[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging-4.12] libx86: introduce a helper to deserialise msr_policy objects
commit c481b9f32da5af232edaf0feff0bf213fa23e0ba Author: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Fri Sep 11 14:56:34 2020 +0200 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Fri Sep 11 14:56:34 2020 +0200 libx86: introduce a helper to deserialise msr_policy objects As with the serialise side, Xen's copy_from_guest API is used, with a compatibility wrapper for the userspace build. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: afec08b92ffe8b85d2bf2e8c7c221b63ba96743e master date: 2019-03-12 14:12:23 +0000 --- xen/include/xen/lib/x86/msr.h | 21 ++++++++++++++ xen/lib/x86/msr.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/lib/x86/private.h | 14 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+) diff --git a/xen/include/xen/lib/x86/msr.h b/xen/include/xen/lib/x86/msr.h index e2cfbb1a8d..6236622adf 100644 --- a/xen/include/xen/lib/x86/msr.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/lib/x86/msr.h @@ -48,6 +48,27 @@ typedef xen_msr_entry_t msr_entry_buffer_t[]; int x86_msr_copy_to_buffer(const struct msr_policy *policy, msr_entry_buffer_t msrs, uint32_t *nr_entries); +/** + * Unserialise an msr_policy object from an array of msrs. + * + * @param policy The msr_policy object to unserialise into. + * @param msrs The array of msrs to unserialise from. + * @param nr_entries The number of entries in 'msrs'. + * @param err_msr Optional hint filled on error. + * @returns -errno + * + * Reads at most MSR_MAX_SERIALISED_ENTRIES. May fail for a number of reasons + * based on the content in an individual 'msrs' entry, including the MSR index + * not being valid in the policy, the flags field being nonzero, or if the + * value provided would truncate when stored in the policy. In such cases, + * the optional err_* pointer is filled in to aid diagnostics. + * + * No content validation is performed on the data stored in the policy object. + */ +int x86_msr_copy_from_buffer(struct msr_policy *policy, + const msr_entry_buffer_t msrs, uint32_t nr_entries, + uint32_t *err_msr); + #endif /* !XEN_LIB_X86_MSR_H */ /* diff --git a/xen/lib/x86/msr.c b/xen/lib/x86/msr.c index 60fb567687..7c92f0dd9e 100644 --- a/xen/lib/x86/msr.c +++ b/xen/lib/x86/msr.c @@ -47,6 +47,73 @@ int x86_msr_copy_to_buffer(const struct msr_policy *p, return 0; } +int x86_msr_copy_from_buffer(struct msr_policy *p, + const msr_entry_buffer_t msrs, uint32_t nr_entries, + uint32_t *err_msr) +{ + unsigned int i; + xen_msr_entry_t data; + int rc; + + /* + * A well formed caller is expected to pass an array with entries in + * order, and without any repetitions. However, due to per-vendor + * differences, and in the case of upgrade or levelled scenarios, we + * typically expect fewer than MAX entries to be passed. + * + * Detecting repeated entries is prohibitively complicated, so we don't + * bother. That said, one way or another if more than MAX entries are + * passed, something is wrong. + */ + if ( nr_entries > MSR_MAX_SERIALISED_ENTRIES ) + return -E2BIG; + + for ( i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++ ) + { + if ( copy_from_buffer_offset(&data, msrs, i, 1) ) + return -EFAULT; + + if ( data.flags ) /* .flags MBZ */ + { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } + + switch ( data.idx ) + { + /* + * Assign data.val to p->field, checking for truncation if the + * backing storage for field is smaller than uint64_t + */ +#define ASSIGN(field) \ +({ \ + if ( (typeof(p->field))data.val != data.val ) \ + { \ + rc = -EOVERFLOW; \ + goto err; \ + } \ + p->field = data.val; \ +}) + + case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO: ASSIGN(plaform_info.raw); break; + +#undef ASSIGN + + default: + rc = -ERANGE; + goto err; + } + } + + return 0; + + err: + if ( err_msr ) + *err_msr = data.idx; + + return rc; +} + /* * Local variables: * mode: C diff --git a/xen/lib/x86/private.h b/xen/lib/x86/private.h index 3ee99aad62..e0ff2dae23 100644 --- a/xen/lib/x86/private.h +++ b/xen/lib/x86/private.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <asm/msr-index.h> #define copy_to_buffer_offset copy_to_guest_offset +#define copy_from_buffer_offset copy_from_guest_offset #else @@ -44,6 +45,19 @@ static inline bool test_bit(unsigned int bit, const void *vaddr) 0; \ }) +/* memcpy(), but with copy_from_guest_offset()'s API. */ +#define copy_from_buffer_offset(dst, src, index, nr) \ +({ \ + const typeof(*(src)) *src_ = (src); \ + typeof(*(dst)) *dst_ = (dst); \ + typeof(index) index_ = (index); \ + typeof(nr) nr_ = (nr), i_; \ + \ + for ( i_ = 0; i_ < nr_; i_++ ) \ + dst_[i_] = src_[index_ + i_]; \ + 0; \ +}) + #endif /* __XEN__ */ #endif /* XEN_LIB_X86_PRIVATE_H */ -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.12
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |