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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging-4.10] x86/mm: Prevent some races in hypervisor mapping updates
commit 75a05daf1ddfc0057bd9eeedfd1d872bb47faeda
Author: Hongyan Xia <hongyxia@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Oct 20 15:20:10 2020 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Oct 20 15:20:10 2020 +0200
x86/mm: Prevent some races in hypervisor mapping updates
map_pages_to_xen will attempt to coalesce mappings into 2MiB and 1GiB
superpages if possible, to maximize TLB efficiency. This means both
replacing superpage entries with smaller entries, and replacing
smaller entries with superpages.
Unfortunately, while some potential races are handled correctly,
others are not. These include:
1. When one processor modifies a sub-superpage mapping while another
processor replaces the entire range with a superpage.
Take the following example:
Suppose L3[N] points to L2. And suppose we have two processors, A and
B.
* A walks the pagetables, get a pointer to L2.
* B replaces L3[N] with a 1GiB mapping.
* B Frees L2
* A writes L2[M] #
This is race exacerbated by the fact that virt_to_xen_l[21]e doesn't
handle higher-level superpages properly: If you call virt_xen_to_l2e
on a virtual address within an L3 superpage, you'll either hit a BUG()
(most likely), or get a pointer into the middle of a data page; same
with virt_xen_to_l1 on a virtual address within either an L3 or L2
superpage.
So take the following example:
* A reads pl3e and discovers it to point to an L2.
* B replaces L3[N] with a 1GiB mapping
* A calls virt_to_xen_l2e() and hits the BUG_ON() #
2. When two processors simultaneously try to replace a sub-superpage
mapping with a superpage mapping.
Take the following example:
Suppose L3[N] points to L2. And suppose we have two processors, A and B,
both trying to replace L3[N] with a superpage.
* A walks the pagetables, get a pointer to pl3e, and takes a copy ol3e
pointing to L2.
* B walks the pagetables, gets a pointre to pl3e, and takes a copy ol3e
pointing to L2.
* A writes the new value into L3[N]
* B writes the new value into L3[N]
* A recursively frees all the L1's under L2, then frees L2
* B recursively double-frees all the L1's under L2, then double-frees L2 #
Fix this by grabbing a lock for the entirety of the mapping update
operation.
Rather than grabbing map_pgdir_lock for the entire operation, however,
repurpose the PGT_locked bit from L3's page->type_info as a lock.
This means that rather than locking the entire address space, we
"only" lock a single 512GiB chunk of hypervisor address space at a
time.
There was a proposal for a lock-and-reverify approach, where we walk
the pagetables to the point where we decide what to do; then grab the
map_pgdir_lock, re-verify the information we collected without the
lock, and finally make the change (starting over again if anything had
changed). Without being able to guarantee that the L2 table wasn't
freed, however, that means every read would need to be considered
potentially unsafe. Thinking carefully about that is probably
something that wants to be done on public, not under time pressure.
This is part of XSA-345.
Reported-by: Hongyan Xia <hongyxia@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Hongyan Xia <hongyxia@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
master commit: 1ce75e99d75907aaffae05fcf658a833802bce49
master date: 2020-10-20 14:20:19 +0200
---
xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 89 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
index e644685cab..faa7df30c1 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -2132,6 +2132,50 @@ void page_unlock(struct page_info *page)
} while ( (y = cmpxchg(&page->u.inuse.type_info, x, nx)) != x );
}
+/*
+ * L3 table locks:
+ *
+ * Used for serialization in map_pages_to_xen() and modify_xen_mappings().
+ *
+ * For Xen PT pages, the page->u.inuse.type_info is unused and it is safe to
+ * reuse the PGT_locked flag. This lock is taken only when we move down to L3
+ * tables and below, since L4 (and above, for 5-level paging) is still globally
+ * protected by map_pgdir_lock.
+ *
+ * PV MMU update hypercalls call map_pages_to_xen while holding a page's
page_lock().
+ * This has two implications:
+ * - We cannot reuse reuse current_locked_page_* for debugging
+ * - To avoid the chance of deadlock, even for different pages, we
+ * must never grab page_lock() after grabbing l3t_lock(). This
+ * includes any page_lock()-based locks, such as
+ * mem_sharing_page_lock().
+ *
+ * Also note that we grab the map_pgdir_lock while holding the
+ * l3t_lock(), so to avoid deadlock we must avoid grabbing them in
+ * reverse order.
+ */
+static void l3t_lock(struct page_info *page)
+{
+ unsigned long x, nx;
+
+ do {
+ while ( (x = page->u.inuse.type_info) & PGT_locked )
+ cpu_relax();
+ nx = x | PGT_locked;
+ } while ( cmpxchg(&page->u.inuse.type_info, x, nx) != x );
+}
+
+static void l3t_unlock(struct page_info *page)
+{
+ unsigned long x, nx, y = page->u.inuse.type_info;
+
+ do {
+ x = y;
+ BUG_ON(!(x & PGT_locked));
+ nx = x & ~PGT_locked;
+ } while ( (y = cmpxchg(&page->u.inuse.type_info, x, nx)) != x );
+}
+
/*
* PTE flags that a guest may change without re-validating the PTE.
* All other bits affect translation, caching, or Xen's safety.
@@ -5102,6 +5146,23 @@ l1_pgentry_t *virt_to_xen_l1e(unsigned long v)
flush_area_local((const void *)v, f) : \
flush_area_all((const void *)v, f))
+#define L3T_INIT(page) (page) = ZERO_BLOCK_PTR
+
+#define L3T_LOCK(page) \
+ do { \
+ if ( locking ) \
+ l3t_lock(page); \
+ } while ( false )
+
+#define L3T_UNLOCK(page) \
+ do { \
+ if ( locking && (page) != ZERO_BLOCK_PTR ) \
+ { \
+ l3t_unlock(page); \
+ (page) = ZERO_BLOCK_PTR; \
+ } \
+ } while ( false )
+
int map_pages_to_xen(
unsigned long virt,
unsigned long mfn,
@@ -5113,6 +5174,7 @@ int map_pages_to_xen(
l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, ol1e;
unsigned int i;
int rc = -ENOMEM;
+ struct page_info *current_l3page;
#define flush_flags(oldf) do { \
unsigned int o_ = (oldf); \
@@ -5128,13 +5190,20 @@ int map_pages_to_xen(
} \
} while (0)
+ L3T_INIT(current_l3page);
+
while ( nr_mfns != 0 )
{
- l3_pgentry_t ol3e, *pl3e = virt_to_xen_l3e(virt);
+ l3_pgentry_t *pl3e, ol3e;
+ L3T_UNLOCK(current_l3page);
+
+ pl3e = virt_to_xen_l3e(virt);
if ( !pl3e )
goto out;
+ current_l3page = virt_to_page(pl3e);
+ L3T_LOCK(current_l3page);
ol3e = *pl3e;
if ( cpu_has_page1gb &&
@@ -5463,6 +5532,7 @@ int map_pages_to_xen(
rc = 0;
out:
+ L3T_UNLOCK(current_l3page);
return rc;
}
@@ -5492,6 +5562,7 @@ int modify_xen_mappings(unsigned long s, unsigned long e,
unsigned int nf)
unsigned int i;
unsigned long v = s;
int rc = -ENOMEM;
+ struct page_info *current_l3page;
/* Set of valid PTE bits which may be altered. */
#define FLAGS_MASK (_PAGE_NX|_PAGE_RW|_PAGE_PRESENT)
@@ -5500,11 +5571,22 @@ int modify_xen_mappings(unsigned long s, unsigned long
e, unsigned int nf)
ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(s, PAGE_SIZE));
ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(e, PAGE_SIZE));
+ L3T_INIT(current_l3page);
+
while ( v < e )
{
- l3_pgentry_t *pl3e = virt_to_xen_l3e(v);
+ l3_pgentry_t *pl3e;
+
+ L3T_UNLOCK(current_l3page);
- if ( !pl3e || !(l3e_get_flags(*pl3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
+ pl3e = virt_to_xen_l3e(v);
+ if ( !pl3e )
+ goto out;
+
+ current_l3page = virt_to_page(pl3e);
+ L3T_LOCK(current_l3page);
+
+ if ( !(l3e_get_flags(*pl3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
{
/* Confirm the caller isn't trying to create new mappings. */
ASSERT(!(nf & _PAGE_PRESENT));
@@ -5722,9 +5804,13 @@ int modify_xen_mappings(unsigned long s, unsigned long
e, unsigned int nf)
rc = 0;
out:
+ L3T_UNLOCK(current_l3page);
return rc;
}
+#undef L3T_LOCK
+#undef L3T_UNLOCK
+
#undef flush_area
int destroy_xen_mappings(unsigned long s, unsigned long e)
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.10
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