|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging] x86/hvm: Drop restore boolean from hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits()
commit 345fd6d01e6730ea9024ae3b98e1832c35b34a28
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Sep 29 16:51:07 2020 +0100
Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Oct 6 12:28:37 2020 +0100
x86/hvm: Drop restore boolean from hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits()
Previously, migration was reordered so the CPUID data was available before
register state. nestedhvm_enabled() has recently been made accurate for the
entire lifetime of the domain.
Therefore, we can drop the bodge in hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits() which existed
previously to tolerate a guests' CR4 being set/restored before
HVM_PARAM_NESTEDHVM.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 8 ++++----
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c | 6 ++++--
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 2 +-
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 2 +-
6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c
index 8e3375265c..0ce132b308 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ int arch_set_info_hvm_guest(struct vcpu *v, const
vcpu_hvm_context_t *ctx)
if ( v->arch.hvm.guest_efer & EFER_LME )
v->arch.hvm.guest_efer |= EFER_LMA;
- if ( v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[4] & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(d, false) )
+ if ( v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[4] & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(d) )
{
gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Bad CR4 value: %#016lx\n",
v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[4]);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 101a739952..54e32e4fe8 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -972,14 +972,14 @@ const char *hvm_efer_valid(const struct vcpu *v, uint64_t
value,
X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_PG)))
/* These bits in CR4 can be set by the guest. */
-unsigned long hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(const struct domain *d, bool restore)
+unsigned long hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(const struct domain *d)
{
const struct cpuid_policy *p = d->arch.cpuid;
bool mce, vmxe;
/* Logic broken out simply to aid readability below. */
mce = p->basic.mce || p->basic.mca;
- vmxe = p->basic.vmx && (restore || nestedhvm_enabled(d));
+ vmxe = p->basic.vmx && nestedhvm_enabled(d);
return ((p->basic.vme ? X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PVI : 0) |
(p->basic.tsc ? X86_CR4_TSD : 0) |
@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d,
hvm_domain_context_t *h)
return -EINVAL;
}
- if ( ctxt.cr4 & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(d, true) )
+ if ( ctxt.cr4 & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(d) )
{
printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "HVM%d restore: bad CR4 %#" PRIx64 "\n",
d->domain_id, ctxt.cr4);
@@ -2425,7 +2425,7 @@ int hvm_set_cr4(unsigned long value, bool may_defer)
struct vcpu *v = current;
unsigned long old_cr;
- if ( value & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(v->domain, false) )
+ if ( value & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(v->domain) )
{
HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_1,
"Guest attempts to set reserved bit in CR4: %lx",
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c
index ba26b6a80b..f450391df4 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ bool svm_vmcb_isvalid(const char *from, const struct
vmcb_struct *vmcb,
unsigned long cr0 = vmcb_get_cr0(vmcb);
unsigned long cr3 = vmcb_get_cr3(vmcb);
unsigned long cr4 = vmcb_get_cr4(vmcb);
+ unsigned long valid;
uint64_t efer = vmcb_get_efer(vmcb);
#define PRINTF(fmt, args...) do { \
@@ -130,9 +131,10 @@ bool svm_vmcb_isvalid(const char *from, const struct
vmcb_struct *vmcb,
(cr3 >> v->domain->arch.cpuid->extd.maxphysaddr))) )
PRINTF("CR3: MBZ bits are set (%#"PRIx64")\n", cr3);
- if ( cr4 & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(v->domain, false) )
+ valid = hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(v->domain);
+ if ( cr4 & ~valid )
PRINTF("CR4: invalid bits are set (%#"PRIx64", valid: %#"PRIx64")\n",
- cr4, hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(v->domain, false));
+ cr4, valid);
if ( vmcb_get_dr6(vmcb) >> 32 )
PRINTF("DR6: bits [63:32] are not zero (%#"PRIx64")\n",
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 95d109f962..86b8916a5d 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1529,7 +1529,7 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned
int cr,
*/
v->arch.hvm.vmx.cr4_host_mask =
(HVM_CR4_HOST_MASK | X86_CR4_PKE |
- ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(v->domain, false));
+ ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(v->domain));
v->arch.hvm.vmx.cr4_host_mask |= v->arch.hvm.vmx.vmx_realmode ?
X86_CR4_VME : 0;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
index 1e51689ef3..3a37e9ebea 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
@@ -2323,7 +2323,7 @@ int nvmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, u64
*msr_content)
data = X86_CR4_VMXE;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1:
- data = hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(d, false);
+ data = hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(d);
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC:
/* Do not support CR3-target feature now */
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
index be0d8b0a4d..334bd573b9 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ int hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long
gla,
/* Check CR4/EFER values */
const char *hvm_efer_valid(const struct vcpu *v, uint64_t value,
signed int cr0_pg);
-unsigned long hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(const struct domain *d, bool restore);
+unsigned long hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(const struct domain *d);
int hvm_copy_context_and_params(struct domain *src, struct domain *dst);
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging
|
 |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |