;
-            BUG_ON(p2m->pod.entry_count < 0);
-            pod_unlock(p2m);
-        }
-    }
 
-out:
     p2m_unlock(p2m);
 
     return rc;
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master

_______________________________________________
Xen-changelog mailing list
Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog

 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.