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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen master] x86: clear RDRAND CPUID bit on AMD family 15h/16h
commit 93401e28a84b9dc5945f5d0bf5bce68e9d5ee121
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Wed May 27 09:49:37 2020 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Wed May 27 09:49:37 2020 +0200
x86: clear RDRAND CPUID bit on AMD family 15h/16h
Inspired by Linux commit c49a0a80137c7ca7d6ced4c812c9e07a949f6f24:
There have been reports of RDRAND issues after resuming from suspend on
some AMD family 15h and family 16h systems. This issue stems from a BIOS
not performing the proper steps during resume to ensure RDRAND continues
to function properly.
Update the CPU initialization to clear the RDRAND CPUID bit for any
family
15h and 16h processor that supports RDRAND. If it is known that the
family
15h or family 16h system does not have an RDRAND resume issue or that
the
system will not be placed in suspend, the "cpuid=rdrand" kernel
parameter
can be used to stop the clearing of the RDRAND CPUID bit.
Note, that clearing the RDRAND CPUID bit does not prevent a processor
that normally supports the RDRAND instruction from executing it. So any
code that determined the support based on family and model won't #UD.
Warn if no explicit choice was given on affected hardware.
Check RDRAND functions at boot as well as after S3 resume (the retry
limit chosen is entirely arbitrary).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc | 4 ++++
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 3 +++
xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h | 1 +
5 files changed, 56 insertions(+)
diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
index ee12b0f53f..e16bb90184 100644
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
@@ -488,6 +488,10 @@ The Speculation Control hardware features `md-clear`,
`ibrsb`, `stibp`, `ibpb`,
be ignored, e.g. `no-ibrsb`, at which point Xen won't use them itself, and
won't offer them to guests.
+`rdrand` can be used to override the default disabling of the feature on
certain
+AMD systems. Its negative form can of course also be used to suppress use and
+exposure of the feature.
+
### cpuid_mask_cpu
> `= fam_0f_rev_[cdefg] | fam_10_rev_[bc] | fam_11_rev_b`
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
index 05cbcbad73..0cc6853c42 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include <xen/param.h>
#include <xen/smp.h>
#include <xen/pci.h>
+#include <xen/warning.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -747,6 +748,26 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (acpi_smi_cmd && (acpi_enable_value | acpi_disable_value))
amd_acpi_c1e_quirk = true;
break;
+
+ case 0x15: case 0x16:
+ /*
+ * There are some Fam15/Fam16 systems where upon resume from S3
+ * firmware fails to re-setup properly functioning RDRAND.
+ * By the time we can spot the problem, it is too late to take
+ * action, and there is nothing Xen can do to repair the
problem.
+ * Clear the feature unless force-enabled on the command line.
+ */
+ if (c == &boot_cpu_data &&
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) &&
+ !is_forced_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
+ static const char __initconst text[] =
+ "RDRAND may cease to work on this hardware upon
resume from S3.\n"
+ "Please choose an explicit cpuid={no-}rdrand
setting.\n";
+
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
+ warning_add(text);
+ }
+ break;
}
display_cacheinfo(c);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
index 3e0d9cbe98..c413188d00 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/mpspec.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/random.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <mach_apic.h>
#include <public/sysctl.h> /* for XEN_INVALID_{SOCKET,CORE}_ID */
@@ -98,6 +99,11 @@ void __init setup_force_cpu_cap(unsigned int cap)
__set_bit(cap, boot_cpu_data.x86_capability);
}
+bool __init is_forced_cpu_cap(unsigned int cap)
+{
+ return test_bit(cap, forced_caps);
+}
+
static void default_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)
{
/* Not much we can do here... */
@@ -497,6 +503,27 @@ void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
printk("\n");
#endif
+ /*
+ * If RDRAND is available, make an attempt to check that it actually
+ * (still) works.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
+ unsigned int prev = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i)
+ {
+ unsigned int cur = arch_get_random();
+
+ if (prev && cur != prev)
+ break;
+ prev = cur;
+ }
+
+ if (i >= 5)
+ printk(XENLOG_WARNING "CPU%u: RDRAND appears to not
work\n",
+ smp_processor_id());
+ }
+
if (system_state == SYS_STATE_resume)
return;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
index 4b734284a4..ee11087626 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ static int __init parse_xen_cpuid(const char *s)
{
if ( !val )
setup_clear_cpu_cap(mid->bit);
+ else if ( mid->bit == X86_FEATURE_RDRAND &&
+ (cpuid_ecx(1) & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) )
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
mid = NULL;
}
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
index 8f6f5a97dd..070691882b 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ extern const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct
x86_cpu_id table[]);
extern void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *);
extern void setup_clear_cpu_cap(unsigned int);
extern void setup_force_cpu_cap(unsigned int);
+extern bool is_forced_cpu_cap(unsigned int);
extern void print_cpu_info(unsigned int cpu);
extern void init_intel_cacheinfo(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master
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