[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging-4.13] x86/intel: Expose MSR_ARCH_CAPS to dom0
commit b9083432f1d40ff1b7b8b9a849a8ec54c4b23c88 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Fri Sep 11 14:51:08 2020 +0200 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Fri Sep 11 14:51:08 2020 +0200 x86/intel: Expose MSR_ARCH_CAPS to dom0 The overhead of (the lack of) MDS_NO alone has been measured at 30% on some workloads. While we're not in a position yet to offer MSR_ARCH_CAPS generally to guests, dom0 doesn't migrate, so we can pass a subset of hardware values straight through. This will cause PVH dom0's not to use KPTI by default, and all dom0's not to use VERW flushing by default, and to use eIBRS in preference to retpoline on recent Intel CPUs. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: e46474278a0e87e2b32ad5dd5fc20e8d2cb0688b master date: 2020-08-31 13:43:26 +0100 --- xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 8 ++++++++ xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c index a887f38d7f..27132f91a6 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c @@ -627,6 +627,14 @@ int init_domain_cpuid_policy(struct domain *d) recalculate_cpuid_policy(d); + /* + * Expose the "hardware speculation behaviour" bits of ARCH_CAPS to dom0, + * so dom0 can turn off workarounds as appropriate. Temporary, until the + * domain policy logic gains a better understanding of MSRs. + */ + if ( is_hardware_domain(d) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS) ) + p->feat.arch_caps = true; + return 0; } diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c index 9caa387eda..875ac39d30 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c @@ -96,6 +96,22 @@ int init_domain_msr_policy(struct domain *d) if ( !opt_dom0_cpuid_faulting && is_control_domain(d) && is_pv_domain(d) ) mp->platform_info.cpuid_faulting = false; + /* + * Expose the "hardware speculation behaviour" bits of ARCH_CAPS to dom0, + * so dom0 can turn off workarounds as appropriate. Temporary, until the + * domain policy logic gains a better understanding of MSRs. + */ + if ( is_hardware_domain(d) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS) ) + { + uint64_t val; + + rdmsrl(MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, val); + + mp->arch_caps.raw = val & + (ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL | ARCH_CAPS_RSBA | + ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO); + } + d->arch.msr = mp; return 0; -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.13
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