[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging] VT-x: simplify/clarify vmx_load_pdptrs()
commit 1969576661f3e34318e9b0a61a1a38f9a5aee16f Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Tue Jul 14 10:00:45 2020 +0200 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Tue Jul 14 10:00:45 2020 +0200 VT-x: simplify/clarify vmx_load_pdptrs() * Guests outside of long mode can't have PCID enabled. Drop the respective check to make more obvious that there's no security issue (from potentially accessing past the mapped page's boundary). * Only bits 5...31 of CR3 are relevant in 32-bit PAE mode; all others are ignored. The high 32 ones may in particular have remained unchanged after leaving long mode. * Drop the unnecessary and badly typed local variable p. * Don't open-code hvm_long_mode_active() (and extend this to the related nested VT-x code). * Constify guest_pdptes to clarify that we're only reading from the page. * Drop the "crash" label now that there's only a single path leading there. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 24 ++++++++---------------- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c index cc6d4ece22..eb54aadfba 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1312,19 +1312,15 @@ static void vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int intr_shadow) static void vmx_load_pdptrs(struct vcpu *v) { - unsigned long cr3 = v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[3]; - uint64_t *guest_pdptes; + uint32_t cr3 = v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[3]; + const uint64_t *guest_pdptes; struct page_info *page; p2m_type_t p2mt; - char *p; /* EPT needs to load PDPTRS into VMCS for PAE. */ - if ( !hvm_pae_enabled(v) || (v->arch.hvm.guest_efer & EFER_LMA) ) + if ( !hvm_pae_enabled(v) || hvm_long_mode_active(v) ) return; - if ( (cr3 & 0x1fUL) && !hvm_pcid_enabled(v) ) - goto crash; - page = get_page_from_gfn(v->domain, cr3 >> PAGE_SHIFT, &p2mt, P2M_ALLOC); if ( !page ) { @@ -1332,14 +1328,13 @@ static void vmx_load_pdptrs(struct vcpu *v) * queue, but this is the wrong place. We're holding at least * the paging lock */ gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, - "Bad cr3 on load pdptrs gfn %lx type %d\n", + "Bad cr3 on load pdptrs gfn %"PRIx32" type %d\n", cr3 >> PAGE_SHIFT, (int) p2mt); - goto crash; + domain_crash(v->domain); + return; } - p = __map_domain_page(page); - - guest_pdptes = (uint64_t *)(p + (cr3 & ~PAGE_MASK)); + guest_pdptes = __map_domain_page(page) + (cr3 & ~(PAGE_MASK | 0x1f)); /* * We do not check the PDPTRs for validity. The CPU will do this during @@ -1356,12 +1351,9 @@ static void vmx_load_pdptrs(struct vcpu *v) vmx_vmcs_exit(v); - unmap_domain_page(p); + unmap_domain_page(guest_pdptes); put_page(page); return; - - crash: - domain_crash(v->domain); } static void vmx_update_host_cr3(struct vcpu *v) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c index 7dfff6c445..1e51689ef3 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ static void virtual_vmentry(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) paging_update_paging_modes(v); if ( nvmx_ept_enabled(v) && hvm_pae_enabled(v) && - !(v->arch.hvm.guest_efer & EFER_LMA) ) + !hvm_long_mode_active(v) ) vvmcs_to_shadow_bulk(v, ARRAY_SIZE(gpdpte_fields), gpdpte_fields); regs->rip = get_vvmcs(v, GUEST_RIP); @@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ static void virtual_vmexit(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) sync_exception_state(v); if ( nvmx_ept_enabled(v) && hvm_pae_enabled(v) && - !(v->arch.hvm.guest_efer & EFER_LMA) ) + !hvm_long_mode_active(v) ) shadow_to_vvmcs_bulk(v, ARRAY_SIZE(gpdpte_fields), gpdpte_fields); /* This will clear current pCPU bit in p2m->dirty_cpumask */ -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging
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